[2007-05-24]Israel and the Palestinians:Forty years on Forty, Israel, Palestinians, years

学谦

Israel and the Palestinians以色列人与巴勒斯坦人
Forty years on弹指四十年（学谦　译）　
May 24th 2007 | JERUSALEM
From The Economist print edition

The aftermath of the war of 1967 has been a story of squandered opportunities and deepening divisions among Israelis and Palestinians alike
6日战争的余波演变为了挥霍机会和加剧分裂的故事，无论是以色列人还是巴勒斯坦人都一样

WITH the damp of a rainstorm still hanging in the evening air, a human wave bore down on Jerusalem's old city from the west, engulfing the cool stone walls in a blue-and-white sea. Chanting, dancing and waving flags, thousands of young Israelis celebrated the capture of the ancient capital with a symbolic re-enactment—flowing through its narrow alleys towards the Western Wall, as Israeli troops did on June 7th 1967.
　　尽管晚空中依旧弥漫着暴风雨的气息，而自西而来的人群仍源源不断的涌向耶路撒冷（Jerusalem）老城［注一］，把冰冷的石墙淹没在蓝白色的海洋［注二］之中。这是成千上万年轻的以色列人在欢庆，他们诵着经、跳着舞，还挥舞着旗帜，潮水般的奔过逼仄小巷，直至西墙（the Western Wall）［注三］。这是他们象征性的重演1967年6月7日以军攻占这座古都后的举动。

May 16th, the day that the “reunification” of Jerusalem fell this year by the Jewish calendar, was the day Israel marked the 40th anniversary of its greatest ever military victory, when it crushed three Arab armies and took control of nearly three times its own landmass in just six days. Like those conquering troops, this year's rejoicers wore a uniform, albeit of a different kind: casual clothes and skullcaps for the men, long skirts for the women. Other than religious Zionists, that subset (about a fifth) of Israeli Jews who believe that settling as much as possible of “Greater Israel” is a religious duty, few Israelis today think that Israel's finest hour left it with a lot worth celebrating. Many of the rest are as likely to see its capture of land and subsequent occupation as a tragedy for Israel.
　　若以犹太历来计算的话，2007年5月16日正是耶路撒冷“重新统一”的纪念日，也就是以色列（Israel）史上最伟大军事胜利40周年纪念日。当时以色列仅用6天时间，便击溃了三个阿拉伯对手［注四］，一举控制了比其疆域大近两倍的领土。与当年征服耶路撒冷的以军一样，今年的欢庆者也都着装统一，只是不是军装罢了：男士头戴无边便帽，身穿便服；女士则身着长裙。约有1/5的以色列犹太人是虔诚的犹太复国主义者，他们坚信尽可能的定居于“大以色列（Greater Israel）［注五］”是一种宗教责任。而除了他们之外，如今很少有以色列人会认为以色列留住了那段最美好的时光，尽管有众多有意义的庆典。其余更多的人很可能看到的是征服和占领对以色列来说一种悲剧。

The Palestinians who watched the march quietly from the sidelines, kept at a safe distance by police, have had still more cause to mourn. Just as the war made Jews the world over feel vindicated after 19 years of precarious statehood, the reunification of historic Palestine—Israel, Gaza and the West Bank—under Israeli rule seemed to give the Palestinians a chance to get their own struggle for a state back on track. Yet since then both societies have fractured to the point that their internal conflicts sometimes eclipse the one they have with the other side. And in the meantime a dispute over land has acquired the harsh absolutes of a religious conflict.
　　巴勒斯坦人站在边界线旁，与警察保持着安全的距离，他们静静的关注着游行队伍，仍然有足够的理由哀伤。19年来，巴勒斯坦一直未能确立国家地位［注六］，但全世界的犹太人都认为把原因简单的归结为战争并不公正。在以色列的支配下，疆域包括以色列、加沙（Gaza）和约旦河西岸（West Bank）的旧巴勒斯坦能够重获统一，这似乎是给了巴勒斯坦人一次机会，使其建国的努力回到正轨。不过至今双方仍存在分歧，他们内部的冲突时常使一方不能与另一方达成一致。同时，土地争执也演变为尖锐的宗教冲突。

Many of the participants, historians now argue, were reluctant to go to war. Israel's leaders did not then believe in the doctrine of “strategic depth”, protection through holding more territory; that came later. Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president, had been cranking up the rhetoric about destroying Israel in an effort to maintain his position as a “pan-Arab” leader, but in reality kept warning his allies that Israel was still too strong to be attacked. Jordan's King Hussein had held secret talks with Israeli officials, who felt it in their interest to prop up his regime.
　　如今历史学家认为，其实当年许多参与者并不愿意发动战争。那时的以色列领导人并不信奉后来才有的“战略纵深（strategic depth）”原则，即通过维持更广阔的领土来实现防御。埃及总统贾迈勒•阿卜杜勒•纳赛尔（Gamal Abdel Nasser）虽曾几度夸口要消灭以色列，但也只是为了维护其“泛阿（pan-Arab）”领导人地位的努力罢了，事实上他一直在告诫盟友以色列依然过于强大而不要攻击它。约旦（Jordan）国王侯赛因（Hussein）也曾多次同以色列官员进行过秘密会谈，因为这些以色列官员认为支持侯赛因执政符合以色列利益。

The main tensions were with Syria, which competed with Israel for the scarce waters of the Jordan river and supported raids on it by Palestinian guerrilla movements. Among these was the Fatah organisation, headed by a young engineer called Yasser Arafat, who argued that what would liberate Palestine was not Arab government talking-shops—such as the puppet Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) that the Arab League had created in 1964—but an armed struggle waged by the Palestinians themselves. The Israeli army under its hot-headed chief of staff, Yitzhak Rabin, also deliberately provoked the Syrians in an escalating series of clashes, and at one point Israel threatened to invade.
　　阿以的紧张主要来自于叙利亚（Syria），而这完全是因为叙利亚与以色列争夺约旦河（Jordan river）稀缺的水资源，并支持巴勒斯坦游击队袭击以色列而造成的。法塔赫（Fatah）［注八］组织便是这些游击队中的一个，该组织的领导人是一名叫亚西尔•阿拉法特（Yasser Arafat）的年轻工程师，他认为应当依靠巴勒斯坦人民自己的武装斗争去争取解放，而不是去指望阿拉伯政府的空淡会，如阿盟（Arab League）于1964年成立的有名无实的巴解组织（PLO）［注九］。就在这一年，脾气火爆的伊扎克•拉宾（Yitzhak Rabin）出任以军总参谋长。他蓄意升级一系列冲突以激怒叙利亚人，并且一度威胁要入侵叙利亚。

Syria appealed to Nasser, who had signed a defence pact with it. He ordered troop deployments in the Sinai and closed the Red Sea to Israeli shipping, hoping that this would get his allies off his back. Instead, it pushed Israel into launching a pre-emptive strike. Even so, Levi Eshkol, the prime minister, opposed it for two weeks. He caved in to pressure from the army only after a threat by some parties to quit the governing coalition forced him to bring the hawkish Moshe Dayan (pictured above) on board as defence minister.
　　叙利亚向纳赛尔发出了请求。根据之前他们签订的防务条约，纳赛尔命令把部队部署到西奈半岛（Sinai），并封锁红海以禁止以色列船只通过，期望这样能使盟友避免背面受敌。然而事与愿违，这反倒促使了以色列先发制人发动空袭。即使如此，以色列总理列维•艾希科尔（Levi Eshkol）曾有两周对此持反对意见。他在一些政党威胁要退出联合政府，被迫任命鹰派人物摩西•达扬（Moshe Dayan，见上图）为国防部长之后，才屈从于军方压力。

Reading the historical accounts today, one wonders what the government commission that recently slammed Israeli politicians and generals for their rashness in launching last summer's war in Lebanon would have made of 1967. It was a war prompted by a gung-ho military (see article), a misreading of the enemy's intentions and political expediency; a huge gamble that stretched Israel's forces to the very limit, and could have destroyed the country had it failed.
　　今天读这些史料，大家不禁会想因为去年夏天贸然发动对黎巴嫩（Lebanon）战争，而由那些在最近备受指责的以色列政治家和将军组成的内阁，如果处在1967年又会怎么做？这是一场由于对敌人意图和政治手段的误判，而由激进军队挑起的战争；这也是一场铺张以军力量到极限程度，不成功便成仁的豪赌。

No wonder Israelis were relieved and proud. But their feelings went deeper. The Holocaust had left many Jews with a crisis of faith: how could a caring God allow such a tragedy? The triumph in 1967 gave them reason to believe again. “For Jewry to be envied: that is a change indeed,” concluded The Economist's dispatch from Jerusalem that week (see article).
　　难怪以色列人宽慰和自豪，虽然他们的情感将更深沉。大屠杀给许多幸存的犹太人遗留了信仰危机：仁慈的主怎么能够容忍这样的惨剧？而1967年的胜利给了他们重拾信仰的理由。“犹太民族已变得让人羡慕：而事实上，这只是一个转折，” 那个星期的《经济学人》在刊发来自耶路撒冷的急件中做出了这样一个结论。

The fact that the West Bank was home to the major biblical sites—the old city of Jerusalem, the tomb of the patriarchs in Hebron, Rachel's tomb in Bethlehem—added to the sensation of a divine guiding hand. “Der Judenstaat”, the seminal tract by Theodor Herzl, the father of Zionism, is usually mistranslated as “The Jewish State” rather than “The Jews' State”, but now the mistranslation became apt. In the words of Michael Oren, an Israeli historian, the war “confronted the state of Israel with its Jewishness”.
　　事实上，约旦河西岸是圣经中的主要遗址发祥地——包括耶路撒冷旧城，希伯来（Hebron）犹太祖先墓，伯利恒（Bethlehem）雷切尔（Rachel）［注十］墓——增加了神之指引的感觉。犹太复国主义之父西奥多•赫茨尔（Theodor Herzl）所撰的纲领性论著《犹太国（The Jews' State）》，经常被错译为《犹太之国（The Jewish State）》，但目前这个错误已变得很贴切。用以色列历史学家迈克尔•奥仁（Michael Oren）的话来说，这场战争是“以色列国与其犹太性的碰撞”。

That gave religious Zionism new credibility. Young idealists went out to the West Bank to put up impromptu settlements, which the army at first dismantled. But the rest of the country's interests quickly fell into line with theirs. The West Bank offered aquifers and made a good security buffer; it and the Gaza Strip provided cheap Palestinian labour and housing land; and building new Jewish neighbourhoods around East Jerusalem was a way for Israel to consolidate its hold on the holy city. It was two decades before the first Palestinian uprising, or intifada, made mainstream Israelis question the wisdom of holding on to the occupied territories.
　　于是，这给虔诚的犹太复国主义者带来了新的确实性。年轻的理想主义者纷纷赶往约旦河西岸，随地建造定居点。虽然以军一开始就已拆除过定居点，但很快这个国家的其它利益与他们的行为交织在了一起。约旦河西岸不仅有地下水源，还是个很好的安全缓冲带；西岸和加沙地带都能供给便宜的巴勒斯坦劳动力和住宅用地；而且在东耶路撒冷周边构建新犹太区，是巩固以色列对圣城持续统治的一个途径。20年前巴勒斯坦人的第一次起义，使得以色列主流人群开始质问继续占领这些领土是否明智。

For some Palestinians, meanwhile, 1967 seemed like a gift. Palestinians in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank could suddenly meet again after 19 years apart, although the million or so refugees outside were now cut off from them. It was easier to campaign against occupation by the Zionist enemy than by their Arab brethren. Moreover, Nasser had used the Palestinians' plight as a convenient rallying-cry to unite the Arab world around his leadership. The war's abject failure discredited pan-Arabism, allowing Arafat to bring the Palestinian cause itself to centre stage. Soon he was able to take over the PLO and step up the use of direct, violent attacks on Israel, taking Nasser's place as the leader that Arabs everywhere admired.
　　在此期间，1967的战争对于部分巴勒斯坦人来说又似乎是一种恩赐。分居于以色列、加沙和西岸长达19年之久的巴勒斯坦人，突然又可以重新聚首，虽然也有大约百万的巴勒斯坦难民从此又与他们断绝来往。这样比起依靠他们的阿拉伯兄弟来，他们能更容易反抗犹太复国军的占领。更何况，纳赛尔已利用巴勒斯坦所遭遇的困境，作为号召阿拉伯世界团结在他身边的绝佳口号。虽然战争以尴尬的失利收场，让泛阿主义的名誉从此扫地，却促成阿拉法特带领巴勒斯坦人自己走向了中心舞台。不久之后，他接管了巴解组织并后加强了对其的直接管理，开始暴力攻击以色列，在阿拉伯世界获得了广泛的称赞而取代了纳赛尔的领袖地位。

However, the war had longer-lived repercussions that ultimately made things more complex. One was a wider geopolitical shift. The key to Israel's victory, a massive aerial assault that destroyed the Egyptian air force on the ground, was accomplished with French Mystère and Mirage fighter-bombers. Today the backbone of its combat force is American F-15s and F-16s. Only after the war did the United States sign its first big arms deal with Israel; today it supplies some $2.5 billion a year in military aid. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, cut off ties with Israel and strengthened them with the Arab world. Israel's success also galvanised diaspora Jewry, giving rise to the strong “Jewish lobby” in America and to the “refusenik” movement in the Soviet Union. By turning the refusal of exit visas for Soviet Jews into a political issue, it helped keep Jews there from assimilating. But the cold war, hitherto a fight for influence in Europe and Latin America, had now acquired a Middle Eastern axis, and Jews and Arabs were at its centre.
　　不管怎样，这场战争的长期影响最终使得事情越来越复杂。其中之一就是更广泛的地缘政治格局的改变。当时以色列胜利的关键在于，大规模使用法国的“神秘（Mystère）”和“幻影（Mirage）”歼击轰炸机空袭埃及，并将其空军摧毁于地面。而如今，以色列空军战斗机的主力已换成了美国的F-15s和F-16s。战争刚一结束，美国就和以色列签署了第一份武器订购大单；目前美国每年差不多要向以色列提供25亿美元的军事援助。另一方面，苏联则切断了与以色列的联系，而加强了与阿拉伯世界的联系。以色列的胜利也鼓舞了散居各地的犹太人，增强了美国“犹太游说集团”的影响力，推动了苏联犹太人的“移民”运动。通过将拒签苏联犹太人出境签证演变为一个政治问题，从而有助于避免苏联犹太人被苏联政府所同化。不过，之前已经为了在欧洲和拉丁美洲的影响而争斗不止的冷战，现在又在中东搅起了斗争的漩涡，而犹太人和阿拉伯人则卷入了漩涡的中央。

A second change was that, even as the war proved Israel's military deterrence, it made deterrence obsolete. Instead of tackling Israel head-on, its neighbours concentrated ever more on sponsoring proxies that entangled the army in the terrible complexities of guerrilla warfare, where victory is impossible to define and the combatants are hard to separate from civilians. Israel's last conventional war, and last clear victory (albeit at a heavy cost), was in 1973. Today it fights Iran and Syria through Hizbullah in Lebanon and various militant groups in Gaza. Last summer it launched campaigns on both fronts that killed many hundreds of innocents but could not wipe out the enemy. The idea that “strategic depth” of territory can protect the country has also taken a beating from Saddam Hussein's Scud missiles in the first Gulf war, from Gaza's and Hizbullah's rockets, and now from the impending menace of an Iranian nuclear missile. The army is getting an overhaul after the Lebanon debacle, but even the best-trained army cannot destroy the kinds of threats Israel faces today.
　　正如战争证明了以军的威慑力，战争也淘汰了威慑力，这便是第二个改变。邻国不再正面同以色列冲突，而是集中力量扶植代理人，从而将以军拖入游击战的泥沼。从此胜利再也无法定义，而战士也很难与平民区分开来。1973年的第四次中东战争，是以色列打的最后一场传统战争，也是最后一次明显的获胜（虽然付出了沉重的代价）。如今，以色列对抗伊朗和叙利亚的方式是和黎巴嫩真主党以及加沙地带各式各样的武装派别作战。去年夏天，以色列针对真主党和加沙同时发动了两场战役，在杀害了数百计无辜平民之后却依旧没能彻底肃清敌人。而“战略纵深”能够保卫国家的想法，也遭到了打击，如以色列遭到了第一次海湾战争（the first Gulf war）中萨达姆•侯赛因（Saddam Hussein）飞毛腿（Scud）导弹，以及目前加沙和真主党的火箭弹的袭击，还有迫在眉睫伊朗核弹头的威胁。在黎巴嫩事件之后，以军现在需要休整，但即使最训练有素的军队也无法消除以色列今天面临的威胁。

Third, the collapse of pan-Arabism left an ideological vacuum. It was partly filled by political Islamism, with its dream not merely of a single Arab state but of a united Islamic society or umma, run along the guidelines of Islamic law. As the new ideology took hold it spun off radical interpretations that came to threaten the region's existing regimes. Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979 was its first notable success. And in 1987 the Muslim Brotherhood's Palestinian franchise was reborn as the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and began its long path to taking control of the Palestinian cause. Hamas is to the Palestinians what the settlers are to Israel: it believes that the land was consecrated to Muslims by God, and is not negotiable.
　　第三，泛阿主义的瓦解形成了意识形态的真空。而这又被政治化伊斯兰主义所部分填充，该主义不只是代表单个阿拉伯国家的愿望，而是承载着团结伊斯兰社会或乌玛（umma）［注十一］的梦想，依照伊斯兰法（Islamic law）的指引而前进。由于新意识形态坚持其独立的基本解释，进而威胁到该地区的现存政权。1979年伊朗爆发的伊斯兰革命（Islamic revolution）是第一次著名胜利。而1987年，随着伊斯兰抵抗运动（Hamas，哈马斯）的成立，穆斯林兄弟巴勒斯坦人的公民权利主张又获得了新生，此后哈马斯开始了漫漫征途以获取对巴勒斯坦事业的掌控。哈马斯对巴勒斯坦人的意义，就像犹太定居者对于以色列人的意义：哈马斯相信这片土地是神赐予穆斯林的，是不容妥协的。

Divide and misrule
隔离与混乱

Forty years of conflict have convinced most Palestinians and Israelis that they are best off separating into two states. Yet they seem incapable of getting there.
　　四十年的冲突使大多数巴勒斯坦人和以色列人相信，巴以最好还是分割成两个国家。然而现在，他们似乎还无力达成这一目标。

Though most Israelis have come to accept that the Palestinians should have independence, most still think they are not automatically entitled to it, but first need to earn it by providing Israeli security. For their part, though most Palestinians are willing to let Israel exist if it leaves them alone, most think armed struggle of some sort is justified as long as it continues to occupy their land and kill suspected militants and innocent bystanders alike. Neither side has ever had a leadership willing to override those views.
　　尽管大多数以色列人开始接受巴勒斯坦应当独立，但大多数人依然认为他们没有自主独立的资格，而是应该通过为以色列提供安全保障而赢取独立。对于巴勒斯坦人而言，尽管大多数人愿意让以色列继续存在，如果能让他们获得独立的话。但大多数人也认为，只要以军还占领着他们的土地，不加区别的杀害可疑战斗人员和无辜平民，只要这些状况还在持续，那么武装斗争就是合理的。双方从未有一个领导人愿意推翻上述他们自己的观点。

In the meantime the Israeli settlements that dot the West Bank like holes in a Swiss cheese keep growing. The measures that protect them from Palestinian extremists, such as special settler-only roads and hundreds of checkpoints and roadblocks, stifle the West Bank's economy and drive even more Palestinians to extremism.
　　在此期间，以色列不断在约旦河西岸兴建定居点，星罗棋布的定居点就好像瑞士奶酪中的空隙。为了避免遭受来自巴勒斯坦激进分子的袭击，他们采取了种种保护措施，如仅允许定居者通过的特别通道，设置数百个检查站和路障，扼杀西岸经济并且驱逐更多极端主义倾向的巴勒斯坦人。

On top of this, the attrition of the conflict has left the two societies deeply divided. On the Israeli side, the chronic instability of the governments elected in its system of proportional representation makes them hostage to minority interests, and the settlers are one of the most determined and organised minorities in the country. Their politicians can forge alliances with other groups, such as the growing ultra-Orthodox factions, who used to be wary of Zionism but are ever more pro-settler, and secular nationalists, many of whom immigrated from the debris of the Soviet Union and share with the settlers a dislike of Arabs.
　　综上所述，冲突的摩擦使这两个社会深度分裂。以色列方面，由于比例代表制的选举体系，使得政府受制于少数人的利益，从而长期习惯性的摇摆不定。而定居者是这个国家最坚定、最有组织的少数派之一。他们的政客能与其他集团结成同盟，例如日益壮大的极端正统（ultra-Orthodox）派。极端正统派大多移民自残破的苏联，他们虽对犹大复国主义心存警惕，但却是更坚定的支持定居者和世俗民族主义者，而且他们和定居者一样厌恶阿拉伯人。



Young settlers are just as militant as their parents were a generation ago, setting up small West Bank outposts and resisting their dismantlement in fierce, well-publicised mass protests. Israel's pull-out of the settlements in Gaza in 2005, which seemed at the time to have broken the settlers' spirit, now appears to have left them more united and emboldened. And the interface between ultra-Orthodoxy and religious Zionism has spawned a new breed of young settlers known as hardal (a Hebrew acronym that also means “mustard”), who are more fanatical than ever.
　　如同一辈前那样，年轻的定居者和他们的父辈一样好斗，他们设立西岸小哨所，强烈抵制对定居点的拆除，广泛发布抗议声明。2005年，以色列拆除了在加沙的定居点，似乎这在当时破坏了定居者精神。现在看来，这一行动反而使他们更加团结，更加肆无忌惮。而极端正统派与世俗犹太复国主义的结合，又催生出叫做哈德拉（hardal，希伯莱首字母的缩写，亦指“芥末”）新一类年轻定居者，他们比以往都要狂热。

On the Palestinian side, the 1967 war laid one slow-burning fuse by cutting off Gaza and the West Bank from the rest of the Arab world. That turned Arafat and his cronies into a leadership in exile. They grew so detached from the Palestinians under Israeli rule that the first intifada in 1987 took them completely by surprise. Hamas took advantage to claim some of the credit for that popular uprising. Arafat and company were allowed back after signing the Oslo peace accords with Israel in 1993. But in trying to impose a system of authority based on loyalty to himself, he created a lasting rift in Fatah between his “outside” people and younger local leaders. Corrupt and unpopular, Fatah could not even produce a united list for last year's Palestinian election. That played a large role in Hamas's landslide victory.
　　而巴勒斯坦方面，1967年战争切断了加沙和约旦河西岸与其他阿拉伯世界的联系，这相当于放置了一根缓缓燃烧的导火索，也造就流亡异乡的阿拉法特及其战友的领导地位。因为巴勒斯坦人处于以色列的控制之下，他们的发展极其孤立。但在1987年第一次制造巴勒斯坦人暴动之后，世人对他们感到彻底的诧异。哈马斯因这次广受欢迎的起义而为自己捞取了一些政治资本。在1993年和以色列签订了奥斯陆和平协议后，阿拉法特与其战友被允许返回巴勒斯坦。但他试图在法塔赫中强加一个基于对他忠诚的权威体系，使得在流亡派和年轻本地派中产生了一道难以愈合的裂痕。由于腐败和不得人心，法塔赫甚至不能在去年的巴勒斯坦选举中产生一个团结的参选名单。而这对哈马斯取得压倒性胜利起到了很大的作用。

To complicate matters further the Oslo accords, which gave the Palestinians in the occupied territories partial autonomy, and the second, much bloodier intifada in 2000, which prompted Israel to pull out of Gaza and put up its barrier in the West Bank, have fragmented the Palestinians even more than they were before Israel occupied them. Today Gaza is nearly cut off to visitors, and residents can get in and out only sporadically, via Egypt. Visas for Palestinians outside to visit the West Bank are getting harder to come by. None but a select few from the occupied territories can visit Israel, and Palestinians who live in Israel are finding it increasingly difficult to visit the territories. Those who live in refugee camps in neighbouring countries have always been isolated—they cannot return to Palestine, they are often stateless and their host countries impose a variety of restrictions ranging from the annoying to the oppressive.
　　奥斯陆协议赋予了被占领土的巴勒斯坦人部分自治权，但履行协议的进程使事情更加复杂。2000年发生了更加血腥的第二次巴勒斯坦人暴动，使得以色列果断的撤离加沙地带，并在西岸修筑隔离墙，从而把巴勒斯坦弄得比以往更加支离破碎。如今，加沙已几乎完全切断了和外界的联系，当地居民只能借助转道埃及，零星的进出该地区。在外面的巴勒斯坦人也很难获得前往西岸的签证。除了少数被占领区中经过检查的巴勒斯坦人外，没有谁能进入以色列；而生活在以色列的巴勒斯坦人也发现，要进入被占领区越来越困难。在邻国难民营度日的巴勒斯坦人则一直很孤立——他们回不了巴勒斯坦，而且在避难国往往没有国籍，他们遭受到种种限制，给他们造成了烦恼甚至压迫。

That has heightened the differences in Palestinian society. The urban, urbane elite in the West Bank look down on the more Islamist denizens of Gaza and scratch their heads in disbelief at the deadly factional violence there; some still recall with a shudder how a wave of Gazans (“sharks”, as one Ramallah resident calls them) arrived in the West Bank seeking work in the 1990s. The Palestinians in Jerusalem, who have held Israeli residence permits since 1967 but considered themselves a cut above the rest long before that, look down on the occupied ones. The cosmopolitan, progressive Palestinians from northern Israel who hold Israeli citizenship look down on the conservative, clannish Jerusalemites. And everyone else treats the Palestinian-Israelis as suspicious collaborators because their grandparents did not flee in 1948.
　　这都加剧了巴勒斯坦社会内部的差距。在城市，西岸的都市精英瞧不起更伊斯兰的加沙人，而且对那里血腥的派别暴力冲突嗤之以鼻。直到现在，他们从一些人回想起上世纪90年代来西岸找工作的加沙佬（一名拉姆安拉市民称他们为“贪婪的鲨鱼”）移民潮就会打哆嗦。而耶路撒冷的巴勒斯坦人，他们自1967年就获得了以色列的居住许可证，不过在被占领之前就认为自己比其他的巴勒斯坦人优秀，也瞧不起其他占领区的人。还有那些取得了以色列公民权，居住在以色列北部的巴勒斯坦进步人士，他们信奉世界主义，瞧不起保守而排他的耶路撒冷巴勒斯坦人。此外，所有人都把巴勒斯坦裔以色列人当作可疑的合作对象，因为他们的祖辈没有在1948年选择逃离。

Reuters

More divided than ever隔离更甚

Political agendas have diverged too. Hamas is much more powerful in Gaza, and even within Hamas the West Bankers are more willing to hint at a compromise with Israel than the Gazans. Refugees, especially those “outside”, cleave to their “right of return” more fiercely than Palestinians in Palestine. “If they all come here we have a big problem too, not just the Israelis,” confides the (Hamas) mayor of one West Bank town.
　　政治议程也一样存在分歧。哈马斯在加沙的势力十分强大，但哈马斯内部的西岸人比加沙佬们更愿意与以色列和解。而流亡者，尤其是那些“流亡派”，比一直留在在巴勒斯坦的巴勒斯坦人更强烈的坚持“回归的权利”。“如果让他们都回来，也会给我们带来大麻烦，不仅仅是以色列人，”一个西岸城镇的（哈马斯）镇长透露道。

Since Arafat's death in 2004, the leadership has fragmented, and not just between Hamas and Fatah. Hamas's exiled chief, Khaled Meshal, is frequently at odds with leaders in Gaza. Meanwhile, as the peace process has faded, Palestinians living in Israel have adopted a more local agenda, campaigning against discrimination that they suffer in the Jewish state, and for an internal right of return to their ancestors' villages that has nothing to do with the return of refugees from abroad.
　　自阿拉法特于2004年去世，巴勒斯坦领导层就变得支离破碎，而且不仅仅只发生在哈马斯和法塔赫之间。哈马斯的流亡领导人哈立德•马沙尔（Khaled Meshal），就常常与在加沙的领导层不合。其间，随着和平进程的黯然失色，生活在以色列的巴勒斯坦人开始采取更本地化的议程，开展针对在这个犹太国家中遭遇不公平待遇的抗议运动，同时也为了争取回到他们祖居地村庄属于内政范畴的权力。不过，他们的行动对流亡国外的难民归国却没有什么意义。

The general erosion of political authority, especially in Gaza, has created a power vacuum that clan chieftains and criminal bosses have been quick to fill. The lawlessness is fertile soil for jihadi extremists. These are anathema to the other Palestinian factions, which do not want to be dragged into the West's war with al-Qaeda. In Gaza such extremist groups are a tiny fringe, often probably no more than façades for criminals. But they have taken a stronger hold in some of the more desperate refugee camps abroad (see article).
　　政治权力遭到了广泛的侵蚀，以加沙尤为严重，而氏族长老和犯罪集团大佬很快填补了这一权力真空。对于杰哈德（jihadi）的激进分子而言，缺乏法律约束是滋生他们的土壤。这些极端组织为那些不希望自己被基地组织和西方的战争拖下水的其他巴勒斯坦派别所唾弃。在加沙，这样的极端组织只是极少数，多数只不过是打着极端组织旗号，而行犯罪之实罢了。但在越绝望的难民营中，这些组织却能获得越强烈的支持。

War and peace
战争与和平

Today, the most positive spin on the 1967 war is that it paved the way for peace between Israel and its neighbours. Defeat made the Arabs begin to accept that the Jewish state could not be destroyed. The end of the dream of a pan-Arab state forced them to deal with Israel one-on-one. The lands that it had captured gave them something to negotiate over. The return of the Sinai to Egypt in 1982 set the example. Peace with Jordan followed in 1994. Talks with Syria came close to success in 2000. Finally, 35 years after those historic six days, the Arab world did the equivalent of admitting defeat. In 2002 the 22 members of the Arab League offered Israel full normalisation of relations in return for a full withdrawal from the territories captured in 1967, and repeated their offer earlier this year.
　　今天，认为6日战争奠定了以色列和邻国通往和平道路的基础的看法，是对这场战争最肯定的评价。失败使阿拉伯开始接受以色列将不会被消灭。也结束了泛阿国家的梦想，迫使他们一对一的与以色列交涉。而领土的占领让他们开始学会通过谈判来结束争端。1982年，以色列归还西奈半岛给埃及就树立了一个范例。此后，1994年又与约旦签订和平协议。2000年与叙利亚亚的和谈也差点取得成功。而在这历史性6日的35年后，阿拉伯世界也最终变相的承认了失败。22个阿盟成员国于2002年表示，他们提议用同以色列的关系全面正常化，来换取以色列从1967年占领的领土全面撤军，而且今年初他们又重申了一次。

But as tends to happen in the Middle East, events had already been overtaken by other events. The Arab League's first offer came at the blood-soaked height of the second intifada; its reiteration found both Israeli and Palestinian politics at new lows of divisiveness and desperation. Israel now sees itself as fighting not just 200m Arabs but 1.2 billion Muslims, armed with weapons it cannot resist and an ideology it cannot counter. Palestinians feel that a viable state is practically impossible, so deeply has Israel encroached on their land and dismembered their society. Like many wars, 1967 created opportunities. A shame that everyone has squandered them.
　　就像在中东常常发生的那样，各种事件总是一波未平，一波又起。阿盟第一次提议，正是巴人第二次起义的高潮，充满血雨腥风；再次重申的时候，又正赶上以巴政治正处于新一轮分歧和绝望的状态。现在，以色列发现和他们作战的并非仅是2亿阿拉伯人，而是12亿穆斯林，他们手持武器，无法与之抵抗，他们的意识形态也不能对抗。而巴勒斯坦则感到，几乎无法建立起一个能发展的国家，因为以色列对他们领土侵占是如此之深，对他们社会的分割是如此之甚。但同许多战争一样，1967年的6日战争也创造了机会。然而令人感到羞耻的是，每个人都挥霍过这些机会。

［注一］耶路撒冷老城：耶路撒冷分东、西两个城区，西耶路撒冷以犹太人为主，是现代以色列的核心地带；而老城及其东、北、南三面的东耶路撒冷则以巴勒斯坦人为主。耶路撒冷老城被一圈城墙所围绕，面积只有1平方千米，其中又分为4个宗教与种族聚居区：犹太区、基督徒区、亚美尼亚区和穆斯林区。耶路撒冷最重要的也是引起重大争议的宗教圣地均位于此处：包括犹太教的西墙和圣殿山，穆斯林的圆顶清真寺（Dome of the Rock）和阿克萨清真寺，以及基督徒的圣墓教堂和苦路。
　　1948年5月14日以色列宣布建国时，第一次中东战争爆发。战争结束时，以色列和约旦签订停战协定，划定的停火线穿过耶路撒冷的市中心。耶路撒冷西部被新成立的以色列国占领，而东耶路撒冷（包括老城和西岸）被外约旦（今约旦）占领。。而直到1967年的6日战争，以色列才全部占领耶路撒冷。

［注二］蓝白色的海洋：因以色列国旗是白底蓝色大卫星的构成，故有此称。

［注三］西墙：又称哭墙，是耶路撒冷旧城第二圣殿护墙的一段，也是第二圣殿护墙的仅存遗址；亦有“叹息之壁”之称。犹太教把该墙看作是第一圣地，教徒至该墙例须哀哭，以表示对古神庙的哀悼并期待其恢复，故称。

［注四］三个阿拉伯对手：指埃及、叙利亚和约旦。

［注五］大以色列：“大以色列”有两种含义，一种是宗教含义，指上帝的“应许之地”——迦南，即从埃及尼罗河直到幼发拉底大河之地；另一种是1981年沙龙向内阁提交的“大以色列”计划。此处应是指宗教含义的“大以色列”。

［注六］巴勒斯坦一直未能确立国家地位：1988年11月,在阿尔及尔举行的巴勒斯坦全国委员会第19次特别会议通过了《独立宣言》,宣布接受联合国第181号决议(即巴勒斯坦分治决议),建立以耶路撒冷为首都的巴勒斯坦国,但未确定其疆界。

［注七］约旦河稀缺的水资源：指1959年以色列的约旦河改道计划。

［注八］法塔赫：巴勒斯坦解放组织所属的武装组织。巴勒斯坦民族解放阵线的简称。阿拉伯文法、塔、赫分别是巴勒斯坦、解放 、运动三个词的字首字母。成立于1959年，是巴勒斯坦解放组织中实力最强、影响最大的组织，也是主流代表。主要领导人亚西尔·阿拉法特。口号是“革命，直到胜利”。1968年5 月 ，法塔赫与其他巴勒斯坦解放组织在约旦首都安曼召开会议，组成新的巴勒斯坦解放组织委员会。法塔赫是巴解组织中的中坚力量。最高权力机构是代表大会，革命委员会是大会闭幕期间的最高权力机关。革命委员会产生中央委员会为最高领导机构。法塔赫的武装组织是暴风突击队。亚西尔·阿拉法特任中央委员会主席兼暴风突击队总司令。法塔赫最初决定通过武装斗争打倒犹太复国主义，解放全部巴勒斯坦领土，建立以耶路撒冷为首都的民主国家，在公正、平等基础上保证巴勒斯坦全体公民的合法权利。以后逐步强调要以外交和政治斗争方式在约旦河西岸和加沙地带建立一个国家。1983年 5 月，法塔赫内部因对黎以撤军协议和约巴对话出现分歧而发生流血冲突。1983年末，法塔赫反对派在叙利亚和利比亚支持下，围攻在黎巴嫩北部的法塔赫部队。为此阿拉法特率4000名巴解战士迁移到阿拉伯其他国家。法塔赫主流派以阿拉法特、阿布·伊亚德、阿布·杰哈德和卡杜米为首，确认阿拉法特在巴解中的领导地位。主张推动约巴会谈，约巴合组代表团参加中东和谈，开展同埃及对话，希望与美国加强联系。1992年后，积极支持巴以谈判并签订协议。

［注九］巴解组织：全称巴勒斯坦解放组织，1964年5月在耶路撒冷成立。1974 年10月在拉巴特举行的第七次阿拉伯首脑会议上被确认为巴勒斯坦唯一合法的代表。巴解组织从建立时日起就得到阿拉伯各国政府的承认。1964～1967年艾哈迈德·舒凯里拉任主席  。1968年5月在约旦安曼召开会议，组成新的巴勒斯坦全国委员会。在这次会议上，阿拉法特确立了他的领导地位。

［注十］雷切尔：以色列人先祖雅各的妻子。

［注十一］乌玛：本意为不同地域、时期、文化的人群的称谓，现指“穆斯林社团”或“穆斯林公社”。



[ 本帖最后由 学谦 于 2007-6-18 17:15 编辑 ]

丁锋

engulfing the cool stone walls in a blue-and-white sea

犹太人的围墙传统

耶路撒冷（Jerusalem）旧城的“哭墙”（Wailing Wall）是以色列的国宝，原以色列人圣殿仅余的残址，是犹太人世界中最神圣的地方。



圣城耶路撒冷的城墙


以及以巴永远的创伤“安全墙”

dtchengxc

学谦辛苦了。
没看内容，格式精致，每个专有名词都做了注解，很专业啊，可以看出其人性格之一斑：完美主义。不知然否?:lol
搬张板凳慢慢看...

phynics

先看到这里，好长……

harald

敬仰着看。。。

jerrywhitt

0. The aftermath of the war of 1967 － 6日战争的余波，我觉得还是要把年代翻译出来。另外story翻译成故事在这里我有点不明白，我想应该还有更深层次的含义，等我看完了吧。

1. 第一段翻译得非常具有美感，简直找不到更美的句子了，“小倩”是不是去过那里啊？以色列美人与钱嫂谁更漂亮？:lol

2.1. this year's rejoicers wore a uniform, albeit of a different kind今年的欢庆者也都着装统一，只是不是军装罢了。
uniform在这里你把它作为了一个形容词而翻译成了“统一的，一致的”，但我觉得这里该是名词，也就是说这里如不考虑albeit，句子就可以重新写为...rejoicers wore a different kind of uniform...我理解的是不同类型的制服。制服可以有很多种，如军服、办公服、礼宾服与劳动服等，这里是不是可以是庆功服？
2.2. ...settling as much as possible of “Greater Israel” is a religious duty...尽可能的定居于“大以色列（Greater Israel）”是一种宗教责任
“小倩”将settling理解为人民定居于大以色列，而我却觉得这里应该是尽可能确保大以色列的稳定与富强，即it is a religious duty to make sure that the settling of "greater Israel" is guaranteed as much as possible.

To be continued in case of network failure!:loveliness:

学谦

大姐真是礼尚往来阿...感动之极:'( ，就没人帮我评阿...

0. story也有人建议为“经历”，当时我是最后翻译标题的，已经精疲力竭，所以没有多加思考，就用了“故事”，这个问题可以继续深入探讨：%

fred

发现几个小问题：

1.一举控制了比其疆域大近三倍的领土
took control of nearly three times its own landmass

问题：是……的三倍和比……大三倍没有分清
建议：一举控制了将近其国土面积三倍的土地

2.不过至今双方仍存在分歧，他们国内的冲突时常使一方不能与另一方达成一致。而在此期间，这片满斥着争执的土地得到的只是刺目的教派冲突。
Yet since then both societies have fractured to the point that their internal conflicts sometimes eclipse the one they have with the other side. And in the meantime a dispute over land has acquired the harsh absolutes of a religious conflict.

问题：没有弄清以色列内部巴人同以色列人的矛盾，以及以色列全国同边界外巴勒斯坦人的矛盾关系；后半句理解有误。
建议：然而，由于这两个社会隔阂太深，有时其内部冲突同与巴勒斯坦的外部冲突相比，反而显得微不足道（eclipse）。同时，土地争执也演变为尖锐的宗教冲突。

3.如今有许多相关人员和历史学家认为，当初其实谁都不愿意发动战争
Many of the participants, historians now argue, were reluctant to go to war

问题：理解有误——historians now argue 是插入语。
建议：历史学家现在认为，许多当年的参与者其实不愿意走向战争。

4.这完全是因为约旦河（Jordan river ）稀缺的水资源
which competed with Israel for the scarce waters of the Jordan river

问题：或许把competed看成了completed?
建议：它同以色列争抢稀缺的约旦河水资源

5.是能够消灭敌国却没有达成的失败
a huge gamble that stretched Israel's forces to the very limit, and could have destroyed the country had it failed

问题：理解有误——the country指以色列
建议：这场赌博，把以色列拖的精疲力竭，如果失败，很可能就会毁掉以色列
6.但无论是20年前巴勒斯坦人的第一次起义，还是在加沙地带和西岸的暴动，都使得以色列主流人群开始质问继续占领这些领土是否明智
It was two decades before the first Palestinian uprising, or intifada, made mainstream Israelis question the wisdom of holding on to the occupied territories

问题：句子太长，理解不了。intifada就是前面的uprising.
建议：巴人发动的首次起义，促使主流以色列社会开始重新思考继续占领这些领土是否明智，而这已经是20年后的事情了。或者更直白：巴人发动首次起义20年后，主流以色列社会才开始重新思考继续占领这些土地是否明智的问题

7. 250亿美元的军事援助
some $2.5 billion a year in military aid
问题：25亿美元
建议：省

8.通过将拒签苏联犹太人出境签证演变为一个政治问题，有助于保持犹太人的同化
By turning the refusal of exit visas for Soviet Jews into a political issue, it helped keep Jews there from assimilating

问题：keep…from是防止的意思。短语理解失误
分析：以色列胜利有两个影响，一个是美国产生了强大的犹太人游说集团，另一个就是拒绝给苏联犹太人颁发出境签证，从而防止红色苏联的犹太人来到以色列“同化”纯正的以色列人。
建议：通过大肆炒作拒签苏联犹太人出境签证问题，以色列也抵制了苏联犹太人对本国犹太人的同化 。

9.随之取代的是邻国始终把矛头指向着以色列，他们为了遏制以色列蓬勃的势头，通过游击战的可怕复杂把以军牵连于其中
Instead of tackling Israel head-on, its neighbours concentrated ever more on sponsoring proxies that entangled the army in the terrible complexities of guerrilla warfare

问题：有些东西没译出来（proxy）.
建议：邻国不再正面同以色列冲突，而是集中力量扶植代理人，从而将以军拖入游击战的泥沼。

10.“战略纵深”的想法能够保卫国家，但在第一次海湾战争（the first Gulf war）中也遭到了来自萨达姆•侯赛因（Saddam Hussein）飞毛腿（Scud）导弹，以及目前来自加沙和真主党的火箭弹的袭击，还有迫在眉睫伊朗核弹头的威胁
The idea that “strategic depth” of territory can protect the country has also taken a beating from Saddam Hussein's Scud missiles in the first Gulf war, from Gaza's and Hizbullah's rockets, and now from the impending menace of an Iranian nuclear missile

问题：句子太长，看走眼了。结构是：the idea has taken a beating from
建议：所谓“战略纵深”领土能够保卫国家的说法，也遭到了一系列打击，如首次海湾战争时期侯赛因的飞毛腿导弹……

11.但就算是最训练有素的军队也无法消除所有的威胁，这就是以色列今天所要面临的问题。
even the best-trained army cannot destroy the kinds of threats Israel faces today.

问题：误解
建议：即使最训练有素的军队也无法消除以色列今天面临的威胁。

12.由于新意识形态坚持其独立的基本解释，进而威胁到该地区的现存政权
As the new ideology took hold it spun off radical interpretations that came to threaten the region's existing regimes

问题：take hold没理解，站住脚，to become established
建议：随着新意识形态逐渐深入人心，对教义的极端解释也开始传播开来，从而对本地区现存政权形成威胁。

13.扼杀西岸经济并且驱逐更多极端主义倾向的巴勒斯坦人。
stifle the West Bank's economy and drive even more Palestinians to extremism.

问题：误解
建议：扼杀西岸经济，甚至将更多巴人逼向极端主义。

14.而将以色列少数派组织化的定居者是最为果断的人群之一
the settlers are one of the most determined and organised minorities in the country

问题：determined和organised关系没弄清（并列）
建议：而定居者是这个国家最坚定、最有组织的少数派之一

15.他们谨慎对待犹太复国主义，而对早期定居者和世俗民族主义者更甚，但也分担了阿拉伯人对定居者的厌恶
who used to be wary of Zionism but are ever more pro-settler

问题：理解有误
建议：他们过去曾经谨慎对待犹太复国主义，但现在却比以前更支持定居者了。

16.造就流亡异乡的阿拉法特及其战友的领导地位
That turned Arafat and his cronies into a leadership in exile

问题：理解有误
建议：这样就把阿拉法特及其一帮追随着变成了流亡他乡的领导集团

17.因为巴勒斯坦人处于以色列的控制之下，他们的发展极其孤立
They grew so detached from the Palestinians under Israeli rule that the first intifada in 1987 took them completely by surprise

问题：没有弄清关系
建议：阿拉法特领导集体同以色列统治下的巴勒斯坦人之间严重隔绝，因此1987年巴人起义时，他们都大吃一惊。

18.哈马斯利用广泛的暴动声望而提出了一些主张
Hamas took advantage to claim some of the credit for that popular uprising

问题：对claim误解。这里是博取声望的意思claim   credit
建议：哈马斯因这次广受欢迎的起义而为自己捞取了一些政治资本

19.遭受着来自烦恼和压迫的种种限制
their host countries impose a variety of restrictions ranging from the annoying to the oppressive

问题：不理解annoying 和oppressive修饰什么。
建议：他们所居住的国家对他们实施了各种限制，小的时候，是不断骚扰，大的时候，几乎是赤裸裸的压迫和欺凌

20.而且赞成享有国内返回权，以回到他们祖居的村庄，这些对于从国外回来的流亡者而言，相当什么都没有做
Palestinians living in Israel have adopted a more local agenda, campaigning against discrimination that they suffer in the Jewish state, and for an internal right of return to their ancestors' villages that has nothing to do with the return of refugees from abroad

问题：句子太长，关系搞不清
建议：住在以色列的巴勒斯坦人已经采纳了一种更为地方化的措施，举行大规模运动，抗议他们在这个犹太人国家遭受的种种歧视，争取回到祖先居住过的村庄的内部权力，而这种权利的争取同国外（巴勒斯坦）难民返回以色列没有任何关系（以色列担心他们是一伙的）。

21.奠定了以色列和邻国通往和平的道路。
it paved the way for peace between Israel and its neighbours

问题：奠定了基础，没听过奠定了道路
建议：为以色列及其邻国的和平道路扫清了障碍。

22.但注意到因为这些都发生在在中东，这里的事情远非其他事件所能比。阿盟一次提议是对血腥第二次巴勒斯坦人暴动的缓和，而重申则是因为巴以双方政治都处于不和与绝望的新低
But as tends to happen in the Middle East, events had already been overtaken by other events. The Arab League's first offer came at the blood-soaked height of the second intifada; its reiteration found both Israeli and Palestinian politics at new lows of divisiveness and desperation

问题：句子是在理解不了。tends是动词，主语是后面的events。由于不理解，所以出现了生造的“远非其他事件所能比”。
建议：就像在中东常常发生的那样，各种事件总是一波未平，一波又起（overtaken）。阿盟第一次提议，正是巴人第二次起义的高潮，充满血雨腥风；再次重申的时候，又正赶上以巴政治正处于新一轮分歧和绝望的状态。

鄙人预见：研究报告事实繁杂，句子冗长，译成中文，首先要准确理解英文，在此基础上，再用通顺流畅的中文表达出来。另外，有些事实，一定要再三求证，以免以讹传讹。

学谦

1.一举控制了比其疆域大近三倍的领土
took control of nearly three times its own landmass
问题：是……的三倍和比……大三倍没有分清
建议：一举控制了将近其国土面积三倍的土地

这条很对，我确实搞不清“是……的三倍”和“大三倍”的关系
改：一举控制了比其疆域大近两倍的领土

2.不过至今双方仍存在分歧，他们国内的冲突时常使一方不能与另一方达成一致。而在此期间，这片满斥着争执的土地得到的只是刺目的教派冲突。
Yet since then both societies have fractured to the point that their internal conflicts sometimes eclipse the one they have with the other side. And in the meantime a dispute over land has acquired the harsh absolutes of a religious conflict.
问题：没有弄清以色列内部巴人同以色列人的矛盾，以及以色列全国同边界外巴勒斯坦人的矛盾关系；后半句理解有误。
建议：然而，由于这两个社会隔阂太深，有时其内部冲突同与巴勒斯坦的外部冲突相比，反而显得微不足道（eclipse）。同时，土地争执
也演变为尖锐的宗教冲突。

存疑，待进一步探讨
改：待定

3.如今有许多相关人员和历史学家认为，当初其实谁都不愿意发动战争
Many of the participants, historians now argue, were reluctant to go to war
问题：理解有误——historians now argue 是插入语。
建议：历史学家现在认为，许多当年的参与者其实不愿意走向战争。

同意
改：同你的建议

4.这完全是因为约旦河（Jordan river ）稀缺的水资源
which competed with Israel for the scarce waters of the Jordan river
问题：或许把competed看成了completed?
建议：它同以色列争抢稀缺的约旦河水资源

恩，你说的对，这个是我漏掉了
改：这完全是因为叙利亚与以色列争夺约旦河（Jordan river ）稀缺的水资源，还支持…

5.是能够消灭敌国却没有达成的失败
a huge gamble that stretched Israel's forces to the very limit, and could have destroyed the country had it failed
问题：理解有误——the country指以色列
建议：这场赌博，把以色列拖的精疲力竭，如果失败，很可能就会毁掉以色列

同意，我忽视了中间那个分号的作用
改：这是一场由于对敌人意图和政治手段的误判，而由激进军队挑起的战争；这也是一场铺张以军力量到极限程度，不成功便成仁的豪赌

6.但无论是20年前巴勒斯坦人的第一次起义，还是在加沙地带和西岸的暴动，都使得以色列主流人群开始质问继续占领这些领土是否明智
It was two decades before the first Palestinian uprising, or intifada, made mainstream Israelis question the wisdom of holding on to the occupied territories
问题：句子太长，理解不了。intifada就是前面的uprising.
建议：巴人发动的首次起义，促使主流以色列社会开始重新思考继续占领这些领土是否明智，而这已经是20年后的事情了。或者更直白：巴人发动首次起义20年后，主流以色列社会才开始重新思考继续占领这些土地是否明智的问题

按你这么说，or intifada其实是一个省略句了，这样才解释的通。当时我翻译的时候，也是很疑惑，intifada就是特指2次巴勒斯坦人的起义，怎么在the first Palestinian uprising，又加上一个or intifada。呵呵，多谢你的解答，很感谢。
但是，你说开始“重新思考继续占领这些领土是否明智，而这已经是20年后的事情了”，不知这么说有什么根据？因为巴人第一次起义的时间，就在20年前，而如果说是起义二十年后，也就是今天才开始反思，是不是有些误解？毕竟从事实上来看，拉宾与阿拉法特的和解，就是一种反思的结果。
改： 20年前巴勒斯坦人的第一次起义，使得以色列主流人群开始质问继续占领这些领土是否明智

7. 250亿美元的军事援助
some $2.5 billion a year in military aid
问题：25亿美元
建议：省

呵呵，我总是犯这种低级错误，多谢了
改： 25亿美元

8.通过将拒签苏联犹太人出境签证演变为一个政治问题，有助于保持犹太人的同化
By turning the refusal of exit visas for Soviet Jews into a political issue, it helped keep Jews there from assimilating
问题：keep…from是防止的意思。短语理解失误
分析：以色列胜利有两个影响，一个是美国产生了强大的犹太人游说集团，另一个就是拒绝给苏联犹太人颁发出境签证，从而防止红色苏联的犹太人来到以色列“同化”纯正的以色列人。
建议：通过大肆炒作拒签苏联犹太人出境签证问题，以色列也抵制了苏联犹太人对本国犹太人的同化 。

这点我不同意，请注意背景，请注意“refusenik”的意思。这里很明显是指，苏联政府拒绝给移民以色列的犹太人颁发签证，而以色列通过把这个问题政治化，从而阻止了犹太人被苏联政府同化。当然，你的建议给了我很大的启发。开始忽视了keep…from这个短语。这次翻译有些缺乏宏观的把握了，呵呵
改： 从而有助于避免苏联犹太人被苏联政府所同化。

9.随之取代的是邻国始终把矛头指向着以色列，他们为了遏制以色列蓬勃的势头，通过游击战的可怕复杂把以军牵连于其中
Instead of tackling Israel head-on, its neighbours concentrated ever more on sponsoring proxies that entangled the army in the terrible complexities of guerrilla warfare
问题：有些东西没译出来（proxy）.
建议：邻国不再正面同以色列冲突，而是集中力量扶植代理人，从而将以军拖入游击战的泥沼。

同意，你的理解和翻译比我精确
改：同你的建议。

10.“战略纵深”的想法能够保卫国家，但在第一次海湾战争（the first Gulf war）中也遭到了来自萨达姆•侯赛因（Saddam Hussein）飞毛腿（Scud）导弹，以及目前来自加沙和真主党的火箭弹的袭击，还有迫在眉睫伊朗核弹头的威胁
The idea that “strategic depth” of territory can protect the country has also taken a beating from Saddam Hussein's Scud missiles in the first Gulf war, from Gaza's and Hizbullah's rockets, and now from the impending menace of an Iranian nuclear missile
问题：句子太长，看走眼了。结构是：the idea has taken a beating from
建议：所谓“战略纵深”领土能够保卫国家的说法，也遭到了一系列打击，如首次海湾战争时期侯赛因的飞毛腿导弹……

呵呵，确实，其实当时知道什么意思，但是翻着翻着就走眼了，呵呵
改： 而“战略纵深”能够保卫国家的想法，也遭到了打击，如第一次海湾战争（the first Gulf war）中萨达姆•侯赛因（Saddam Hussein）飞
毛腿（Scud）导弹，以及目前来自加沙和真主党的火箭弹的袭击，还有迫在眉睫伊朗核弹头的威胁

11.但就算是最训练有素的军队也无法消除所有的威胁，这就是以色列今天所要面临的问题。
even the best-trained army cannot destroy the kinds of threats Israel faces today.
问题：误解
建议：即使最训练有素的军队也无法消除以色列今天面临的威胁。

同意，看走眼了
改： 同你的建议

12.由于新意识形态坚持其独立的基本解释，进而威胁到该地区的现存政权
As the new ideology took hold it spun off radical interpretations that came to threaten the region's existing regimes
问题：take hold没理解，站住脚，to become established
建议：随着新意识形态逐渐深入人心，对教义的极端解释也开始传播开来，从而对本地区现存政权形成威胁。

有2个问题还需要你帮忙解答一下。一，spin off在这里怎么理解？二，对教义的极端解释也开始传播开来，是从何而来的？
改： 待定

13.扼杀西岸经济并且驱逐更多极端主义倾向的巴勒斯坦人。
stifle the West Bank's economy and drive even more Palestinians to extremism.
问题：误解
建议：扼杀西岸经济，甚至将更多巴人逼向极端主义。

看来还是对drive不同的理解了，是“逼迫”还是“驱逐”呢？我觉得根据上面的文意，应该是驱逐吧？如果是逼迫的话，那就不是稳定定居点内局势的做法了。
改： 待定

14.而将以色列少数派组织化的定居者是最为果断的人群之一
the settlers are one of the most determined and organised minorities in the country
问题：determined和organised关系没弄清（并列）
建议：而定居者是这个国家最坚定、最有组织的少数派之一

呵呵，看来低级错误还不少哈
改： 同你的建议

15.他们谨慎对待犹太复国主义，而对早期定居者和世俗民族主义者更甚，但也分担了阿拉伯人对定居者的厌恶
who used to be wary of Zionism but are ever more pro-settler
问题：理解有误
建议：他们过去曾经谨慎对待犹太复国主义，但现在却比以前更支持定居者了。

我也曾是和你一样的想法，但是从对极端正统派遵循的教义来看，他们应该是强烈反对以色列建国，或者说回到巴勒斯坦的。他们之所以称为极端正统，就是相信犹太人是被上帝驱逐出故土的，在得到上帝宽恕之前，不应该违背这一原则。
不过我还是觉得你的理解很有道理，因为联系上下文来看，应该是这样的理解。对背景不是很了解，需要继续探讨。
改：待定

16.造就流亡异乡的阿拉法特及其战友的领导地位
That turned Arafat and his cronies into a leadership in exile
问题：理解有误
建议：这样就把阿拉法特及其一帮追随着变成了流亡他乡的领导集团

我们的理解，存在根本的不同吗？

17.因为巴勒斯坦人处于以色列的控制之下，他们的发展极其孤立
They grew so detached from the Palestinians under Israeli rule that the first intifada in 1987 took them completely by surprise
问题：没有弄清关系
建议：阿拉法特领导集体同以色列统治下的巴勒斯坦人之间严重隔绝，因此1987年巴人起义时，他们都大吃一惊。

其实我们理解并没有什么不同，只是表达方式的不同。因为以色列的巴人被与阿拉法特没有什么联系，所以他们的发展很孤立（注意“发展”，你的译文没有译出来），所以起义才会令世人吃惊。

18.哈马斯利用广泛的暴动声望而提出了一些主张
Hamas took advantage to claim some of the credit for that popular uprising
问题：对claim误解。这里是博取声望的意思claim   credit
建议：哈马斯因这次广受欢迎的起义而为自己捞取了一些政治资本

非常赞同
改：同你的建议

19.遭受着来自烦恼和压迫的种种限制
their host countries impose a variety of restrictions ranging from the annoying to the oppressive
问题：不理解annoying 和oppressive修饰什么。
建议：他们所居住的国家对他们实施了各种限制，小的时候，是不断骚扰，大的时候，几乎是赤裸裸的压迫和欺凌

这个是我的表达不够准确
改：待改

20.而且赞成享有国内返回权，以回到他们祖居的村庄，这些对于从国外回来的流亡者而言，相当什么都没有做
Palestinians living in Israel have adopted a more local agenda, campaigning against discrimination that they suffer in the Jewish state, and for an internal right of return to their ancestors' villages that has nothing to do with the return of refugees from abroad
问题：句子太长，关系搞不清
建议：住在以色列的巴勒斯坦人已经采纳了一种更为地方化的措施，举行大规模运动，抗议他们在这个犹太人国家遭受的种种歧视，争取回到祖先居住过的村庄的内部权力，而这种权利的争取同国外（巴勒斯坦）难民返回以色列没有任何关系（以色列担心他们是一伙的）。

我认为还是and for an internal right of return to their ancestors' villages that has nothing to do with the return of refugees from abroad这部分的问题，你的建议给我了一个参考，但是我觉得可能我们都没有完全理解原文和背景，所以期待更好的解释
改：待改

21.奠定了以色列和邻国通往和平的道路。
it paved the way for peace between Israel and its neighbours
问题：奠定了基础，没听过奠定了道路
建议：为以色列及其邻国的和平道路扫清了障碍。

呵呵，说得对
改：奠定了以色列和邻国通往和平道路的基础

22.但注意到因为这些都发生在在中东，这里的事情远非其他事件所能比。阿盟一次提议是对血腥第二次巴勒斯坦人暴动的缓和，而重申则是因为巴以双方政治都处于不和与绝望的新低
But as tends to happen in the Middle East, events had already been overtaken by other events. The Arab League's first offer came at the blood-soaked height of the second intifada; its reiteration found both Israeli and Palestinian politics at new lows of divisiveness and desperation
问题：句子是在理解不了。tends是动词，主语是后面的events。由于不理解，所以出现了生造的“远非其他事件所能比”。
建议：就像在中东常常发生的那样，各种事件总是一波未平，一波又起（overtaken）。阿盟第一次提议，正是巴人第二次起义的高潮，充满血雨腥风；再次重申的时候，又正赶上以巴政治正处于新一轮分歧和绝望的状态。

这一句，关键是没有理解events had already been overtaken by other events，多谢你的解释，让我恍然大悟。
改：同你的建议

不管怎么样，非常感谢fred这次认真的点评，同时也希望我们今后能够冰释前嫌，忘记以前的不愉快。

另22处错误，当然有些是双方的误解，有些是我的低级错误，有些是很严重的理解错误。翻译这么长的文章，难免有很多错误，尤其像我这样英文并不很好的人。所以，我以为肯定还不止这些问题，希望还有高人能继续发现问题，让我完善这篇译文：）

[ 本帖最后由 学谦 于 2007-5-31 10:17 编辑 ]

sparker

Just as the war made Jews the world over feel vindicated after 19 years of precarious statehood, the reunification of historic Palestine—Israel, Gaza and the West Bank—under Israeli rule seemed to give the Palestinians a chance to get their own struggle for a state back on track. Yet since then both societies have fractured to the point that their internal conflicts sometimes eclipse the one they have with the other side. And in the meantime a dispute over land has acquired the harsh absolutes of a religious conflict.
这段的理解看来大家有些不一样。
Fred的理解：
“2.不过至今双方仍存在分歧，他们国内的冲突时常使一方不能与另一方达成一致。而在此期间，这片满斥着争执的土地得到的只是刺目的教派冲突。
Yet since then both societies have fractured to the point that their internal conflicts sometimes eclipse the one they have with the other side. And in the meantime a dispute over land has acquired the harsh absolutes of a religious conflict.

问题：没有弄清以色列内部巴人同以色列人的矛盾，以及以色列全国同边界外巴勒斯坦人的矛盾关系；后半句理解有误。
建议：然而，由于这两个社会隔阂太深，有时其内部冲突同与巴勒斯坦的外部冲突相比，反而显得微不足道（eclipse）。同时，土地争执也演变为尖锐的宗教冲突。”

我觉得eclipse并不是微不足道，eclipse在这里不是形容词，它也没有形容词的用法。eclipse在这里是动词。指犹太社会的内部冲突和巴勒斯坦人的内部冲突（最近大家也看到了内战内行的巴勒斯坦人了吧）反过来掩盖了犹太社会和巴勒斯坦社会相互间的外部冲突。所以，这句的意思可能正好与Fred兄最终的理解相反。

对于这一段，首先是对于19years的理解，这一句其实是说犹太人在度过了建国后的19年动荡岁月之后（以色列1948年建国，6日战争时是1967年，他们建国19年）终于通过这次战争找到了建国的合理性。
在六日战争前，虽然两次中东战争以色列所在一方都获胜，但是，从军事和领土角度来说，以方一直是处于被动局面，周围的阿拉伯领居们虎视眈眈，以军没有压倒性优势，只是靠自卫和与英法（第二次中东战争）合作来入侵别国扩大领地。而六日战争后，以色列不但独立打败了周围两大阿拉伯军事强国埃及和叙利亚，占领了西奈半岛和戈兰高地两个战略要地作为缓冲，更促成了联合国通过242号决议要求阿拉伯国家承认以色列的独立与安全（打破了阿拉伯国家军事反以同盟的合法性）解决了以色列国的生存问题（之后的两次中东战争一次是阿拉伯国家收复属于他们的失地，一次是以色列入侵黎巴嫩，都不再是对以色列本土的侵犯了）。了解了这个背景就可以稍稍体会一下当时以色列人的喜悦心情了。而这还不包括宗教上收复整个耶路撒冷的重大意义，正是这一伟大胜利成为了以色列在中东的转折点，也使拉宾、达扬等战将成为以色列历史上空前绝后的国家英雄。

而后一句如我最开始所说，指的是现在，以色列的内部矛盾（定居点问题、对外政治问题）和巴勒斯坦的内部矛盾（政权问题、斗争方式问题、外交问题）造成的冲突反而大过了民族矛盾、领土问题造成的冲突。也就是小标题所说的赢得了战争却加剧了内部的分裂。

而最后一句是说与此同时，领土纠纷也必然导致了宗教冲突的加剧（这句Fred的翻译基本正确）。
the reunification of historic Palestine—Israel, Gaza and the West Bank—under Israeli rule seemed to give the Palestinians a chance to get their own struggle for a state back on track. 是说在以色列人获得vindicated的同时，巴勒斯坦人也因为领土丧失而找到了团结一心抵抗以色列夺回领土的理由。
所以，虽然两个社会间的内部矛盾依然激烈，但是领土问题造成的外部矛盾才是最主要的，最后一句是这个意思。这也与前文，以色列人的庆祝和巴勒斯坦人的旁观相呼应。也就是指出了，中东问题的根本是领土和宗教问题。内部矛盾相比之下只是暂时的或者是因为对怎样处理主要矛盾意见的不统一而发生的。