[2012.08.03]塞姆丁里之战

引用 林木木 2012-8-6 13:57

顶着锅盖来发文，欢迎板砖，顺便占个位~

引用 aubreychen 2012-8-6 15:45

threatening to intervene should the PKK use Syria as a launching pad for its operations
意思是 ：threatening to intervene if the PKK uses Syria as a launching pad for its operations

引用 rendezvous 2012-8-6 15:46

Sedat Tore, Semdinli’s mayor from the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) says the din of artillery and bombs "is terrorising our people".
萨姆丁里市市长Sedat Tore是和平与民主党(BDP) 成员，该党支持库尔德工人党。他说，呼啸而过的炮火和炸弹“吓坏了当地市民”

”吓坏了当地市民“  当地即指 萨姆丁里市 ，Sedat Tore 即是市长，后面说”吓坏了当地市民“就不是很合适，还是按原文的”吓坏了我们的市民（人民）“比较好

引用 lord_loro 2012-8-6 15:47

本帖最后由 lord_loro 于 2012-8-6 16:04 编辑

占座

这个贫困市的1.95万人口对库尔德工人党都抱有深切的同情
PKK在这个拥有1.95万人口的贫困市深受同情

该党在土耳其边境夺取了大量主要由库尔德人组成的叙利亚城镇。
沿土叙边境

引用 _易雪_ 2012-8-6 16:05

本帖最后由 _易雪_ 于 2012-8-6 16:44 编辑

@林木木 翻的好赞！！！

有几个小意见~ ^^

1. an impoverished town of 19,500 where sympathy for the PKK runs strong.
   这个贫困市的1.95万人口对库尔德工人党都抱有深切的同情。
  （直接说人口……对……同情，有点儿奇怪~）
  这个贫困市有1.95万人口，人们都非常同情库尔德工人党。

2. the din of artillery and bombs "is terrorising our people"
   呼啸而过的炮火和炸弹“吓坏了当地市民”，
  枪林弹雨，战火纷飞，我们的市民都被吓坏了

3. 库尔德工人党声称击毙49名政府士兵并且控制着萨姆丁里的周边区域。
  库尔德工人党声称击已经击毙了49名政府士兵并且控制着萨姆丁里的周边区域。

4. 而政府军则予以否认
  “而”和“则”去掉一个呗~ ^^

5. The shroud of mystery thickened
   由此这层神秘面纱变得更加迷雾重重
  (迷雾重重形容面纱感觉不太妥~)
   本来就神秘莫测，现在更加扑朔迷离。

6. 因为28年前正是在这一天
  因为正是28年前在这一天

7. and threatening to intervene should the PKK use Syria as a launching pad for its operations.
    还威胁说不会让库尔德工人党将叙利亚作为行动跳板的意图得逞。
  这是不是个虚拟倒转？If the PKK ...
    还威胁说，如果库尔德工人党将叙利亚作为行动跳板，他们一定会介入的。

8. 该草案可能有助库尔德实现夙愿
  措辞、观点？

9. 他们可以用长期被禁的母语教育后代
  能让他们用长期被禁的母语教育后代

10. improve the Kurds’ lot
     在提高库尔德人地位问题上
   lot: person's fortune, destiny or share (牛津高阶)
     改善命运？（感觉还是不太通。。。==）

11. Erdogan所付出的努力是前任所有首相所不能及的
   Erdogan付出的努力是所有前任首相都望尘莫及的

  

引用 aubreychen 2012-8-6 16:09

Amid all the chest-pounding there are some hopeful signs that Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development (AK) party has not abandoned reforms in favour of an all out (and long tested) "military solution" to the Kurdish problem. Even
在所有这些相互叫嚣之中，还是有些希望的信号的，执政党目前为止还没有放弃改革而全力以赴采用军事手段解决......

引用 林木木 2012-8-6 16:31

lord_loro 发表于 2012-8-6 15:47
占座

这个贫困市的1.95万人口对库尔德工人党都抱有深切的同情

欢迎loro大神~~

第一个似乎差别不太大?

第二个是我疏忽了，改的非常好~~

引用 林木木 2012-8-6 17:02

本帖最后由 林木木 于 2012-8-6 17:24 编辑

_易雪_ 发表于 2012-8-6 16:05
@林木木 翻的好赞！！！

有几个小意见~ ^^

谢谢易雪童鞋的长评~

1.已改
2.很好，已改~
3.加个“已”字怎么样？工人党声称已击毙49名政府士兵
4.去掉“而”
5.为使句子衔接恰当，已改成“于是本来就神秘莫测的情况现在更加扑朔迷离”
6.改为“因为正是28年前的这一天”
7.正解，已改
8.我翻译的时候也是这么想的，但是“ 这样的措辞可能有助库尔德实现夙愿”，因为无论是措辞还是观点都没有实际意义，所以我想这个是不是指的上文的草案，坐等大神
9.似乎差不多？
10.等大神~
11.望尘莫及，好~~↖(^ω^)↗

再次感谢~

引用 lord_loro 2012-8-6 17:18

Your lot is the kind of life you have or the things that you have or experience.--> Collins
境遇如何？

引用 childish 2012-8-6 17:24

为什么是爆料？

引用 yannanchen 2012-8-9 00:41

chest-thump·ing   /ˈtʃɛstˌθʌmpɪŋ/ Show Spelled[chest-thuhm-ping] Show IPA
noun
the act or practice of boasting

引用 yannanchen 2012-8-9 00:43

本帖最后由 yannanchen 于 2012-8-9 00:45 编辑

  Chest Pounder  
an individual who engages in the relentless act during a conversation of telling you how superior he or she is, either by direct or indirect means and regardless if you ask. Everything is about him/her. Figuratively pounding the chest, such as an alpha male gorilla.

引用 yannanchen 2012-8-9 01:32

The Constitution and the Kurdish Question
When asked, most Kurds express three broad sets of criticisms of the current constitution. First, it relies on Turkish ethnicity to define citizenship. Second, it prevents Kurds from expressing themselves in their own language and furthering their own culture and political interests, through impediments to education, speech, and/or broadcasting. Third, it preserves the state’s centralized character, which has a stultifying effect on local decision-making. While the first two of these criticisms are specific to the Kurdish issue, remedying the third—the over-centralization of the political and administrative system—would benefit all of Turkey’s citizens.

1. The State, Ethnicity, and Citizenship
The preamble to the current constitution sets the forth the ideological tone and spirit of the document. It is also where the first encounter with Turkish ethnic identity occurs. The first paragraph states:
In line with the concept of nationalism and the reforms and principles introduced by the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk, the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero, this Constitution, which affirms the eternal existence of the Turkish nation and motherland and the indivisible unity of the [noble] Turkish state, embodies:3
The document proceeds to affirm the existence of “Turkish historical and moral values” and the principle that sovereignty is “vested fully and unconditionally in the Turkish nation.” It concludes by stating, “it [the constitution] is entrusted by the Turkish nation to the patriotism and nationalism of its democracy-loving sons and daughters.”4

Despite the interspersed presence of references to Turkish citizenship and the notion of equality before the law, the document’s intent and message is unmistakable. Its references to “Atatürkist nationalism,” a “Turkish existence,” and the history of Turkishness, however, give it an exclusive ethnic spirit. It presupposes that there is only one form of nationalist feeling and only one ideology to which all citizens must adhere. The preamble in essence assumes the existence of only one ethnic and cultural identity.5 By sanctifying the founding leader Atatürk and his philosophy and reforms, the preamble suggests a vision confined to a time and space that have long disappeared.

The need for a preamble has been questioned by a majority of the groups offering alternative versions. With the exception of the Bar Association—whose proposed preamble retains many of the references to Atatürk’s reforms and ideology—the emerging civil society consensus is for a short and neutral paragraph that emphasizes the rights of Turkish citizens in lieu of a preamble.6 The panel put together by Professor Ergun Özbudun at Erdogan’s request following the 2007 elections also favored a short paragraph that emphasizes the inalienable rights of individuals, although it, too, pays respect to Atatürk’s grand goals.7

Atatürk remains a potent and singularly important symbol. He is the founder of the modern Turkish state, and even Kurdish leaders have argued that references to him are acceptable. The problem emerges when his legacy is codified in a strict—though still ambiguous—official ideology. Its use as the official ideology has been at the root of state authorities’ authoritarian behavior.

Most civil society groups have suggested relatively short preambles, arguing for simplicity and universality. Both DISK, the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Syndicates—one of the two most important labor union confederations—and the December 10 Movement resolve the ethnic identity issue by invoking a rather unique and all-encompassing concept: “the successors to Anatolian civilizations.”8

European societies, including those with ethnic minorities, have selected to include short preambles that emphasize universal goals and principles. In Spain, for instance, the preamble states that the will of the nation is to “protect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise [of] human rights, their cultures and traditions, languages, and institutions.”9 By contrast, Romania has no preamble. Bulgaria references universal human values. The Hungarian document simply states that Hungary is to be a parliamentary multi-party democracy with a social-market economy.

The problems for Kurds, as an ethnic group, are not limited to the preamble. The constitution’s first three articles define Turkey as a secular republic with Ankara as its capital, Turkish as its language, and a specific national anthem. Article 2, which states that the republic is “loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk,” also references the “fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble.” These articles, together with the preamble, have helped to shape the spirit and content of the constitution. What makes them especially significant is that they have been made bulletproof by Article 4, which states that the first three articles are immutable. Article 4, in fact, even prohibits “contemplating any change” to them.10

Among other problematic articles are the ones concerning citizenship. Article 66 states that “everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk. The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk.”11 The article, which also establishes the conditions under which citizenship is acquired or lost, does not in fact define citizenship as a right. Instead, citizenship equals being a “Turk.” Although Turkish officials insist that the usage of “Turk” is intended as an adjective and does not denote an ethnic identity, citizens who do not consider themselves Turkish find this definition disparaging.12

Paradoxically, the 1924 constitution was more inclusive than the current one; while it considered all citizens to be Turks, it stressed that the concept of citizenship should not discriminate along religious or racial lines.13 In practice, however, this distinction did not help Kurds and other minorities in Turkey, as the new state tried furiously to assimilate them even as it denied their existence.

Hence, the current efforts by civil society groups and pro-Kurdish political activists and politicians are targeted at defining “constitutional citizenship.” Accordingly, citizenship is defined as a “fundamental right.” Not only is constitutional citizenship independent of race, religion, ethnicity, gender, or culture, it is meant to respect a society’s natural diversity and prevent state authorities from pursuing policies designed to assimilate minorities.14 As a fundamental right, state authorities, therefore, cannot revoke citizenship. This idea runs counter to current practice; the 1982 constitution allows the state to revoke the citizenship of anyone deemed to have acted incompatibly with devotion to the motherland. The ambiguity implicit in this formulation has empowered state authorities to revoke the citizenship of numerous dissidents.

The preamble and Article 66 are not the only articles that privilege the “Turkish Nation.” Article 5 is among the most comprehensive and important ones because it defines the role and duties of the state. It reads, “[t]he fundamental aims and duties of the state are: to safeguard the independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic and democracy. . .” The preeminence accorded to the state—an ambiguous concept at best—and the projection of goals and obligations on to it is one of the core problematic conceptualizations in the Turkish constitution.

By adopting an expansive approach to the state, the constitution in effect created an impossible situation. On the one hand, it opened the way for arbitrary interpretations of state-individual relations and, therefore, encumbered the individual with obligations it cannot possibly meet, such as acting in a “manner compatible with devotion to the motherland.” On the other hand, it also burdened the state with obligations that can sound absurd. For instance, Article 59 requires the state to develop sporting opportunities for its citizens and to “protect the successful” sportsman. None of the European constitutions approaches the state as a living institution with rights and duties.

Other articles also contain references to the “Turkish Nation,” such as Article 6 on sovereignty, Article 7 on the powers of the Grand National Assembly, and Article 9 on the exercise of judicial power. In each case, the Turkish Nation is singled out. These references, however, are easily remedied by dropping the word “Turkish” without modifying the articles’ content. Still, given the strength of nationalist forces and ideas, few politicians will likely dare to support such a simple wording change. Altering other articles is even harder to contemplate because they lie on the fault line of Turkish politics, and many people will fight to preserve the ethnic character of the state. In reality, politics will make it impossible for retail-style amendments; only a wholesale change would ease the public’s acceptance.

2. Cultural and Political Rights

Since the beginning of the republic, Kurds have complained that the Turkish state’s assimilation campaign and the prohibition on the use of their language is a way to extinguish their culture. Starting in the 1990s, many of the restrictions on the use of Kurdish have been slowly and, in a de facto manner, removed or simply ignored. Nevertheless, the constitution is replete with articles that prevent the use of Kurdish. Many of the restrictions on cultural rights are indistinguishable from political rights. Devising a line between what is cultural and what is political has bedeviled the authorities and their critics. For instance, does the right to broadcast in Kurdish constitute a cultural or a political right, especially if the content is of political nature?15

For Kurds, the notion of cultural rights, as distinct from political rights, has to do with education and the maintenance of Kurdish traditions as distinct from Turkish ones. In other words, it is about the right to call a particular local dance Kurdish (and not Turkish) or even the right to denote the region where one lives as Kurdistan or use the original Kurdish name for a town and hamlet. The main concern, however, remains the use, study, and future development of the Kurdish language.

The Turkish government, on the other hand, is still conflicted about the use of Kurdish. To compete with a European-based, pro-PKK Kurdish television station that broadcasts in Kurdish, the government started its own Kurdish-language channel, Kanal Shesh, which naturally is devoid of any political content. Paradoxically, the official minutes of Turkish Grand National Assembly’s daily meetings will not reflect anything any member of parliament may have uttered in Kurdish because it is “an unidentified language.”

None of the constitutional proposals advanced by the myriad of groups in Turkey, including the pro-Kurdish BDP, takes issue with Turkish as the official language. However, stating that the Turkish republic’s “official language is Turkish” is different than the stipulation in the 1982 constitution that defined the state’s language to be Turkish. Having an official language does not prevent the use of other languages as the need arises. Spain’s official language is Spanish, but clearly it does not prohibit the use of other languages, such as Catalan or Basque. An official language is a language that has been adopted legally, in this case by a parliament. Parliament, again as in the case of Spain, can allow other languages to be used.

Currently, the most contentious dispute is over restrictive clauses such as Article 42, which explicitly bans the “teaching of any language other than Turkish as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens.” Moreover, the constitution also stated that “foreign languages” to be taught in institutions of learning should be determined by law. In practice, this meant that Kurdish was never authorized, while other languages, such as Greek and Armenian, were allowed. These provisions of the constitution and their implementation directly contradict the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, in which the Turkish state guaranteed that “no restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.”16

Although many of the prohibitions on the use of Kurdish are slowly being dismantled or purposefully ignored, many of the laws emanating from the constitution, such as electoral laws, severely restrict the use of Kurdish for political purposes. To date, using Kurdish during a political campaign—including addressing a Kurdish-speaking audience in Kurdish—is prohibited. Ahmet Turk, the most senior of the Kurdish politicians, was recently charged with precisely this crime. The prosecutor has demanded that he be sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.

In addition, the constitution prohibits political parties from engaging in certain activities. The ambiguous nature of these proscriptions—which in practice have allowed any prosecutor or set of judges to interpret any speech or act as a violation of the law—has enabled the judiciary to also ban political parties at will. It is the Kurdish parties that have borne the brunt of such actions, as the current BDP represents the eighth such party in the last twenty years that Kurds have established. All of its predecessors were systematically closed down by the state.

Similarly, Article 79 of the constitution creates the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK), which is comprised of members of the Yargitay (Supreme Court) and the Danistay (Council of State). The YSK’s decisions have become more politicized and capricious with time. The constitution prevents any legal challenge to YSK decisions. Hence, Kurdish groups tend to perceive the YSK as another instrument designed to prevent their right to representation. The crises over Kurdish representation before and after the 2011 elections have once again demonstrated the YSK’s erratic nature. It banned and then unbanned individual candidates, and disqualified elected members from assuming their seats in parliament. Each time its decisions were characterized as fully complying with the laws and rules promulgated by the constitution.

Cultural and political rights intersect because many of the political demands articulated by Kurds concern the use of Kurdish not just in the political sphere but also in education. Though no unanimity of views among Kurds exists, at a minimum they want to see some form of education in Kurdish in the public school system. Some Kurds go further and demand a curriculum in Kurdish, with some of the courses taught in Turkish. While Kurds have been discussing this question for some time, the Turkish public is woefully unprepared for this change—it will be an arduous, step-by-step process. Altering the constitution will at least allow for the beginning of a conversation.

3. Decentralization and Local Governments

Turkey remains one of the most centralized states in the West. Almost every decision or appointment is made in Ankara. Local governments have few, if any, powers and depend completely on the central government for their finances. The central government also appoints provincial governors, all police officers, judges, teachers, and health service personnel. The monopolization of decision-making power in Ankara originated from the founders’ fear of the periphery. In their mind, the periphery stood in stark contrast with the modernity they sought to introduce; the periphery is where the Islamist and Kurdish ethnic strands flourished.

The underdeveloped Kurdish-populated provinces have traditionally been perceived by central government personnel as the least desirable location in which to serve, and, in everyday parlance, being sent to the east and southeast is tantamount to internal exile. Not surprisingly, therefore, the relationship between locals and centrally appointed functionaries has traditionally been very poor. Officials appointed do not want to be there and have few, if any, bonds to the local population, often resulting in poor relations. Language problems add another layer of complexity and miscommunication to civil servant-citizen interactions.

Even in non-Kurdish majority provinces, the centralization of decision-making in Ankara makes for poor governance and causes resentment, though not on the scale and depth of the Kurdish provinces. Members of parliament, for instance, have no local offices and their constituents routinely must travel to Ankara to pursue favors, requests, or interventions from their representatives.

Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect civil servants ensconced in Ankara to have a better understanding of and appreciation for local conditions than the elected local officials. Hence, an element of decentralization would serve the whole country well, not just the Kurdish-populated regions. Turkey remains obligated under the European Charter of Local Self-Government to reform its administrative structure.

Additionally, Article 127 of the constitution sets broad parameters for the central government’s supervisory powers over municipal governments. Most importantly, it invests the interior minister with the power to remove any elected official accused of violating the law. In practice, this has been applied disproportionately against the mayors and councilors in the Kurdish provinces. For example, the mayor of the Sur municipality in Diyarbakir, Abdullah Demirtas, was removed from office in 2007 for providing basic services to residents in Kurdish.17 The Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities has admonished Turkey for failing to provide elected municipal leaders a setting free of political intimidation and enacting new laws to facilitate local decision-making.

Many of the constitutional proposals currently in circulation stress the need to decentralize the Turkish administrative system to improve governance, provide greater say to local citizens, and advance inter-ethnic relations. TESEV, an Istanbul-based independent think tank, has argued that a one-size-fits-all approach to centralization cannot account for regional variance and specific local problems. Ethnic and identity challenges are more likely to be addressed successfully within decentralized political structures.18

The main impediment to any decentralization effort is the fear that it may mark the beginning of regional autonomy in line with the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government and even Kurdish independence. In an attempt to force the issue publicly, Kurdish groups in the southeast have articulated and unofficially adopted a proposal they term Democratic Autonomy. This primarily consists of small but cascading steps to transfer some powers to localities. While fears related to the devolution of powers are understandable, the need for better governance and delivery of services is a global trend likely to trump Ankara’s desire to maintain control. There are also many examples around the world where autonomy has worked well—despite contentious relations between the center and provinces—without resulting in independence.

Conclusion

Turkish constitutions, with the exception of short-lived 1921 document, have hindered the integration of Kurds as equal citizens in Turkey. A new constitution represents the first step and, without it, Turkey will always live with internal dissension, violence, and instability. Moreover, it is also quite clear that Kurdish political groups are no longer waiting for the government to act. They are intent on pushing for what they believe to be their rights by devising new arrangements (democratic autonomy), articulating specific demands (education in the Kurdish language), and mobilizing politically (BDP).

We have outlined some of the minimum modifications necessary to resolve the Kurdish issue. However, three other important requirements are necessary to move forward.

First, simply altering articles or rendering them ethnically neutral will not suffice. While a new constitution must be mindful of the need to integrate groups and minorities who have been excluded from the mainstream body politic—especially the Kurds and the Alevis, a heterodox religious group—it must first and foremost be democratic in spirit and content.

Second, the new constitution must appeal to a large, if not overwhelming, majority of Turkey’s citizens. The new constitution cannot just be written inside the parliament or solely approved by that body, however representative it may be. In view of the wide interest the issue has received and the numerous proposals submitted by civil society groups, the political system must secure a buy-in from society.

Third, the 1982 constitution, with its 177 articles, is an unwieldy and unnecessarily long document. Still, many of the difficulties facing Turkey in resolving its Kurdish question reside in the laws that were promulgated over the years. These laws, which are generally restrictive, have their origins in the constitution. For instance, electoral laws—specifically the 10-percent minimum threshold that political parties must cross for their representatives to get elected—is not in the constitution but was enacted by the legislature. Similarly, many of the laws regarding education, political parties, the penal code, and other issues must also be completely overhauled to further the democratization process. Changing the constitution is just the first step.

Writing—but especially airing and approving—a new constitution will take time. Once a new document is approved, the task of transforming all of the laws so that they concur with the new constitution will also take time. In the meantime, existing constitutional bodies—including the Constitutional Court—and stakeholders vested in the current system, be they civilian or military, will likely resist.

The road ahead remains long and arduous.

引用 林木木 2012-8-9 07:54

yannanchen 发表于 2012-8-9 00:43
Chest Pounder  
an individual who engages in the relentless act during a conversation of telling y ...

说来惭愧，chest-pounding我找了挺多词典，只在有道里看到了http://dict.youdao.com/search?le ... mp;keyfrom=dict.top陈老师看看这个能不能进
释义在下
This is the potential we spoke of where we told you the chest-pounding dictators of this earth are on their way out, and will be replaced by benevolent leadership.
我们在讨论此星球上打击人心的独裁者正在下台将被德政领导所取代时，谈过这可能性。

于是我就误会了，谢谢陈老师提醒~

引用 morebluer 2012-8-12 09:10

本帖最后由 morebluer 于 2012-8-12 09:15 编辑

good job! but i think there is a mistaken.
For nearly two weeks, PKK rebels entrenched around the township of Semdinli in the Hakkari province have resisted an onslaught by Turkish helicopters and fighter jets that have been pounding the mountainous terrain, setting fire to forests and forcing hundreds of villagers to flee.
不久前，哈卡里省萨姆丁里市周围的库尔德工人党武装遭到了政府军的突袭，直升机和歼击机不断轰炸山岭区，致使森林大火，数以百计的百姓被迫出逃，战斗已持续近两个星期，而且据说已蔓延至萨姆丁里市郊。

歼击机在俄罗斯（苏联）和我国指专用于空战的飞机，如Su-27侧卫，Mg-29支点，和我们的歼-5，6，7，8等。西方称这种飞机为fighter，即战斗机，但fighter的概念要比歼击机宽泛，如美军的F-16战隼和F-18大黄蜂，这两种飞机都是既有空战能力又有对地攻击能力，但在美国及北约国家F-16多用于执行对地攻击任务（以色列尤甚），干的都是湿活儿（定点清除）。美空军执行对地攻击任务的飞机叫攻击机（attack），即我们的强击机，如美空军的A-10(雷电，俗称尤猪,第一次海湾战争中大出风头，不但杀伊军多，而且杀盟军也多)。不过现代战斗机的发展趋于多功能化，米国的F-22,F-35，我们的歼10，歼20，毛子的Su-37都是兼具对空对地能力的（既能干干活儿，又能干湿活儿）。

土耳其是美国在北约的小弟，装备了不少的F-16（前一段还被叙利亚防空部队击落过一架 ），土鸡经常用来欺侮库尔德人，这次估计也是一样，所以这里的fighter jets 译成战机即可。呵呵，土鸡的战机，传说中的安那托利亚之鹰

引用 morebluer 2012-8-12 09:17

楼主在啊，这么快就回了啊，我还没有编完呢

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