[2004.5.18] 不良资产

引用 lord_loro 2011-8-21 23:23

7年过去了，除了债务占GDP的份额上升到接近60%，其他变化不大。

引用 join_soon 2011-8-22 08:56

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Non-performing
不良资产
China's sclerotic financial system not only fails to allocate capital properly; its frailty endangers the country's continued growth and stability
中国僵化的金融体系不仅不能有效实行资产配置，它的脆弱还危及该国的持续发展和稳定
Mar 18th 2004 | from the print edition


Still awaiting reform
还在等待改革

IF MONEY circulates around a sound economy the way blood circulates around a healthy body, then outwardly robust China has a black hole for a heart. It is in the financial system that the contradictions inherent in Deng's “socialist market economy” are most apparent, with a banking sector that has built up a mountain of non-performing loans (NPLs) by lavishing cash on value-destroying state firms while starving deserving private borrowers; a moribund stockmarket incapable of properly allocating capital and creating long-term wealth; a tiny corporate-bond market; an insignificant venture-capital industry; and a government that is financing growth through a potentially unsustainable rise in public debt.

如果金钱在一个良性的经济体里像血液在一个健康身体里那样循环，那外表活力四射的中国却有一颗黑洞般的内心。其邓小平所谓“社会主义市场经济”造成的金融系统固有的矛盾显而易见：银行部门无节制的向财富坟墓般的国有企业借贷却对更应获得钱款的私人借贷者置之不理，由此堆积了巨大的不良贷款；死气沉沉的股票市场无法有效实现资产配置和创造长期财富；公司债券市场规模微小；风投行业作用寥寥；政府通过潜在不稳定性风险日益增加的公共债务实现财政增长。

But at least China's leadership is beginning to take financial reform seriously. One indication is the rise of western-minded officials such as Liu Mingkang, head of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), and Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People's Bank of China, the central bank. The top priority is the banking system, which still provides Chinese businesses with nine-tenths of their funding and whose total loans have ballooned to 145% of GDP. Thanks to years of politically motivated lending, the banks have bad debts of up to 4 trillion yuan.

但至少中国的领导者已经开始认真的进行金融改革了。一个迹象是提拔了一些具有西方思维模式的官员，如银监会主席刘明康和中国人民银行既央行行长周小川。当前的首要重点在提供了中国商业90%的资金，总贷款额相当于GDP的145%的银行系统。由于常年的政策性放贷，银行坏债已高达4万亿元。

Yet another bail-out of the four big state-owned lenders (which control 60% of all banking assets) is now under way, following two unsuccessful efforts in 1998 and 1999. The latest spring-clean deals with the banks individually, and adroitly uses some of China's vast stock of foreign-exchange reserves to boost their capital. Further steps will be needed, but by next year both China Construction Bank and Bank of China, the two least bad of the big four, should be in shape for an international stockmarket listing.

不过继1998和1999两次失败的尝试后，对四大国有银行（它们占银行总资产的60%）的又一次注资行动已经展开。最近的这次彻底改造对各银行单独进行，并且巧妙运用了中国巨大的外汇储备以推高其资本额。除此还需要进一步的动作，不过到明年建行和中行，四家里相对较好的两家，将会在国际证券市场上市。

Yet this may be “too little, too soon”, in the words of Nicholas Lardy, an expert on China's financial system and a senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washington, DC. He believes the money is both insufficient and being injected too early. “The banks should not get outside funds until they prove that they can operate on a commercial basis,” he argues. That is still years away. As appendages of government, China's banks are massive, bureaucratic and imbued with an intensely political culture. The big four alone had 1.4m employees and 116,000 branches at the end of 2001. Branch managers often have closer ties to local officials and businessmen than to their own bosses, which breeds corruption.

不过这些按Nicholas Lardy，华盛顿的一位国际经济研究所的中国金融系统专家和高级研究员的话说是“太少、太快”了。他认为注入的资金不够充分，时机也太早。他说：“除非证明它们能用商业化的基础运营否则银行不应该得到外部资金”。这事还得好几年呢。作为政府的附属机构，中国的银行们体积庞大，作风官僚，充满了浓厚的政治文化气息。在2001年底，单单四大行就有140万员工、116000个分支。分行的经理们一般相较其领导而言与当地官员和商人关系更紧密，这滋生了腐败。

Javed Hamid, head of East Asia for the IFC, the private-sector lending arm of the World Bank, describes the state of affairs at the Bank of Shanghai, one of the better of the smaller city banks, when the IFC and HSBC took a stake in it in 2001: “The minutes of board meetings would be written before the meeting. Decisions would be made on the basis of [the bank's lending] growth, not whether it would improve returns. Branch managers were like kings. They didn't know what a human-resources function was. People were rewarded not on the basis of market criteria, but on how loyal they were to the party.”

世界银行私人贷款部门IFC东亚区的负责人Javed Hamid这样描述上海银行的状况，作为规模相对较小的城市银行里情况相对良好的一家银行，当2001年IFC和汇丰银行入股时：“董事会议的时间需要在会前事先写好，决策的做出基于（银行贷款）的增长，不管这是否会改善回报。分行经理如同国王一般。他们根本不知道什么是人力资源。人们的奖励不是基于市场标准而是他们对党如何的忠诚”

Their master's voice
监管者的声音

A look at the banks' recent behaviour shows that not much has changed. New lending took off in the fourth quarter of 2002 as the government tried to protect the economy from a world slowdown, creating 3 trillion yuan of new loans in 2003 (see chart 6), a 56% increase on the year before. In the final quarter of last year officials clamped down on lending, especially on property, to avoid overheating. Both the acceleration and the subsequent clampdown were directed from the centre. China's banks still carry out orders instead of applying commercial criteria.
对银行最近行为的一次观察表明并没有多少改变。由于政府试图保护经济免受世界经济衰退的影响，2002年第四季度的新增贷款大幅飙升，使2003年新增贷款额达到3万亿元（见表6），同比增加了56%。去年第四季度官员们缩减了放贷量，尤其是对固定资产的贷款，以避免经济过热。无论是加速还是收紧都由中央主导。中国的银行仍在执行命令而不是运用市场规则。



Mr Liu at the CBRC is promising to improve top management, corporate governance and risk controls, not least by bringing in foreigners both as top managers and strategic shareholders. The central bank, for its part, has taken a step towards liberalising interest rates: since January this year, banks have been able to charge up to 70% more than the benchmark lending rate (rather than 30%), according to the riskiness of the borrower. But such reforms will take time to work through. And no one yet knows how many new NPLs have been created by the latest lending spree. Until that question has been answered, it will be difficult to attract foreign lenders as strategic partners.

银监会的刘主席保证不仅会在高管和战略伙伴中引入外国人，还要改善高层管理、公司监管和风险管控。就央行自身而言，已开始逐步放开利率：从今年1月起，银行可根据借款人的偿债风险，在基准贷款利率基础上自行上调最多70%（而不是30%）。但这些改革措施的见效需要时间。而且没人知道在最新一轮的放贷风潮中又增加了多少不良贷款。除非搞清这个问题，否则很难吸引外国投资人充当战略伙伴。

If any western bank regards China as its territory, it is HSBC. But its Asia chairman, David Eldon, is sceptical about investing in institutions whose accounts he cannot trust and which, as things stand, he cannot control. “Once you own somewhere in excess of 20% but less than 30% [of a Chinese bank], you are putting your own balance sheet at risk,” he says. The most likely investors in Chinese banks at present are global investment banks such as Citigroup and CSFB, which may take a stake in return for the lucrative mandate to underwrite their clients' initial public offering.

如果有哪家西方银行把中国视为其领土的话，无疑是汇丰。但其亚洲区主席David Eldon对投资这些账目难以取信，而且明摆着他无法掌控的机构深表疑虑。他说：“一旦你对某家中国银行的控股超过20%而不到30%，你自身的资产平衡表就有风险了”。目前中国的银行们最有可能的投资者是花旗和瑞士第一波士顿信贷银行这样的国际投行，作为入股的回报，他们将有机会获准成为这些客户首次公开募股的承销商，这将获利颇丰。

The investment banks have been making good money by helping to list Chinese companies internationally, and so have investors in these stocks: Hong Kong's H-share index of mainland companies doubled in 2003. This must be galling to domestic punters, who have seen the A-share markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen decline by around 30% since June 2001.

这些投行已从帮助中国企业海外上市中大赚一笔，那些股票的投资者也是如此：香港H股中大陆企业的指数在2003年已经翻了一番。这肯定让国内的投资者眼红不已，自2001年6月以来，他们眼睁睁看着上海和深圳的A股市场下跌了大约30%。

This performance reflects the sorry state of China's 14-year-old experiment with the stockmarket. Much of the decline can be attributed to a massive share overhang: the government still owns two-thirds of the equity in the country's 1,287 listed firms, and its periodic attempts to sell, or rumours that it may do so, depress prices. On top of that, the market is rigged by the securities industry, made up of 130 largely corrupt brokers, most of which are trying to stave off bankruptcy, having promised investors guaranteed returns they now cannot honour.

这种表现反映了中国只有14年历史经验的股票市场的可悲境遇。大部分的下跌可以归咎于股份的巨量倒挂：政府仍旧拥有1287家上市公司2/3的份额，其阶段性的出售尝试或者这种可能性的传言，都会使价格下跌。此外，市场被证券行业操纵，该行业由130家严重腐败的掮客组成，其中大部分都挣扎在破产边缘，向投资者们承诺着他们达不到的保障性回报。

But the biggest problem is the poor quality of the listed companies. All but a handful are state enterprises, which are approved for an IPO by a political committee rather than by independent underwriters. A 2002 survey by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the top regulator, found that one in ten listed companies had doctored its books, and the finance ministry reported in January that 152 firms it had surveyed had mis-stated their profits by a combined 2.9 billion yuan. “The stockmarket has been used to support national industrial policy, to subsidise SOE restructuring, not to allow private companies to raise capital,” says Stephen Green of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

但最大的问题还在于上市公司不良资质。绝大部分都是国有企业，他们获准IPO源于政治命令而不是来自独立的承销商。2002年证监会一次调查发现1/10的上市公司对招股说明书做了手脚，财政部1月份的报告称其调查的152家公司虚报利润总计290亿元。“股票市场被用于支撑国家的产业政策，补贴国有企业的重组，而不允许私营企业募集资金”国际事务皇家研究院的Stephen Green如是说。

The CSRC is now trying to tackle one of the most serious abuses: shuffling assets between a listed company and its unlisted, state-owned parent to the disadvantage of minority shareholders. In future it will investigate “related party” transactions where companies buy or sell assets at a price that diverges more than 20% from an independent valuation. More spectacularly, the CSRC and the city government of Shenzhen in January seized control of China Southern Securities, the fifth-largest broker, because of corruption and mismanagement.

证监会正在试图阻止最受诟病的一项行为：将资产从上市公司和其未上市的国有母公司之间转移到处境不佳的小部分股东那里。未来它还将调查“关联方”交易，即公司用偏离独立估值20%以上的价格买卖资产的行为。更令人关注的是，因其腐败和经营不力，证监会和深圳市政府1月份控制了南方证券，这个中国第五大券商。



But in the government's eyes, stockmarket reform has a lower priority than salvaging the banks. This is partly because with a market capitalisation of around $500 billion, or 36% of GDP, the stockmarket is tiny (see chart 7), and its freely tradable part, $175 billion, even tinier; and ironically also because reform here harbours the greater danger: with somewhere between 5m and 15m active retail investors, concentrated in a few urban centres, new rules that depress prices further could create social unrest among those with most to lose.

但在政府眼中，股票市场改革的优先级不及抢救银行。部分是由于这个市场很小，大约5000亿美金的市值只占GDP的36%（见表7），而可自由交易的部分只有1750亿，规模更小。有点讽刺的是还因为股票市场的改革有极大的危险：涉及到500到1500万集中在一些中心城市的活跃股民，新规则使股价进一步下跌的话可能会其中大部分人蒙受损失，从而导致社会的不稳定。

Both the bad debts of the banking system and the stockmarket's failure to create a store of long-term wealth for the population have a bearing on China's public finances. Superficially these look in decent shape. At the end of 2002, the country's external public debt stood at a mere 7% of GDP, and domestic debt at a relatively modest 23%; but that is still more than triple the 1997 figure. To this must be added contingent liabilities: according to Mr Lardy, bailing out the entire banking system will cost a net 3.3 trillion yuan, or 30% of GDP, over the next few years. Setting up a proper public pension and welfare system will require another 70% of GDP or more, though over a longer time span. Still, on a conservative reading, China's liabilities amount to at least 60% of GDP.

银行系统的坏账和不能为广大群众创造长期财富的股票市场都是中国公共财政的负担。表面上看问题不大。到2002年底，中国的外部公债只占GDP的7%，内债占23%也相对较少。但相较于1997年的数值已3倍有余.这肯定增加了相应的负债：据Lardy估计，今后几年内向整个银行系统注资将花费3.3万亿元，合GDP的30%。建立起合适的公共养老金和福利系统将需要另外的70%的GDP或更多，虽然这会分摊在一个长期的时间跨度内。即便按保守估计，中国的债务总额将会至少占到GDP的60%。

At present, the country has no problem servicing these. Tax collection has improved from 12% to 18% of GDP over the past decade. More important, interest rates have been at historic lows, so in 2002 it took less than 5% of government spending to service the domestic debt. But what if the tax take declined again or rates went up? “There are serious questions over the country's fiscal sustainability,” says Mr Lardy. A financial crisis looks unlikely in the short term, but it cannot be discounted—and as a developing economy with a broken financial system, China remains susceptible to possible external shocks, such as a war with Taiwan. At the very least, the country will soon have to restrain its reckless fiscal pump-priming and will need to stop bankrolling SOE reform and rural migration.

当前，中国应对这些绰绰有余。过去十年税收从GDP的12%上升到18%。更重要的是利率处于历史最低点，因此在2002年支付内债的支出还不到政府开支的5%。但一旦税收再次减少或者利率上升了呢？Lardy说“中国的财政稳定性有很严重的问题”。短期不大可能有财政危机，但也不能因此忽视——而且作为金融体系瘫痪的一个发展中国家，中国对可能的外部冲击，如台湾战争，心存疑虑。最起码，中国要立即节制其鲁莽的财政输血，还要停止对国企重组和农村移民的补贴

That presages an economic slowdown, and slower growth is the one thing China's leaders are seriously afraid of. It carries with it the risk of massive job losses and social upheaval, recalling the days of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Another such episode could force political change and even—however unimaginable at present—an end to the Communist Party's rule. And although few would regret the party's passing, for a while it would no doubt be bad for business.

那预示着经济减速，而这是中国领导人最担心的事之一。它会带来大量工人失业和社会巨变的风险，重现1989年天安门事件的岁月。这种事件可能导致政治更替甚至是——无论现在多么的难以想象——共产党掌权的终结。尽管没多少人会对共党的下台感到惋惜，但一段时期内这对经济而言无疑是个坏事。

引用 ideaismoney 2011-8-22 16:50

引用 wyc 2011-8-25 20:08

1989 ？年 ？天？？安？？门？？事件是什么？？

引用 lord_loro 2011-8-25 22:19

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这个。。。。因为涉及敏感话题，知者为不知，不知亦不知吧。

引用 Forrest-dan 2011-9-6 15:20

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第一段
原文：It is in the financial system that the contradictions inherent in Deng's “socialist market economy” are most apparent,
译文：其邓小平所谓“社会主义市场经济”造成的金融系统固有的矛盾显而易见：
分析：原文为强调句型，为了在译文中起到强调效果，最好和most apparent放在一起处理~~~
建议：邓小平的“社会主义市场经济”所固有的矛盾在金融系统最为显著：

公司债券市场规模微小；风投行业作用寥寥
“微小”和“寥寥”押韵，处理得好！佩服！

第二段
原文：The top priority is the banking system, which still provides Chinese businesses with nine-tenths of their funding and whose total loans have ballooned to 145% of GDP.
译文：当前的首要重点在提供了中国商业90%的资金，总贷款额相当于GDP的145%的银行系统。
分析：Chinese businesses译为中国商业属于误译，应为“中国企业”~“当前的首要重点在”用“在”不合适，一般用“是”。 top priority 译为“当前的首要重点”的例子还没见过~~~
建议：当务之急是银行体系——现在，其依然为中国企业提供90%的资金，贷款总额已激增至GDP的145%。
解释：我的“建议”中加了“现在”一词，原因是provides 为现在时，这样的话正好与后面的现在完成时have ballooned对应~~~

lord_loro 翻译量好大啊，原创译作105篇，向你学习！！！

引用 lord_loro 2011-9-6 16:32

本帖最后由 lord_loro 于 2011-9-6 16:37 编辑

回复 Forrest-dan 的帖子

你的两个建议很好，谢谢！

chinese business说成中国企业仍有待商榷，因为这些贷款中包括了铁道部这样的政府部门。不过比我原来的说法要好一些。

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