[2010.03.04]Sharing the pain 患难与共

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Dealing with fiscal deficits
处理财政赤字

Sharing the pain
患难与共

Increasing budget deficits and rising government debts are likely to entail fierce political battles—not least between taxpayers and public-sector workers
增加预算赤字以及提高政府负债有可能需要激烈的政治斗争—远超纳税人与公务员的范畴

Mar 4th 2010 | From The Economist print edition



WHEN times are hard, many people are tempted to let their credit cards take the strain for a while. And when economies fall into recession, many governments are happy to let their budget deficits widen, to tide the economy over.

拮据的时候，许多人倾向于让信用卡超支一阵子。当经济陷入衰退，许多政府都乐于扩大赤字，以度过难关。

Sensible as this may be, deficits in several countries have increased so much and so fast during the economic crisis of the past 18 months or so that it is generally agreed that remedial action will be needed in the medium term. Deficits of 10% or more of GDP cannot be sustained for long, especially when nervous markets drive up the cost of servicing the growing debt.

也许很有道理，一些国家的赤字在过去18个月的经济危机里增加的太多太快以至于普遍认为需要一个中期的挽救计划。GDP10%左右的赤字不能持久，尤其是紧张兮兮的市场会抬高负债增加所需的成本。

Market pressure explains why deficits have come to the fore in southern Europe. Greece and Portugal, in particular, have seen a sharp rise in their cost of finance and some investors have questioned their ability to roll over their debt. But deficits will also be at the centre of the forthcoming British election campaign, and in America the “tea party” movement has launched a populist campaign against rising government spending.

市场的压力解释了为什么南欧的赤字如此显眼。尤其是希腊和葡萄牙已经见证了财政成本的飞速上涨，一些投资者质疑他们滚动还债的能力。但赤字还会是即将到来的英国大选的中心议题，美国“茶叶党”运动发起了一项群众运动以反对政府增加支出。

There is no absolute rule on when deficits or public debts are too high relative to an economy’s size. Prior to the crisis the general consensus was that rich countries could safely have public debts worth 60% of GDP. Yet although Japan’s debt has exceeded its GDP for many years, the government has yet to suffer a financing crisis, perhaps because it has a large number of willing domestic buyers of its bonds. But when the markets do lose confidence in a government’s fiscal rectitude, a crisis can arise quite quickly, forcing countries into painful political decisions.

赤字或公债相对经济总量占多少份额算高并没有一个绝对的数值。危机之前的普遍共识是发达国家负债额不超过GDP60%就是安全的。虽然日本的负债已经很多年都超过了其GDP，政府并未遭遇财政危机，也许是因为其有相当大数量的愿意购买国债的国民。但当市场对政府的财政信誉信心全无之时，危机会快速爆发，迫使国家做出痛苦的政治抉择。

Plainly, economic growth makes policymakers’ lives much easier. Growth reduces deficits automatically by increasing tax revenues and cutting spending on unemployment benefits and so forth. As the economy grows, deficits fall, debts become more sustainable, lightening the adjustment burden and reassuring investors.

简单的说，经济增长让政策制定者的日子舒坦很多。增长通过税收增加和失业福利支出的降低等减少了赤字。随着经济增长，赤字降低，债务变得更易维持，降低了调控负担，让投资者安心。

Nations have recovered from huge debt burdens in the past, often in the aftermath of wars, when men and resources were released from conflict and put to more productive work. When politicians turn to today’s deficit problems, it is vital that they choose policies that enhance long-term growth prospects. They will not lack opportunities: in several countries, for example, increases in statutory pension ages and other reforms that make labour markets more flexible are anyway overdue.

好些国家从以往的巨大负债中恢复过来，一般是战后时期，当人力和资源从冲突中释放出来从事更有生产力的工作时。当政治家们面对如今的赤字问题时，选择强化长期增长前景的政策至关重要。他们并不缺少机会：举例而言，在好几个国家，提高法定退休年龄和其他的改革使得劳动力市场更灵活，不管怎么说有点晚。

It would, however, be unwise to assume that a burst of rapid and prolonged growth is imminent in many rich economies. Ageing or even shrinking populations make sluggish growth more likely. Growth also tends to be weak in the aftermath of financial crises. In a recent book on sovereign debt, “This Time is Different”, Carmen Reinhart of the University of Maryland and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard conclude that “the evidence offers little support for the view that countries simply grow out of their debts.”

然而，认为许多发达国家即将迎来一次快速而持久的增长的设想是不明智的。老年化或缩减的人口数更有可能造成增长迟缓。金融危机之后的增长也更有可能很虚弱。在最近一本关于主权基金的书《这一次大不同》中，作者马里兰大学的Carmen Reinhart和哈佛大学的Kenneth Rogoff总结说“证据不能支持国家已经摆脱债务的观点”

So, short of debt default or implicit default via inflation, that leaves two other ways of closing the deficit. Spending must be cut or taxpayers must pay more. Many political battles of the next few years will be fought on these simple lines, with taxpayers on one side and the beneficiaries of public spending on the other. One imminent battle will be between taxpayers and public-sector workers. In some countries, one party can be seen as representing taxpayers (the Conservatives in Britain and the Republicans in America) and the other the workers (Labour and the Democrats, respectively).

因此，通过通胀削减负债违约或隐性违约，留下两种减少赤字的其他方法。要么减少支出要么纳税人多缴税。接下来好几年将有许多政治斗争围绕这些简单的主线展开，一方是纳税人另一方是公共支出的受益人。一场即将爆发的战斗将在纳税人和公务员间展开。在某些国家，某党派可以被看做是纳税人的代表（英国的保守党和美国的共和党），另一党则是公务员代表（相应的就是工党和民主党）

Another of these fights will be between generations. In America the biggest medium-term budget busters are pensions and health care for the old. A big deficit may ease the economic pain in the short term but risks saddling the next generation with a growth-sapping burden of higher taxes and interest payments. The battles are also intertwined: taxpayers finance the pensions of public employees which are, by and large, more generous and predictable than in the private sector.

另一场斗争将会发生在不同年代的人之间。在美国中期预算最大的毒瘤是老年人的养老金和医疗费。巨大的财政赤字会在短期减少经济的剧痛，但高额税收和利息支出将会成为侵蚀增长的负担，让下一代承担风险。这些斗争还会互相关联缠绕：同为纳税人支付养老金，公务员总体而言比私人部门的要丰厚而有保障。

The outcome of these battles will vary from country to country. Both sides have potent weapons. Many of the biggest taxpayers are political donors and have access to people in power. If they are ignored, they may pack up and move to a more friendly jurisdiction. In Europe especially, public employees, together with recipients of public services, probably have numbers on their side. They are certainly better organised, via their trade unions, and they are political donors too. As French workers have often shown, public-sector unions can intimidate governments with strikes and demonstrations. Their Greek brethren have been trying to emulate them.

各国之间这种斗争的结果将会大相径庭。每一方都有威力巨大的武器。许多大型纳税人都是政治捐款人，能接触有权势的人。如果他们被忽视，他们就会收拾包袱投奔一个更友善的官辖。尤其在欧洲，公务员和公共服务的受益者，可能会站在他们一边。通过工会，他们组织有序，也是政治捐款人。就像法国的工人经常展现的那样，公共部门的公会可以通过罢工和游行威胁政府。希腊的兄弟们正在试图模仿他们。

The case for cuts
要削减的情形。



Experience suggests that governments should focus on spending cuts rather than tax increases. An NBER study of 1996 concluded that “fiscal adjustments which rely primarily on spending cuts and the government wage bill have a better chance of being successful and are expansionary. On the contrary, fiscal adjustments which rely primarily on tax increases and cuts in public investment tend not to last and are contractionary.” A paper by António Afonso of the European Central Bank and Davide Furceri of the OECD found that increases in government spending as a proportion of GDP tended to be correlated with slower economic growth. And a paper published by Policy Exchange, a right-of-centre British think-tank, concluded that successful debt consolidations had put 80% of the emphasis on spending cuts (see table).

经验表明政府应当专注于削减支出而不是增税。NBER一项1996年的研究指出“主要依靠削减支出和政府工资的财政调整方案更有可能成功，也更具扩张性。相反依靠增税和缩减公共投资的财政调整不大会持久还会导致经济紧缩。”欧洲央行的António Afonso和OECD的Davide Furceri论文发现政府支出占GDP的比例在经济增长较缓慢时更易增长。Policy Exchange，一个英国中右智囊在其报告中总结说成功的负债合并有80%侧重于削减支出（见上表）

Some of the more successful deficit-cutting programmes were accompanied by falls in inflation and interest rates. These made it easier for economies to rebound and helped shore up governments’ electoral support. But today inflation is already low, as are most countries’ bond yields. So cutting spending may not bring much reward from the markets in the shape of lower interest rates. Yet the thought that spending might not be cut may bring punishment in the form of higher ones.

还有些更有效的削减赤字的方法结合了降低通胀和利率的办法。这使得经济更易反弹并有助于支撑政府的支持率。但如今通胀已经很低，同样的许多国家的债权收益也很低。因此缩减支出可能不会从已经处于低利率水准的市场获得很多回报。但认为可以不必削减指出的想法将会遭致巨大的惩罚。

Cutting public spending is, however, a hard slog. Spending on welfare rises automatically in a recession; pension payments continue to grow as the population ages. Western countries used the end of the cold war to slash defence budgets in the 1990s, but given continued military action in Afghanistan and the threat of terrorism, further big reductions are hard to envisage. Nor are there the easy, one-off gains to be made through privatisation of big industries pioneered in Britain in the 1980s under Margaret Thatcher.

然而，削减公共支出是个相当的苦差事。衰退时会自动引起福利支出上涨；随着人口老龄化养老金支出会持续上涨。1990年代西方国家利用冷战结束之机大幅削减国防预算案，但考虑到阿富汗持续的军事行动和恐怖主义的威胁，今后大规模的军费削减不大可能。1980年代撒切尔引领的大型工业私有化那样简便的，一蹴而就的好事再也不可能了。

Barack Obama’s promise to freeze discretionary spending (excluding defence and homeland security) saves $250 billion over ten years—not much when annual deficits are $1 trillion or more. So government will have to tackle much more politically sensitive areas. Changes to Social Security (pensions), which are not part of discretionary spending, are likely to form part of any fiscal reform in America. Should the Conservatives win the British election, they may change eligibility for welfare payments.

奥巴马承诺在未来10年要冻结自由支配支出（包括国防和国土安全费用）以节省2500亿美金—相对于每年10万亿的赤字而言杯水车薪。因此政府不得不触及更多更敏感的政治区域。社会保障（养老金）改革，不属于自由支配范畴，也有可能成为美国财政改革的一部分。如果英国保守党当选的话，他们有可能会改革福利支付的获益资格。

Many governments have boxed themselves in by rewarding their own supporters with jobs or subsidies. In Greece, the right-wing New Democracy party came to power in 2004 pledging a liberalisation of the economy. When it left office in 2009, it had more civil servants than when it started. Such “clientilism” tends to lead to an ever bigger presence for the state in the economy, with more and more citizens depending on the government for employment and income. These people then vote in favour of the status quo. It may take a crisis to force governments to act in ways that hurt their core supporters.

许多政府因给予其支持者工作以及补贴而束缚了自己的手脚。在希腊，右翼的新民主党2004年因承诺经济自由化而上台。但2009年下台时，它留下比上台之初更多的公职人员。这种“技术官僚主义”容易导致政府在经济中更广泛的参与，使越来越多公民依赖政府取得工作和收入。这些人投票时也更喜好这种状态。这可能导致危机从而迫使政府采取某种损害核心支持者的措施。

When a crisis does occur, the markets tend to insist on public-expenditure cuts as a kind of test of the government’s machismo. In a recent paper Ms Reinhart and Mr Rogoff say: “Even countries that are committed to fully repaying their debts are forced to dramatically tighten fiscal policy in order to appear credible to investors and thereby reduce risk premia.”

如果危机真的发生，市场倾向于坚持缩减公共支出，把这作为对政府决心的一种检测。Reinhart和Rogoff在最近的论文中说：“即便那些承诺会全额偿还债务的国家也不得不大幅收紧财政政策以取信于投资者并减少额外风险”

Governments may thus find their political decisions driven by the need to keep markets onside. That is why the choice is so stark for the southern European countries, which are tied into the single-currency zone. No longer do these countries have the option of devaluing their currencies, which they have resorted to many times in the past. Nor can they combine tighter fiscal policy with loose monetary policy, because they do not control the latter.

政府因此发现他们的政策取决于保持市场正常运行的需求。这就是为什么被捆绑进单一货币体系的南欧国家的选择如此严酷的原因。这些国家不再有权选择货币贬值，这一招过去曾屡试不爽。他们也不能将紧缩的财政政策与宽松的货币政策相结合，因为他们没法控制后者。

Voters or creditors?
选民还是债权人？

If the cuts demanded are particularly painful, governments may simply be unwilling to bear the political cost of pushing them through. A classic example occurred in 1931 when Britain was trying to remain on the gold standard. The then Labour government was told that cuts in the budget deficit, in particular unemployment benefits, were required to appease the markets; otherwise the Bank of England’s gold reserves would run out in two weeks. The cabinet split. Ramsay Macdonald, the prime minister, took charge of a (largely Conservative) coalition and has been reviled in left-wing circles ever since. And after all that effort, the austerity plan failed to do the trick; Britain left the gold standard within months.

如果削减的代价特别痛苦，政府可能不愿承担推动的政治成本。一个经典的案例发生于1931年，那时英国试图维持金本位政策。工党政府被告知需要削减预算赤字，尤其是失业者福利，来安抚市场，否则英格兰银行的储备金将会在两周内耗尽。内阁起了争执。首相Ramsay Macdonald组织了一个（主要是保守党）联盟，此后保守左翼联盟诟病。在类似尝试之后，这个苛刻的计划未能实现，英国几个月之后就抛弃了金本位。

The 1931 episode was viewed in Labour Party history as a “bankers’ ramp” in which financiers tried to bounce a government into hurting the poor. Modern governments can also be tempted to blame “speculators”, a category covering everyone from bankers to hedge-fund managers, for their own failings. The idea that creditors might be concerned about the governments’ ability to pay their debts—and thus insist on a higher interest rate—seems to be hard for politicians to accept. At the Davos economic forum in January George Papandreou, Greece’s prime minister, said: “This is an attack on the euro zone by certain other interests, political or financial, and often countries are being used as the weak link, if you like, of the euro zone.”

1931年的事件在工党史上被看成“银行家的匝道”，即金融人士试图迫使政府损害穷人利益。现代的政府也会试图归咎于“投机者”，包括银行家和对冲基金经理，以掩盖自己的失职。认为债权人可能关注政府偿债能力——因此坚持较高利率的想法—似乎难以被政治家们所接受。一月份达沃斯论坛上，希腊首相George Papandreou说：“这是对欧元区的一次攻击，源自政治和金融领域的某些特定利益，如果你愿意，国家常被用作欧元区间脆弱的纽带”

Even so, the Greek government has accepted that its deficit needs to be trimmed. In the politics of deficit reduction Mr Papandreou has some crucial advantages: opinion polls suggest that Greeks accept the need for austerity; he won a substantial election victory last year; the opposition is being supportive; and his Pasok party has strong links with the trade unions. It may be easier for a left-wing party to push through budget cuts.

尽管如此，希腊政府同意其赤字需要被削减。在削减赤字的政策上，Papandreou有些关键的优势：观念调查显示希腊人认同节俭的必要性；他去年大选获胜优势明显；反对派很配合；其Pasok党与贸易联盟关系密切。这也许会让该左翼政党推行预算削减时要容易些。

Supportive social cohesion may explain Sweden’s successful fiscal tightening after the banking crisis of the early 1990s. The Social Democratic government turned a budget deficit of 9.3% of GDP in 1994 into a surplus of 1.2% by 1998. Spending fell by more than five percentage points as a proportion of GDP and tax revenues rose by almost as much. Growth averaged 3.2% in 1994-98 and unemployment was lower at the end than at the start—surely a political as well as an economic boon.

起支持作用的社会凝聚力也许可以解释瑞典在1990年代初银行危机后紧缩财政取得成功的原因。社民党政府1994年预算赤字占GDP9.3%，到了1998年反而盈余1.2%。支出占GDP的比例下降了5个点，而税收收入上升的比率几乎与之相当。94到98年间年均增长率3.2%，这个阶段末期失业率比最初也有所下降——毫无疑问是一次政治和经济的福祉。

Politics within the government can help or hinder deficit reduction. Canada had three failed attempts at fiscal reform before a successful austerity programme was unveiled in the Liberal Party’s budget in 1995. Earlier efforts had been blocked by government departments. On the fourth attempt departments were encouraged to suggest sacrifices—and told that budgets would be cut by 10% across the board if they failed to agree. Cuts were made in several areas, including defence, farm subsidies and unemployment benefits. The budget went from a deficit of 6.7% of GDP in 1994 to a small surplus in 1997.

政府的内部政治可以促进也可以妨碍赤字的减少。加拿大在1955年工党一项苛刻的预算案成功实施之前三次财政改革的企图都以失败告终。早先的尝试都遭到各部门的阻力。第四次尝试中各部门被鼓励要有牺牲精神——并被告知如果他们不同意的话，预算将在全国范围内削减10%。缩减预算体现在几个领域：国防、农业补贴和失业福利。1994年时预算赤字占GDP的6.7%而1997年则有小幅盈余。

It may be that tax hikes, particularly for the better off, are politically necessary to ensure popular acceptance that pain is being shared. But big tax increases can do economic damage. In the 1990s some of the more remarkable success stories were associated with countries that reduced taxes in order to attract business and capital. Ireland, which became known as the Celtic tiger because of its growth rate, has a corporate-tax rate of just 12.5% and chose not to raise it when it tightened its belt last year.

也许提高税收，特别是针对富人增税，有其政治必要性，可以使人们相信每个人都在承受苦难。但大幅的增税会对经济造成伤害。1990年代一些非凡的成功故事都与施行减税措施以吸引商业和资本的国家联系在一起。爱尔兰，因其增长率而被称为凯尔特猛虎，企业税率只有12.5%，即使去年不得不勒紧裤腰带也不选择提高税率。



The corporate-tax trend over the last 30 years has been remorselessly downward. A survey by Robert Carroll of American University in Washington, DC, found that the top rate in OECD countries (excluding America) had fallen from 51% in the early 1980s to 32% by 2009 (see chart). If businesses are attracted by low taxes, they may leave if rates rise.

过去30年间企业税率义无反顾地一路下行。美国华盛顿大学American University in Washington的Robert Carroll的一项调查发现经合组织国家最高的税率从1980年代初到2009年已经下降了51%（见上表）如果经济被低税率所吸引，那么税率增高时他们就会离场。

High-tax European governments have complained in the past about competition from countries like Ireland; the current crisis may lead to more calls for co-ordination of tax policies. Indeed, many countries will be raising taxes simultaneously, which may reduce the temptation for businesses to shift. Much depends on where countries start; it should be easier for those with lower tax burdens to increase their take.

高税负的欧洲政府在过去一直抱怨来自爱尔兰这样的国家的竞争；当前的危机也许会导致更多要求税收合作的呼声。事实上，许多国家会同时提高税收，这样就会降低商业转场的诱惑。很大程度上取决与哪些国家做个示范，那些税负较低的国家应该比较容易增加。

High earners can also be mobile. So many French professionals moved to London in the past decade that Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s president, pleaded with them (and offered tax deals) to come back. Britain is gradually losing its appeal to high-earning foreigners. Calculations by PricewaterhouseCoopers, an accounting firm, show that British authorities will take a bigger tax bite out of the pay packet of a married executive earning £250,000 ($373,000) than any other G20 nation except Italy.

高薪者也可以逐利而动。因此许多法国专家在过去十年中去到伦敦以至于法国总统萨科奇恳求他们回来（提供税收优惠）。英国正逐渐失去对高薪外国人的吸引力。根据普华永道PWC，一家审计公司的统计，英国当局将要从收入达到25万英镑的已婚官员那里征收相当大一部分税收，高于除意大利以外的其他G20国家。

The need for countries to maximise their take from their citizens has caused a renewed interest in preventing tax evasion. Countries in the G20 have been pushing hard for low-tax countries such as Switzerland to provide information on foreign depositors. Nevertheless, there are plenty of legitimate ways for businesses and individuals to move to countries with more favourable tax regimes.

国家需要最大程度从其公民处攫取收益，这引起了对避税的新关注。G20成员一直费力推动瑞士这样的低税国家提供外国储户的信息。然而，商业和个人有足够多的合法途径转移到税收更有吸引力的地区。

So the temptation will be to impose taxes that will be difficult to escape, in particular sales or value-added taxes. The political drawback of such levies is that they fall more heavily on the poor than the rich. This will be unpopular, especially because many people regard this crisis as the fault of high-earning bankers. Furthermore, if higher taxes eat into demand, economies may slip back into recession. A Japanese consumption-tax increase in 1997 is still blamed for derailing its recovery.

因此施加难以逃避的税种，尤其是销售税或增值税，很有诱惑力。但这些税种的缺点在于对税负绝大部分作用于穷人而不是富人。这不受欢迎，尤其是许多人都认为这次危机的始作俑者是高收入的银行家。此外，如果高税负侵蚀了需求，经济将会退回衰退。日本1997年提高消费税的做法至今仍被诟病，认为这妨碍了其恢复。

European governments have accordingly produced a mix of measures in their austerity packages. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain have all promised to attack the public-sector wage bill by cutting or freezing wages or by reducing the number of staff. Greece announced a new round of cuts on March 3rd. But the packages have also contained tax rises (motorway tolls in Portugal, fuel taxes in Greece) and assaults on tax evasion.

欧洲政府已经相应的为紧缩方案制订了一项混合衡量手段。希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙和西班牙都已承诺对公职部门的工资动手，要么削减或冻结工资要么裁员。希腊3月3号宣布了新一轮削减方案。但这些措施中也包括了增税（葡萄牙的高速公路过路费，希腊的燃料税）和对避税的打击。

In Greece, tax evasion seems to be rife among the professional classes, with very few citizens declaring high incomes; one response from the government has been to try to encourage the use of receipts. High earners claiming the personal tax allowance of Euro 12,000 ($16,270) will need to provide receipts of at least that value.

在希腊，由于鲜有公民申报高收入，避税似乎在专业阶层较为普遍。政府的一个反应就是试图鼓励使用发票。高收入者声称12000欧元的个税起征线需要提供至少与之等值的发票。

Despite this attempt to spread the pain, the Greek government has been confronted with a wave of strikes by public-sector workers. Governments can use outside financial pressure as an excuse to push through reforms that might otherwise be politically unacceptable. But it is a fine balance. Voters may be more resistant if harsh measures are seen as being dictated by foreigners, whether from the EU or the IMF.

尽管努力分摊负担，希腊政府仍然面临公共部门员工的抗议浪潮。政府可以以外部压力为借口，通过那些原本在政治上不可接受的改革。但是这个平衡不好掌握。如果那些严厉的举措被看作是外国人强加的——无论是欧盟还是国际货币基金组织——选民们或许会产生更强的抵触。

The people aren’t revolting
人民很合作

Lord Salisbury, a British prime minister, and other 19th-century conservatives feared that democracy would lead to the overthrow of private property rights. Debtors tend to outnumber creditors, and thus can outvote them.

英国前首相索尔兹伯里勋爵和其他19世纪的保守党担心民主将会导致私人权利的泛滥。债务人往往多于债权人，因此在票数上占优。

Such pessimism has yet to be proved right. Sometimes, irresistible force meets immovable object. In California, for instance, voters have the right to vote on specific fiscal policies in referendums. The result has been a cap on taxes with no apparent limit on spending. Iceland is about to provide a specific test of this theory in a referendum, in which voters are being asked to accept or reject the terms for compensating foreign depositors in failed Icelandic banks.

这种悲观论调至今尚未得到证实。有时，势在必行的力量遭遇无法动摇的阻碍。例如，在加利福尼亚投票人有权在公投中对特别财政政策进行投票。结果就是给税收设了限定，而支出则没有明显的限制。冰岛将对这个理论在公投中的应用进行一次特别的测试，因为选民要作出表决，选择接受还是拒绝赔偿外国储蓄者在冰岛银行里遭受损失的方案。



However, the efforts of Canada and Sweden suggest progress can be made, if the crisis is acute enough. And dictatorships are unlikely to be better than democracies. Military regimes in Latin America (except Chile) had poor economic records; they saw the state as a source of cushy jobs for officers and subsidies for arms factories. In addition, their very lack of legitimacy may tempt autocracies to bribe influential sections of the electorate.

然而，加拿大和瑞典表明如果危机足够严重，可以取得进展。独裁未必就比民主表现好。拉美国家的军政府（除了智利）经济记录都不佳；他们把国家当做军官清闲工作和军工厂补贴的源泉。此外，极其不健全的法制可能诱使独裁者贿赂选民中有影响力的群体。

Nevertheless, democracies face awkward decisions in the years ahead. One of the biggest problems is pensions, which will dwarf the cost of the recent bank bail-out. When state pensions were introduced in 1889 by Otto von Bismarck, the German chancellor, life expectancy was 45; the idea was to provide an income for those who simply could not work any longer. Women who make it to 65 these days can expect 20 years of retirement.

不管怎样，民主国家接下来几年将面临棘手的抉择。最大的问题是养老金，与之相比最近在银行救济上的花费相形见拙。1889年德国首相奥托-冯-俾斯麦引入国家养老金时，人均寿命45岁，本意为那些无法继续工作的人提供收入。现在女性如果工作到65岁还可以有20年退休生活。

Even that tricky calculation relies on people working to 65 in the first place. Many employers, particularly in the public sector, developed the habit of letting workers retire in their late 50s or early 60s. Germans, who will soon face a state retirement age of 67, will resent being asked to bail out Greeks, who are only just being asked to work to 63.

即使是这样滑稽的计算首先也要取决于女人到65才退休。许多雇主，尤其在公共部门，习惯性让员工在60多岁上下退休。将要面临退休年龄被提高到67岁的德国人，会对援助希腊人愤愤不平，因为他们只用工作到63岁.

In Britain, most public-sector workers are still members of final-salary, or defined-benefit, schemes, whereas new employees in private companies are usually placed in defined-contribution schemes with uncertain benefits. The difference in cost may be as much as 30% of payroll.

在英国，大部分公务员依然享受全额工资和规定的福利计划，而私人企业的新近员工则是绩效奖金和难以确定的福利。成本的差别占到薪酬的30%。

Raising the retirement age, probably to 70, and cutting the public-sector pension bill will deliver only modest savings in the short run, but will immensely improve the long-term picture. It will, however, be staggeringly unpopular. The proportion of the population in or nearing retirement is increasing; and older people are much more likely to vote than younger citizens. Without reform, however, those apathetic young voters face a crippling tax burden.

提高退休年龄，比如说到70岁，同时削减公务员养老金短期内只是省下一小部分，但会极大改善长期的图景。然而，这会极不受欢迎。接近退休年龄的人口比例正在增加，而且上年纪的人相较于年轻人更愿去投票。但是，如果不改革，冷淡的年轻人们就会面对沉重的税负。

There are many battles over deficits to come: taxpayers against public-sector workers; old against young. Well-chosen policies that foster growth may make them less fierce. They may be bloody even so.

还会有很多关于赤字的战斗：纳税人与公务员；老人与青年。促进增长的精心选择的政策会让斗争不那么激烈。但也有可能是血战。

lilywizardry

欧元符号需要用euro代替

lord_loro

难道是论坛发帖有字数限制？ 我的只发了一半，第一次发现。嘿。

lord_loro

后面的部分发不上来了。。。

fhf208188

回复 1# lord_loro


    因为personal tax allowance of后面紧接着一个欧元符号。欧元符号出不来，所以你后面的文章也出不来。用英文字母代替该货币符号，就可以继续贴了。

premiermao

回复 4# lord_loro

我已经帮你把两部分编辑到一起了，有一段译文好像没发上来我就替你补译了一下。下次发文请注意把欧元符号改成EURO.

lord_loro

谢谢版主