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2017.01.16 塞浦路斯会统一吗?

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The Economist explains
Will Cyprus be reunified?
Talks between Greece, Turkey and Britain last week did not end in a deal. But there is cause for optimism

Jan 16th 2017



By T.N.

THE formal split of Cyprus dates to Turkey’s invasion of the island in 1974, which followed a Greece-inspired coup aimed at enosis (union with Greece). Since then Cyprus has been divided between the Greek-Cypriot republic in the south, a full member of the UN and the European Union; and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognised only by Turkey. Periodic attempts to reunify Cyprus have floundered, most recently in 2004 when the so-called Annan plan was backed by Turkish-Cypriot voters but rejected by three-quarters of the Greek-Cypriot majority. But since 2015 the leaders of the two communities have stepped up efforts to produce a fresh agreement they can sell to their voters. UN-brokered talks in Geneva broke up last week without a deal, but hopes remain high that the two sides will resolve their outstanding disagreements in time to hold dual referendums in the summer. Will Cyprus be reunified?

The constitutional model for a reunified state is a “bi-zonal, bi-communal federation”, based on deep decentralisation to the two communities and power-sharing arrangements at the centre. The recent talks have covered several contentious elements, including governance arrangements, territorial adjustments and compensation for Greek Cypriots who fled the north in 1974. There are also thorny economic issues to settle. But the trickiest matter is security. Under the republic’s 1960 constitution, Britain, Greece and Turkey have the right to military intervention in Cyprus should its integrity be threatened (this was the pretext for the Turkish invasion). The Greek Cypriots want to scrap these provisions, arguing that security is guaranteed by EU membership (Cyprus joined in 2004, although the EU’s writ extends only to the south). But the Turkish-Cypriot minority, harbouring bitter memories of intercommunal fighting that racked the island in the 1960s and ’70s, is wary of giving up protection from Turkish troops, some 30,000-40,000 of whom are stationed in the north. The three guarantor powers, which have been involved in the latest round of talks, must approve any security arrangements. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s mercurial president, may be a stumbling block. He needs the support of Turkish nationalists in parliament for a set of proposed domestic constitutional changes, and they may balk at concessions on Cyprus.

Veteran Cyprus-watchers, who have often seen their hopes dashed, are cautious. Even if a compromise can be found on security, perhaps involving a “sunset clause” for Turkish troops, the biggest hurdle lies ahead: a majority of voters in both communities on the island must back any deal. Mindful of the failure of the Annan plan, which was largely imposed on Cyprus from without, Nicos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akinci, the respective leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, have driven the process themselves. They will not sign any agreement they believe voters will reject. This is perhaps the best reason for optimism. But time is tight: Mr Anastasiades faces re-election in just over a year. And European governments have lately found it difficult to win referendums, as the prime ministers (and ex-prime ministers) of Denmark, the Netherlands, Britain and Italy can attest.

The first beneficiaries of reunification would be Cypriots themselves. But the gains would spread beyond the island. A deal would ease the troubled EU-Turkey relationship, open up energy potential in Cypriot waters, and—because Turkey would recognise the reunified state—ease co-operation between the EU and NATO. It would also be a welcome piece of good news for an EU buffeted by endless crises. But warnings that this may be the last chance for reunification are not idle: it is older Cypriots, who can directly recall the violence and rancour of the past, who are keenest on a deal. And there are fewer and fewer of them left.




统一国家的宪法模式是一个 "两区两族联邦",基于对两个社区的深度分权和中央的权力分享安排。最近的会谈涉及几个有争议的内容,包括治理安排、领土调整和对1974年逃离北方的希族塞人的赔偿。还有一些棘手的经济问题需要解决。但最棘手的问题是安全问题。根据共和国1960年的宪法,英国、希腊和土耳其有权在塞浦路斯的完整性受到威胁时对其进行军事干预(这是土耳其入侵的借口)。希族塞人想废除这些规定,认为安全由欧盟成员国保证(塞浦路斯于2004年加入,尽管欧盟的命令只延伸到南部)。但是,土族塞浦路斯少数民族对1960和70年代困扰该岛的族群间的战斗怀有痛苦的回忆,对放弃对土耳其军队的保护持谨慎态度,其中约有3万至4万人驻扎在北部。参与最新一轮谈判的三个保证国必须批准任何安全安排。土耳其总统雷杰普-塔伊普-埃尔多安(Recep Tayyip Erdogan)可能是一个绊脚石。他需要议会中的土耳其民族主义者支持一系列拟议的国内宪法改革,而他们可能会在塞浦路斯问题上做出让步。

经常看到自己的希望破灭的资深塞浦路斯观察家们都很谨慎。即使能在安全问题上找到妥协,也许涉及土耳其军队的 "日落条款",最大的障碍还在前面:岛上两个社区的大多数选民必须支持任何协议。考虑到安南计划的失败,该计划在很大程度上是从外部强加给塞浦路斯的,尼科斯-阿纳斯塔西亚迪斯和穆斯塔法-阿金奇,即希族和土族社区的各自领导人,已经自己推动了这个进程。他们不会签署任何他们认为选民会拒绝的协议。这也许是让人乐观的最好理由。但时间很紧迫。阿纳斯塔西亚迪斯先生在一年多后将面临连任。而欧洲政府最近发现很难赢得公投,丹麦、荷兰、英国和意大利的总理(和前总理)都可以证明这一点。

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