2022.05.20 乌克兰战争结束的三种方案

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Russia and Ukraine
Andrey Kortunov offers three scenarios for the end of the war in Ukraine
The Russian political scientist sees it as a clash between societies as well as armies

May 20th 2022

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The military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine is not an ethnic conflict: ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians are fighting on both sides of the frontline. And radical nationalism is not the main motivation for Ukrainian resistance—contrary to many of Moscow’s statements. Neither is it a fight about religion. Both Russia and Ukraine are essentially secular states, and the recent religious renaissance in the two countries is superficial. Nor is the fight mostly about territory, in my view (though related disputes remain a formidable obstacle to reaching a peace settlement).

The conflict concerns a clash between very different ways of organising social and political life within two countries which together once constituted a large portion of Soviet territory. It is also an intellectual and spiritual confrontation between two mindsets: two views on the modern international system and on the world at large; two opposing perceptions of what is right and what is wrong, what is fair and what is not, what is legitimate and what is illegitimate and of what national leadership should entail.


It would be hard to argue that Ukraine has already emerged as a model of Western-style liberal democracy. But the country is persistently moving in this direction—slowly, inconsistently and with understandable setbacks and inevitable procrastination. Russia, in turn, is not a classical Asian or European authoritarian state, but it has been drifting away from the liberal democratic model for at least the past 20 years. Ukrainian society generally is organised from the bottom up, while Russian society has a top-down process at its core. Since independence in 1991, for example, Ukraine has elected six presidents. Each won power after highly contested (and sometimes very dramatic) elections. In the same period Russia has been ruled by only three heads of state. Each new leader was carefully selected and supported by his predecessor.

Historians, cultural anthropologists and sociologists debate the reasons for this remarkable divergence. The most important thing, however, is that this fundamental incompatibility of the two models of social organisation has led not only to a horrendous fratricidal military confrontation in the very centre of Europe, but that it will also dictate how each side acts in the conflict. From personnel to propaganda and from strategy to statecraft, the two competing post-Soviet models are being put to the test. The outcome will have repercussions that go far beyond Europe.

In Kyiv they can argue that the terms of the encounter are not fair. Russia is bigger, wealthier and militarily more powerful than Ukraine is. On the other hand, Ukraine enjoys international sympathy and almost unlimited defensive, economic, humanitarian and intelligence assistance from the West. Russia can rely only on itself and is exposed to the pressure of increasingly painful sanctions.


Many Russian experts are used to saying that the massive Western military and other support is the only reason why Ukraine has not yet crumbled or surrendered. But this narrative does not explain the sources of Ukraine’s motivation. Consider Afghanistan, where all the long-term large-scale military support from America and its partners did not prevent the Taliban’s unstoppable offensive last year. Though the two conflicts cannot be compared directly, the reality on the ground seems clear: whereas Afghans in 2021 were no longer motivated to fight for their country and for their values, Ukrainians in 2022 clearly are.

The stakes in the conflict could hardly be higher. It is about the future of the international system and about the future of the world order. Most important, it is about our understanding of modernity itself and, consequently, about our preferred models of social and political development.

There are three scenarios for how the war ends, and each would have enormous geopolitical consequences. If the Kremlin were to lose decisively in this epic standoff, we would probably see a re-emergence of the unipolar moment—the remaining opposition to this arrangement by Beijing notwithstanding. Although Ukraine might be unfinished business for Mr Putin, Russia’s status is itself unfinished business for many in the West. Triumph for Ukraine might lead to a tamed and domesticated Russia. A quiet Russia would allow the West to cope more easily with China, which would be the only major obstacle to liberal hegemony and the long-awaited “end of history”.

If the conflict results with an imperfect but mutually acceptable settlement, the final outcome of the collision between the Russian and the Ukrainian models will be postponed. Fierce competition between the two models of social organisation will continue, but, I hope, in a less brutal mode. A less-than-perfect compromise between the West and Russia might be followed by a more important, and more fundamental, compromise between the West and China. If a deal with Mr Putin is possible, a deal with Xi Jinping would be a logical continuation. A rapprochement between China and the West would require more time, energy and political flexibility from the West, however. That would lead to a reformation of the global order, with major changes to the un system, archaic norms of international public law and recalibrations at the imf, the wto and other bodies.

If there is no agreement on Ukraine and the conflict endures through cycles of shaky ceasefires followed by new rounds of escalation, expect decay in global and regional bodies. Inefficient international institutions may collapse amid an accelerating arms race, nuclear proliferation and the multiplication of regional conflicts. Such change would lead only to more chaos in the years ahead.

Assessing the probability of any of the three scenarios is extremely difficult—too many independent variables could influence the outcome of the conflict. I consider the reformation scenario, in which an agreement is made to end the war, to be the best option for all. The others either will introduce change too quickly or block badly-needed change; in both cases political risks will multiply. If the conflict triggers a gradual, orderly and non-violent transition in which the global order becomes more stable, it would mean that humankind has not let Ukraine’s sacrifices go to waste. ■

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Andrey Kortunov is a political scientist and director general of the Russian International Affairs Council, a Russian think-tank.



俄罗斯和乌克兰
安德烈-库尔图诺夫为乌克兰战争的结束提供了三种方案
这位俄罗斯政治学家认为这是一场社会和军队之间的冲突。

2022年5月20日

俄罗斯和乌克兰之间的军事对抗不是一场种族冲突：乌克兰族和俄罗斯族在前线的两边都在战斗。而且，激进的民族主义并不是乌克兰抵抗的主要动机--与莫斯科的许多声明相反。这也不是一场关于宗教的战斗。俄罗斯和乌克兰本质上都是世俗国家，最近这两个国家的宗教复兴只是表面现象。在我看来，这场斗争也不是主要关于领土问题（尽管相关的争端仍然是达成和平解决方案的一个巨大障碍）。

这场冲突涉及到两个国家内部非常不同的社会和政治生活组织方式之间的冲突，这两个国家曾经共同构成了苏联领土的很大一部分。这也是两种心态之间的知识和精神对抗：对现代国际体系和整个世界的两种看法；对什么是正确和错误、什么是公平和不公平、什么是合法和不合法以及国家领导权应该是什么的两种对立看法。


很难说乌克兰已经成为一个西式自由民主的典范。但该国正坚持不懈地朝着这个方向前进--缓慢地、不连贯地、可以理解的挫折和不可避免的拖延。反过来，俄罗斯也不是一个古典的亚洲或欧洲专制国家，但至少在过去20年里，它一直在偏离自由民主模式。乌克兰社会一般是自下而上组织起来的，而俄罗斯社会的核心是自上而下的过程。例如，自1991年独立以来，乌克兰已选出六位总统。每位总统都是在经过激烈竞争（有时是非常戏剧性的）的选举后赢得权力。在同一时期，俄罗斯只由三位国家元首统治。每位新的领导人都是经过精心挑选，并得到其前任的支持。

历史学家、文化人类学家和社会学家对这种显著差异的原因进行了辩论。然而，最重要的是，两种社会组织模式的这种根本不相容性不仅导致了在欧洲正中心发生可怕的自相残杀的军事对抗，而且还将决定双方在冲突中的行动方式。从人员到宣传，从战略到国策，两种相互竞争的后苏联模式正在接受考验。其结果的影响将远远超出欧洲。

在基辅，他们可以争辩说，交锋的条件是不公平的。俄罗斯比乌克兰更大、更富有、军事上更强大。另一方面，乌克兰得到了国际社会的同情，并从西方获得了几乎无限的防御、经济、人道主义和情报援助。俄罗斯只能依靠自己，并面临着越来越痛苦的制裁压力。


许多俄罗斯专家习惯于说，西方的大规模军事和其他支持是乌克兰尚未崩溃或投降的唯一原因。但这种说法并没有解释乌克兰的动机来源。考虑一下阿富汗，美国及其合作伙伴提供的所有长期大规模军事支持都没有阻止塔利班去年不可阻挡的攻势。虽然这两场冲突不能直接比较，但当地的现实似乎很清楚：2021年的阿富汗人不再有为国家和价值而战的动机，而2022年的乌克兰人显然有。

这场冲突的利害关系再高不过了。它关系到国际体系的未来，关系到世界秩序的未来。最重要的是，它关系到我们对现代性本身的理解，因此也关系到我们喜欢的社会和政治发展模式。

关于战争如何结束有三种情况，每一种情况都会产生巨大的地缘政治后果。如果克里姆林宫在这场史诗般的对峙中果断失利，我们可能会看到单极时刻的重新出现--尽管北京仍然反对这种安排。尽管乌克兰可能是普京先生的未竟事业，但俄罗斯的地位对西方许多人来说本身就是未竟事业。乌克兰的胜利可能会导致一个被驯服和驯化的俄罗斯。一个安静的俄罗斯将使西方更容易应对中国，中国将是自由主义霸权和期待已久的 "历史终结 "的唯一主要障碍。

如果冲突的结果是一个不完美但双方都能接受的解决方案，那么俄罗斯和乌克兰模式之间碰撞的最终结果将被推迟。两种社会组织模式之间的激烈竞争将继续下去，但我希望是以一种不那么残酷的方式。西方和俄罗斯之间不太完美的妥协之后，西方和中国之间可能会有更重要、更根本的妥协。如果与普京先生的交易是可能的，与习近平的交易将是一个合乎逻辑的延续。然而，中国和西方之间的和解将需要西方有更多的时间、精力和政治灵活性。这将导致全球秩序的改革，对联合国系统、国际公法的陈旧规范进行重大变革，并对国际货币基金组织、世贸组织和其他机构进行重新调整。

如果在乌克兰问题上没有达成协议，并且冲突在不稳定的停火协议和新一轮的升级中持续下去，那么全球和地区机构将出现衰败。在军备竞赛加速、核扩散和地区冲突增多的情况下，效率低下的国际机构可能会崩溃。这种变化只会导致未来几年的更多混乱。

评估这三种情况中任何一种的概率都是非常困难的--太多的独立变量可能影响冲突的结果。我认为改革方案，即达成协议结束战争，是所有人的最佳选择。其他方案要么会过快地引入变革，要么会阻碍急需的变革；在这两种情况下，政治风险会成倍增加。如果冲突引发了一个渐进的、有序的和非暴力的过渡，使全球秩序变得更加稳定，这将意味着人类没有让乌克兰的牺牲白费。■

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安德烈-库尔图诺夫是一位政治学家，也是俄罗斯智囊团俄罗斯国际事务委员会的总干事。