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Censorship in China

Caution: lust小心：戒
Jan 10th 2008 | BEIJING
From The Economist print edition

More sex please, we're Chinese cinema-goers
多些色吧，我们是电影院里的中国人

                                                                                     ImageNet


IN A country awash with pirated films featuring explicit sex and violence, China's prudish censors risk irrelevance. Their heavy-handed treatment of two recent films has sparked a lively debate about whether cinemas should at last be allowed to show something racier.
在中国，到处充斥着盗版黄色暴力电影，那一本正经的审查制度是不太恰当的。但是，他们最近对两个电影的强硬手段引发了大量讨论，人们争论着是否应该允许电影院放映一些让人爽的东西。

At present, films deemed unsuitable for children may not be shown to adults either. But the censors are under attack. Critics include Gong Li, a famous actress and government adviser, who last March appealed for a rating system that would give adults more choice. Complaints have mounted following the removal of sex scenes from “Lust, Caution”, a spy thriller by a Taiwan-born Oscar-winning director, Ang Lee, and the outright banning this month of “Lost in Beijing”, a sexually explicit drama by a Chinese director, Li Yu.
最近，那些儿童不宜的电影也不让成人看了。但是这种审查受到了攻击。批评从各方而来，其中包括有着政府顾问头衔的大明星巩俐，去年3月曾呼吁建立评级标准，给予成人更多的选择。当由台湾出生的导演，奥斯卡获奖者李安的电影“色，戒”中删除色情情节，以及本月禁止由中国导演李玉拍摄的有很多色情情节的电影“苹果”放映后，人们有了更多的怨言。

The internet and rampant film piracy mean censors' cuts do not go unnoticed. Chinese internet users can readily find websites showing the expurgated parts of “Lust, Caution”. Uncensored bootleg copies are peddled on the streets. The rapid growth of overseas tourism frustrates the censors too. The press reports that some Chinese travel agents have been offering trips to the cinema to see “Lust, Caution” uncut as part of their Hong Kong tour packages. The censors initially approved the showing of “Lost in Beijing”, albeit in a heavily censored form. But just over a month after the film's debut in China, officials changed their minds. They accused the film company of circulating the censored sex scenes on the internet (the filmmakers blamed pirates) and banned the Beijing-based company from making films for the next two years.
有了互联网及大量盗版，人们注意到了审查中的删除部分。中国的互联网玩家很容易就找到那些“色，戒”中的删除部分。违禁的未删节盗版带也在街上叫卖。迅速增长的出国旅游也使审查人员头疼。新闻说一些中国旅行社将观看未删节的“色。戒”作为香港旅游的一个节目。在大量删除色情情节后，审查人员最初准许放映电影“苹果”。但是当电影在中国放映了一个月后，审查人员改变主意了。他们说电影公司把其中的色情情节放到互联网上（电影制作人反对盗版），由此在两年内禁止这家北京的公司拍摄电影。

Officials have mentioned the possibility of eventually introducing a film-rating system, but they appear in no hurry. Communist Party conservatives abhor the idea of condoning explicit sex. One Beijing newspaper reported last year that officials were worried that a rating system would make it more difficult to curb the distribution in China of foreign films, many of which fail to meet current censorship standards.
电影官员谈到有可能会推出电影评级制度，但是他们并不急于动手。共产党中的保守派对于开禁色情电影深恶痛绝。一家北京的报纸说，去年那些官员担心推出电影评级系统后，外国电影在中国发行会很难控制，而这些电影目前很难达到审查标准。

A quixotic attempt by a graduate student in Beijing, Dong Yanbin, to sue the censors for cutting the sex scenes out of “Lust, Caution” resulted in a predictable brush-off by a low-level court in the city. It said that the case could not be accepted unless the student could submit an uncensored version for comparison. Mr Dong prudently refrained from offering the court a pirated copy.
一个唐吉珂德式的北京研究生董岩斌到法院状告电影审查人员删去“色。戒”中的色情情节，其结果是被初级法院驳回。法院说不能接受的理由是这个案子只有在学生提供为删节影片才能进行审理。董先生很谨慎，没有向法院提供盗版。

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Banks and the credit crunch

Stepping beyond subprime
次级房贷危机之外
Jan 10th 2008 | NEW YORK
From The Economist print edition

Only Panglossians think that the sector is over the worst
只有那些充满幻想的人认为这个行业的危机已经过去

                                    Illustration by Satoshi Kambayashi


THE dawning of a new year is supposed to be about hope, but fear remains the dominant emotion among bankers. This week saw another round of bloodletting as they grappled with the effects of the credit crunch. Barclays Capital and CIBC joined the long list of lenders to jettison senior investment bankers. And, to nobody's surprise, Jimmy Cayne stepped down as boss of Bear Stearns, the Wall Street bank with the hedge-fund problems that arguably marked the start of the crisis last June.
新年伊始，应该充满希望，但是银行间仍然充满恐惧。本周，在他们与信贷危机作用的搏斗中，我们见到了又一次流血。巴克莱资本及CIBC与很多银行一样，把自己的投资高级经理赶出门外。并不令人意外的是Jimmy Cayne也辞去其在贝尔斯登的总经理职务。这家银行的对冲基金问题是去年6月引发次级房贷危机的罪魁祸首。

Mr Cayne had been under huge pressure to go, thanks to $1.9 billion of mortgage write-downs—leading to the bank's first-ever quarterly loss—and accusations that he had been more interested in improving his own performance at bridge and golf than shoring up his bank's standing in the markets. He will remain as non-executive chairman, continuing to command an eight-figure salary, after Alan Schwartz, a trusted lieutenant, takes over as chief executive. Mr Cayne's durability prompted one observer to dub him the “Harry Houdini of the boardroom”.
Cayne受到了要求他辞职的巨大压力。这家银行有19亿美金账面冲减，这是这家银行有史以来最大的季度损失。并且人们讲Cayne只关心自己桥牌及高尔夫技艺，而对公司是否能够在金融市场立足并不关心。在他信任的副手Alan Schwartz接任总经理后，他将继续以非执行董事长的职务留在公司，领取上千万的薪水。人们将Cayne这种不死鸟比喻为“董事会里的胡迪尼”。

Bear's problems are not limited to one-off hits. Important parts of its franchise are either suffering client defections (prime brokerage) or disappearing altogether (structured-credit products). There is speculation about a merger—although it is unclear who, among Bear's Western peers at least, would dare to bid, given Bear's oversized exposure to America's slumping housing market and the welter of subprime-related lawsuits it faces. Its shares continued to fall after Mr Cayne's (partial) resignation was announced.
贝尔斯登的问题并不是仅打了一记空拳。这家公司的重要部门不是客人转出（投资客户），就是全部消失了（结构式信贷产品）。人们推测这家公司会被并购，但是没有人知道在贝尔斯登的西方同行中有那个肯开价，这是由于贝尔斯登在美国疲软的房屋市场陷入太深，以及日益增长的与次级房贷有关的官司。在Cayne（部分）辞职后，这家公司的股票仍然下跌。

Depleted though bankers' confidence is, things could be worse. Lubricated by copious amounts of central-bank money, banks did at least make it through the year-end in one piece. Interbank lending rates, though still unusually high, are edging down, and the asset-backed commercial paper market ticked up on January 3rd after falling for 20 straight weeks. The risk of a big bank going under has receded as $27 billion (and counting) of capital has flowed into the sector from sovereign wealth funds. Recipients include Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley and Switzerland's UBS (or, as wags now call it, Union Bank of Singapore). These injections may have upset existing shareholders, who have seen their stakes diluted, but they have ensured that although big lenders have wobbled, none has toppled.
银行家们的信心大失，情况可能会更糟。中央银行给出充足的货币，使得银行得以度过年关。银行间贷款利率虽然依旧很高，但是已经下降。抵押商业贷款在连续下跌20周后，1月3日初见上升。随着外国政府的270亿美金（继续增加中）的资金流入金融业，这些大银行破产的风险已经下降。接到这些钱的公司包括美林，花旗，大摩及瑞士联合银行（或者用玩笑话说是新加坡联合银行）。这些资金的注入可能会使现有的股东不满，他们在公司中的股份变小了，但是这些资金保证这些银行虽然受到冲击，但是不会倒闭。

At least, not yet. The shares of Countrywide fell by another 28% on January 8th, as America's largest mortgage lender was again led to deny rumours of imminent bankruptcy. (It insists it has ample liquidity.) Far from bouncing back, banks have led the stockmarket down since the start of the year. Even Goldman Sachs, hitherto relatively unscathed, has suffered.
起码，目前没有倒闭。美国最大的房贷商Countrywide再次否认公司会破产后，其股价在1月8日下跌了28%。（这家公司强调自己有足够的资金支持）。银行界的股票开年没有回升，还领着股市下跌。甚至以前股价几乎毫发无损的高盛公司的股价也下跌了。

One reason for the gloom is that banks' residential-mortgage woes are far from over. Although banks have already written off whopping sums over subprime mortgages, they are vulnerable to yet more hits. Their worldwide remaining exposure to subprime loans (excluding off-balance-sheet vehicles) is put at $380 billion; analysts think they are still only roughly two-thirds of the way through tallying their mortgage losses. When the likes of Citigroup and Merrill Lynch confess their fourth-quarter sins on January 15th and 17th respectively, they are likely to be the most shocking yet: forecasts put the two banks' additional write-downs at $26 billion, on top of the $15 billion they have kissed goodbye so far. Market gossip points even higher.
悲观情绪存在的原因是民用房贷的危机还远远没有过去。虽然很多大银行已经在账面冲减了大量的次级房贷，他们在更多的冲击下会很脆弱。世界范围内，他们现存的次级房贷（除去账面外渠道）已经达到380亿美金，但是分析家估计这大概仅是整个房贷损失的三分之二左右。1月15日及17日，当花旗及美林分别发布季度报告时，他们可能会给出令人震惊的消息：预计在已经账面冲减的150亿美金之外，这两家公司还会冲减260亿美金。市场中还有人讲数字会大很多。

JPMorgan Chase is expected to get away with a much smaller mortgage-related hit, probably below $2 billion. But it has other worries. It is a big holder of “hung” leveraged loans and bonds, mostly related to buy-outs agreed on in the credit bubble. The $250 billion in unsold debt on banks' books remains a big headache.
摩根大通银行没有受到多少与房贷有关的冲击，大概会低于20亿美金。但是这家银行有其他危机。这家银行是“未出手”杠杆贷款及债券的最大拥有者，很多是与信贷泡沫时期购买公司有关的。这2500亿美金没有售出的债务留在账面，是这家银行的一件头疼事。

As the leading dealer in the market for credit-default swaps (CDS), contracts used to punt on a company's ability to repay its debt, JPMorgan Chase could find itself dragged into another maelstrom. These credit derivatives have exploded in recent years, to an outstanding notional amount of $43 trillion. So far the writers of these contracts have had little to pay out because corporate defaults have been at historic lows. But defaults are about to rise sharply, says Moody's, a rating agency. That raises the prospect of losses for banks that entered the market but failed to lay off their risks properly. If the mortgage market is a guide, there will be plenty in that camp.
信用违约互换（CDS)是赌那些公司不能偿付债务的合同，作为最大的CDS中间商，摩根大通可能会发现自己陷入了另一个大漩涡中。这类信用衍生物近年来发展迅速，目前价值达到4300万亿这个令人吃惊的数目。至今为止，由于公司破产处于历史低点，出售这些合同的人没有赚多少。但是如果公司破产会迅速增加，评估公司穆迪的人如是说。这对于那些进入这个市场中，但没有适当回避风险的那些银行来讲，由此引起的损失期望值在上升。如果房贷市场是个借鉴，这类公司还有很多。

CDS contracts allow investors to take on credit risk without buying the underlying bonds. But not everyone is convinced of their usefulness. Bill Gross, founder of PIMCO, a giant fund manager, thinks they may be banks' “most egregious” concoctions to date. If corporate-bond defaults were to climb back to historical averages, contracts worth $500 billion would become payable, he pointed out this month. John Mauldin, another influential investor, thinks counterparty risk in CDS will be one of the big stories in 2008, particularly as already-fragile bond insurers are big in that market. On January 9th MBIA, the largest such insurer, said it will raise new equity to stave off a ratings downgrade.
CDS合同使投资人不用购买合同下的债券就能参与这类债券的风险。但是并不是每个人都相信这类合同的用途。大型共同基金管理公司PIMCO的Bill Gross认为这是银行弄出的“最令人发指”的毒药。如果公司违约回升至历史平均水平，这些合同就有5000亿要付账，他本月指出。另外一个有影响力的投资人John Mauldin认为CDS合同中的持有方风险将是2008年的大事件，特别是当已经相当脆弱的债券保险商在这市场中占有很大份额。1月9日，最大的债券保险商MBIA宣布将出售新股，以避免被评估公司降级。

As fears of an American recession grow, so do worries about a general deterioration of credit. Commercial property looks more precarious by the day, as do car loans, student loans and credit-card debt (Capital One, a card issuer, cut its profit forecast on January 10th). All of these were, like residential mortgages, fed into Wall Street's stalled securitisation machine. Many now sit in complex products with the same questionable credit ratings.
随着更多人担心美国经济进入衰退，更多人也更担心信贷品质下降了。人们对商业地产日渐小心，对车贷，学生贷款及信用卡债务（信用卡商Capital One在1月10日宣布削减其收入预估）也是同样。所有这些，与民用房贷一样，都是华尔街运转不灵的证券化机器的组成部分。其中许多组成了那些有同样信用问题的复杂产品。

Banks have to worry about more than just the fancy asset-backed stuff. Losses on unsecuritised loans are rising faster than expected. American banks' average net interest margin—the spread between what they pay depositors and charge borrowers—has fallen to its lowest level since 1991 as banks scramble to reduce their reliance on fickle wholesale markets by raising the rates they offer to depositors.
除了那些令人眼晕的资产抵押产品外，银行还有很多要担心的事。未证券化的贷款损失上升得比预计的要高。美国银行平均利差，即他们付给存款人的利息与从贷款人那里拿到的利息之差，已经跌落至1991年来的低点。这是由于银行减少对变化无常的批发市场的依赖，而增加存款利率的结果。

Investment banks, meanwhile, face a slowdown in a number of businesses, from advising on mergers to equity underwriting. Some areas remain vibrant—commodities, for example, and emerging markets—but much restructuring lies ahead. This week Citi folded several units into a new residential-mortgage business, and UBS was prompted to deny rumours that it will try to offload its investment bank.
同时，投资银行也面临数种业务下降，涉及面从公司并购咨询到新股上市。虽然一些业务仍然火热，例如大宗产品，以及新兴市场，但是这些也面临着大幅调整。本周，花旗银行将几个部门合并为新的民用房贷部门，而UBS则否认其要将投资银行业务出售的谣言。

The focus for many banks in coming months will be on conserving or bolstering capital—through share issues, dividend cuts and asset sales—as they reduce their leverage and take unwanted assets, such as those in structured investment vehicles (SIVs), back onto their books. That will enforce a more cautious attitude to lending, putting pressure on profits. Were European banks to bring their leverage back to the level of a decade ago, their return on equity would fall to 14%, compared with 21% now, reckons Citi's Simon Samuels.
今后几个月，银行的注意力会集中在保护或筹集资本上。他们会通过发行新股，削减红利，及出售资产达到这一目的。这样，他们就会减少负债，并减少不需要的资产，例如那些结构式投资工具（SIVs)，重新回到账面上去。这会在发放贷款时更加小心，使得收益受到影响。花旗银行的Simon Samuels估计，如果欧洲银行将他们的负债率降至十几年前的水平，他们的资本回报将不是现在的21%，而是14%。

Bank shares may have further to fall. As Betsy Graseck of Morgan Stanley points out, they are still higher, relative to tangible book value, than their lowest level in the credit crunch of 1989-91. With futures markets predicting property-price falls of up to 30% and the pain spreading beyond mortgages, the bottom may be months away. As one American banking regulator puts it: “There aren't many places to look now and feel happy.” Unless you are an escapologist of Mr Cayne's calibre.
银行股的价格还会继续下跌。如大摩的Betsy Graseck指出的那样，与他们在1989-1991年时信贷危机时比较，这些股价仍然比其有形资产高出许多。见底还要几个月。正如美国银行监管人员所说：“现在没有几个地方能看，并感到放心”。除非你有Cayne那种逃脱术的本事。

shiyi18

Capital markets

The invasion of the sovereign-wealth funds
主权基金的入侵
Jan 17th 2008
From The Economist print edition

The biggest worry about rich Arab and Asian states buying up Wall Street is the potential backlash   富有的阿拉伯及亚洲国家购买华尔街所产生的最大担忧是潜在的强烈反应




BEN BERNANKE once spoke of dropping money from helicopters, if necessary, to save an economy in distress. The chairman of the Federal Reserve probably did not envisage that choppers bearing the insignia of oil-rich Gulf states and cash-rich Asian countries would hover over Wall Street. Yet just such a squadron has flown to the rescue of capitalism's finest.
本.伯南克有一次讲到如果必要，会从直升机上往下扔钱，用以拯救经济于危难。美联储的主席大概没有认识到，那些印着海湾石油国家及拎着钱袋的亚洲国家标记的直升飞机会飞到华尔街上空。然而，正是这一批国家的大队人马来拯救资本主义的精英了。

On January 15th the governments of Singapore, Kuwait and South Korea provided much of a $21 billion lifeline to Citigroup and Merrill Lynch, two banks that have lost fortunes in America's credit crisis. It was not the first time either had tapped the surplus savings of developing countries, known as sovereign-wealth funds, that have proliferated in recent years thanks to bumper oil prices and surging Asian exports. Since the subprime-mortgage fiasco unfolded last year, such funds have gambled almost $69 billion on recapitalising the rich world's biggest investment banks (far more than usually goes the other way in an emerging-markets crisis). With as much as $2.9 trillion to invest (see article), the funds' horizons go beyond finance to telecoms and technology companies, casino operators, even aerospace. But it is in banking where they have arrived most spectacularly. They have deftly played the role of saviour just when Western banks have been exposed as the Achilles heel of the global financial system.
1月15日，新加坡，科威特及韩国的政府向花旗银行及美林证券提供了210亿美金的救命丹，这两家银行在美国的信贷危机中损失惨重。此次行动并不是他们第一次动用这些主权财富基金。近年来，由于油价上升及激增的亚洲出口，这些发展中国家的主权财富基金迅速增长。自从次级房贷危机被暴露后，这种主权财富基金已经投入了近690亿美金，为富裕国家的那些最大银行补充资金（远远超出富裕国家银行在新兴市场危机时的投入）。由于有价值2.9万亿美元可以投资（见文），这些主权财富基金的投资目标不但涉及金融业，还有电讯业及高科技公司，赌场，甚至航空业。但是他们进入银行业的时机却令人瞩目。当西方银行，这国际金融系统的大力神把阿基里斯脚跟暴露出来时，这些主权财富基金灵巧的扮演了救世主的角色。

Moneymen or mischief-makers财东还是搅局的

At first sight this is proof that capitalism works. Money is flowing from countries with excess savings to those that need it. Rather than blowing their reserves on gargantuan schemes, Arab and Asian governments are investing it, relatively professionally. But there are still two sets of concerns. The first has to do with the shortcomings of sovereign-wealth funds. The second, bigger, problem is the backlash they will surely provoke from protectionists and nationalists. Already, Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, has promised to protect innocent French managers from the “extremely aggressive” sovereign funds (even though none has shown much interest in his country).
初看起来，这是资本主义起作用的证明。资本从那些有大量储蓄的国家流向需要这些资本的国家。为了避免他们的外汇存底无限制膨胀，阿拉伯及亚洲政府将这些资本相对专业的进行投资。但是有两种看法。第一种是与主权财富基金的缺陷有关的。而第二条，也是更大的问题是这些资金会引发保护主义及国家主义者的强烈反应。法国总统萨尔科齐已经表示要从那些“极端激进的”主权财富基金手中保护那些无辜的法国管理人员（虽然目前没有这类基金对其国家表示兴趣）。

Although sovereign-wealth funds hold a bare 2% of the assets traded throughout the world, they are growing fast, and are at least as big as the global hedge-fund industry. But, unlike hedge funds, sovereign-wealth funds are not necessarily driven by the pressures of profit and loss. With a few exceptions (like Norway's), most do not even bother to reveal what their goals are—let alone their investments.
虽然这些主权财富基金目前仅持有2%在世界上交易的资产，这些基金增长迅猛，就像世界的对冲基金规模那么大。但是，与对冲基金不同，主权财富基金并不是必须由利润及损失来驱动。除几个例外（例如挪威的基金），多数都不会暴露他们的目标在那里，仅仅让他们的投资留在那里。

For the bosses at the companies they invest in, that may be a godsend: how nice to be bailed out by a discreet “long-termist” investor who lets you keep your job, rather than be forked out in the Augean clean-up hedge-fund types might demand. A quick glance back at “long-termist” nationalised industries shows what a mess that leads too. And it is not just a matter of efficiency. The motives of the sovereign moneymen could be sinister: stifling competition; protecting national champions; engaging, even, in geopolitical troublemaking. Despite their disruptive market power, their managers have little accountability to regulators, shareholders or voters. Such conditions are almost bound to produce rogue traders.
对那些在他们投资的公司中当老板的人来讲，这是上帝给的机会：有这么坚定的“长期投资者”拯救自己的工作机会，这比让那些有众多要求的对冲基金买走，然后在清理公司时将自己（清理奥格阿斯的牛圈）赶走不知道要好多少。回首看看这些“长期”国有化企业，可以看到导致了何种灾难。而且并不仅仅是效率问题。也许这些主权财东的动机不良：抑制竞争；保护国有企业；甚至参与地区政治动乱。尽管他们有着导致混乱的能力，这些基金的管理人员并不需要向其政府，股东或选举人负责。这种情况多数会产生那种恶性交易人。

So far there is no evidence of such “mischievous” behaviour, as the German government calls it (curiously, from another country yet to attract the sovereign-wealth crowd). And weighing the risk of such eventualities against the rewards of hard cash, on the table, right now, makes it clearly daft to raise too much of a stink. America is either in recession or near one; Mr Bernanke has all but promised more aggressive rate cuts, but confidence in the banking system is low. There is a wise old proverb about beggars and choosers.
至今为止，还没有出现那种“不负责任”的行为，德国政府如是说（问题是，这是另一个没有得到主权财富基金的国家）。但是权衡利弊，比较可能出现的风险与现在得到摆在桌面的现金，那么过多想象坏的方面肯定是不太明智的。美国目前没有进入经济衰退，也还没有经济衰退的迹象出现；伯南克仅仅是许诺更多降息，但是银行间的信心仍然很低。常言说，要饭的不嫌饭馊。

The relatively friendly welcome sovereign funds have found in America may be temporary. Before the credit crunch American politicians objected to Arabs owning ports and Chinese owning oil firms. On January 15th Hillary Clinton said: “We need to have a lot more control over what they [sovereign-wealth funds] do and how they do it.” Once an emergency has passed, foreign money can often be less welcome. One of Singapore's funds, Temasek, has learned that lesson to its cost in Indonesia.
在美国，这种对主权财富基金相对友好的态度可能仅仅是暂时的。在信贷危机前，美国的政客拒绝了阿拉伯国家占有美国的港口（注：阿联酋政府曾要买入美国港口管理公司，后来没买成）及中国公司拥有美国石油公司（中海油收购优尼科公司受阻）。1月15日，希拉里说：“我们需要对这些[主权财富基金】所作所为有更多的控制权”。危机过后，外国人的资金就不太受欢迎了。一个新加坡的基金Temasek在印度尼西亚的尝试是一个借鉴。

In politics, appeals to fear usually sell better than those to reason. But the hypocrisy of erecting barriers to foreign investment while demanding open access to developing markets is self-evident. Host countries should not set up special regimes for sovereign wealth. Although every country has concerns about national security and financial stability, most already have safeguards for bank ownership and defence.
在政治中，恐慌论常常比理性要起作用。但是，在要求进入发展中市场的同时，歇斯底里般的阻止外国投资，其用意不言自明。得到资金的国家不应对这些主权财富基金设立特别要求。虽然每个国家都有国家安全及金融稳定性的考虑，几乎所有国家都已经对谁拥有银行及保护银行起着监督作用。

Until East and West even out the surpluses and deficits in their economies, sovereign-wealth funds will not go away. Ideally, the high-savings countries of the Middle East and Asia would liberalise their economies, allowing their own citizens to invest for themselves, rather than paying bureaucrats to do it for them. But do not expect miracles. In the meantime, what should be done to keep the rod of protectionism off their—and the world's—backs?
在东西方解决经济中入超及赤字问题前，主权财富基金的问题不会消失。理想的是，这些高储蓄的中东及亚洲国家能够开放其经济，容许其国民那个自己决定如何投资，而不是让那些官僚来为他们决定如何做。但是不要期待会有奇迹出现。目前，应该考虑的问题是如何从那些国家，以至整个世界中将保护主义踢出去。

Shed light or take heat反弹还是容忍

For a start, more transparency would go a long way towards easing concerns: an annual report that discloses the fund's motives and main holdings would be a start. Investments through third parties, such as hedge funds, help too, providing an additional layer of protection against the misdeeds of rogues. Ideally, the funds would eventually take fewer stakes in individual companies, which expose them to the inevitable risks of stockpicking and political pressure. Investing across indices provides more diversification anyway.
首先，要逐渐增加透明度以减少顾虑：开始时，要在年报中指出主权财富基金的用意及基金的组成。通过第三方的投资，例如对冲基金等，也是帮助防止恶性交易人乱搞的另一种途径。理想的是，这种基金能够在每个公司占有少量股份，这也可以使他们减少选择股票的风险，以及政治压力。通过指数投资可以更好的分散风险。

At a time when Western governments have at last learned to let the private sector run banks (however lousily it is sometimes done), it is far from ideal that state-owned funds from emerging economies should be buying stakes in them, even minority ones. On the other hand, such cross-border bargain-hunting gives developing countries a bigger direct stake in capitalism's future. The chief danger will not lie with them. The problem is likely to be in the rich world—and a rising nervousness about foreign money.
当西方政府认识到可以容许私有企业运营银行（尽管有时运营不良），但是容许从新兴经济的政府管理的基金买入银行股还是不很理想，即使这些买入股份并不是占很大比例。另一方面，通过这种越界捡便宜货，发展中国家获得了资本主义前景的大量直接份额。主要危险目前并未显现。问题可能会出在富裕国家---以及对外国资本日渐增长的恐惧。

shiyi18

Desperate measures背水一战
Jan 22nd 2008
From Economist.com

A whiff of panic as the Fed slashes interest rates by three-quarters of a percentage point
美国联储会感到紧张了，降息0.75%

                                                                                           AFP


THE Federal Reserve slashed its benchmark interest rate by three-quarters of a percentage point to 3.5% on Tuesday January 22nd. The decision came at an unscheduled policy meeting—the next planned one was due on January 29th and 30th, when it was widely expected to reduce rates by half a percentage point. With global stockmarkets in freefall, the Fed instead decided that a bigger cut was needed—and sooner. A week may be a long time in politics, but waiting eight days to cut rates would, it seems, have been an intolerable stretch for financial markets.
美国联储会在1月22日周二早上降息0.75%，将利率降到3.5%。这个决定是在会议期间作出的，下次会议定在1月29及30日，人们期望那时候会降息0.5%。当整个世界的股市陷入崩盘，联储会决定不能再等待了，而且进行幅度更大。在政治上，一个星期是很长的时间了，但是如果等待八天再降息的话，可能对金融市场造成不可挽回的后果。

The deepening gloom about the economy may well warrant such an aggressive response. But the timing is puzzling. There is more than a whiff of panic about slashing rates little more than week before a scheduled meeting. The Fed statement issued with the decision rationalises the cut as a response to “downside risks to growth”—the phrase is repeated twice in six short paragraphs—and cites recent gloomy data on housing and jobs. Yet the economic news has not grown any worse in the past few days and, given the time needed before monetary policy affects spending, the added urgency seems odd.
对经济的日益悲观的看法也是这次果敢出手的原因。但是时机仍然耐人寻味。离下次约定会议仅有一个星期了，从这次大幅降息中，可以嗅出联储会有些害怕了。在降息是发表的文件中讲到这次降息是对“经济增长下降的风险”（这句话在六段话中重复了两次），以及最近令人悲观的房屋及就业数据的回应。在过去两天，没有更糟的经济消息出现。如果考虑货币政策影响消费的延迟，这种急迫的降息看来是有些奇怪。

What has shifted for the worse is financial-market sentiment. It is hard not to conclude that the Fed has acted to shore up markets, which have switched to panic mode alarmingly quickly over the past week. The Fed noted—it could hardly fail to do so—that “financial market conditions have continued to deteriorate”. But if concerns of further stockmarket damage was its main motivation the cut did little to prevent a big sell-off on Wall Street. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell over 400 points when it opened shortly after the Fed's announcement: not much less than the fall that was priced in before the Fed acted.
变得更糟的是金融市场的情绪。不能不承认，联储会的行动是要拯救在上周迅速陷入恐慌的金融市场。联储会注意到（他们不会无视的）“金融市场的状况进一步恶化”。但是如果这次降息的核心是要阻止股市进一步下跌的话，降息并没有阻止华尔街上的抛售。在联储会宣布降息后，道琼斯工业平均指数开盘后即暴跌400余点，这与降息前市场反应没有多大差别。

If the markets failed to view looser monetary policy as a nice surprise, that was understandable. In his short tenure the Fed’s chairman, Ben Bernanke, has only used scheduled meetings to make changes to the Fed’s main policy rate. That he was moved to act just a week before one will raise the suspicion that the Fed knows something that markets don’t. Nor is it only the timing that is troubling. The size of the cut also brings more fear than comfort. Even the Fed under Alan Greenspan, which cut rates from 6.5% to 1% in the early years of the decade, was never moved to cut by more than half a percentage point in a single go.
如果市场不能将宽松货币政策视为雪中送炭，这也是可以理解的。伯南克作为联储会主席仅有很短时间，他仅在预定的会议中决定政策变化。在离下次会议仅有一个星期的时候采取行动，使人怀疑联储会知道一些旁人不知道的事情。并不仅仅是时机耐人寻味。这次降息的幅度也使人感到害怕，而不是放心。在格林斯潘领导下的联储会，在2001年时将利息从6.5%降到1%时，每次降息幅度也没有超出0.5%。


Only one voice dissented on the Fed’s rate-setting committee. William Poole voted against the cut, arguing that things were not sufficiently bad to warrant action so close to a regular meeting. That no one else was swayed by that argument suggests that the bulk of the committee is now either very worried about the economic outlook or that there was a serious risk of financial-market meltdown. Concerns about inflation, which the Fed expects to moderate, have been relegated almost to an afterthought.
联储会降息会议中，仅有一个人表示异议。William Poole 投票反对降息，其理由是情况还没有糟到要在约定会议前下手。没有其他人附和他的看法。这种情况意味着联储会多数人除了担心经济前景不良，就是担心金融市场崩盘的严重后果。联储会一反常态，将通胀顾虑（目前联储会认为通胀危险已经减缓）也搁置一旁了。

The meeting at the end of the month is still expected to go ahead and it seems unlikely that the Fed’s committee will convene only to sit on its hands. Futures markets are pricing in a further quarter-point cut on January 30th. Presumably the markets can manage to hold on until then.
本月底预定的会议还会按期举行，但是看来联储会不会没有行动。期货市场已经预计在1月30日会降息0.25%。前提是市场能够在下次联储会会议前稳住军心。

shiyi18

Decoupling 1: Emerging Asia
An independent streak独自奔跑

Jan 24th 2008 | HONG KONG
From The Economist print edition
Some investors fear that America's weakening economy will drag down Asia. In a series of related articles, we ask if they are right. First, the emerging countries一些投资人担心美国疲软经济会拖累亚洲。在一系列文章中，我们的疑问是他们是否正确。首先是，这些新兴国家

INVESTORS were until recently big fans of the “decoupling” theory, the notion that Asian economies can shrug off an American recession. This week's plunge in share prices, at one point taking the MSCI Emerging Asia Index down 25% from its October high, suggests they have changed their minds. But the fact that their stockmarkets are still coupled does not mean that their economies will follow America over a cliff.
直至最近，投资人仍然是“脱钩”理论的信仰者，即亚洲经济不会受到美国经济疲软的拖累。本周亚洲股价跳水，大摩的MSCI新兴亚洲指数曾一度从10月份的高点跌下25%，大概是投资人改变看法了吧。但是事实是即使这些新兴市场的股票市场与美国股市相连，并不意味着新兴市场的经济会跟着美国经济一起跳水。


Decoupling was always a misnomer if it implied that an American recession would have no impact in the East. Exports and hence profits would certainly be squeezed; some fear Japan may even be tipping back into recession (see article). Instead, the real argument in the rest of Asia was that it would suffer less than in previous American downturns.
如果脱钩是讲美国经济衰退不会对东方产生影响的话，那么这是误导。如果美国经济疲软，出口肯定会减少，一些人担心日本也可能会陷入经济衰退（见文）。反之，这种脱钩的实际含义是在此次衰退中，其他亚洲国家受到的影响会比以前美国经济衰退时受到的影响要小。

As well as hitting exports, America's troubles could also affect emerging Asia through financial channels. Its exposure to the subprime mess is thought to be smaller than that of American or European banks. Even so, Chinese bank shares tumbled this week on reports that they would have to make bigger write-downs on their holdings of American subprime securities. And if shares slide further as global investors flee from risky assets, this could dampen business and consumer confidence in the region.
除了对出口业产生影响，美国的问题也会对新兴亚洲金融产生影响。人们认为，亚洲陷入美国次级房贷没有美国及欧洲银行那么深。即使是这样，在本周报告说中国银行会对所持美国次级房贷账面冲减后，中国银行的股价大跌。如果国际投资人逃离风险资产，股价继续下跌的话，这种情况会使得这个区域的商业及消费者信心产生负面影响。

Some Asian economies are more vulnerable than others. Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia are the most exposed, with exports to America equivalent to 20% or more of their GDPs, compared with only 8% in China and 2% in India. There are already some ominous signs. Singapore's exports to America are down by 11% over the past year, whereas Malaysia's fell by 16%. Exports to other emerging economies and to the European Union surged, so total exports still grew by 6% in both economies. But that was much slower than at the start of 2007, and the worry now is that demand from Europe has started to flag.
一些亚洲经济比其他亚洲经济更加脆弱。相比较而言，新加坡，香港及马来西亚对美出口占其GDP20%或更多，受到影响也大。而中国对美出口仅占其GDP8%，印度对美出口仅为GDP2%。目前已经有一些恶兆出现。新加坡去年对美出口下降了11%，而马来西亚则下降了16%。由于对其他新兴经济及欧盟的出口高速提升，所以出口总量在这两国均增加了6%。但是这比2007年初要缓慢许多，而且人们现在担心欧洲的需求已经开始减缓。

The growth in China's exports to America slowed to only 1% (in yuan terms) in the year to December from over 20% in late 2006. So far the impact on GDP has been modest. Figures published on January 24th showed that China's GDP grew by a sizzling 11.2% in the year to the fourth quarter, down from 11.5% in the previous three months. Most economists expect growth to slow to a still-healthy 9-10% this year, but there are growing concerns that new government limits on bank lending risk choking the economy.
中国对美出口去年至12月仅增加了1%（以人民币计算），而不是2006年增加20%余。至今为止，对于中国的GDP影响很小。在1月24日发布的数字表示，中国的GDP发展迅速，至第四季度，年增加率为11.2%，而在去年前三个月增加率为11.5%。多数经济学家估计今年中国的经济增长将减缓至9-10%，但是很多人担心政府对银行贷款限制的新规定会阻止经济增长。

China's economy would probably still expand by around 8-9% even if export growth dried up. During the 2001 American recession China's GDP growth barely slowed. In contrast, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Malaysia suffered full-blown recessions, with growth rates falling by more than ten percentage points from peak to trough. America's slump is likely to be deeper than in 2001 and Asia is now more integrated into the global economy than it used to be. Doomsters conclude, therefore, that these economies could be hit even harder this time.
即使没有出口增长，中国的经济可能仍然会增加8-9%。在2001年美国经济衰退时期，中国GDP增长几乎没有停滞。反之，那时香港，新加坡，台湾及马来西亚则完全进入经济衰退，经济增长率下降超过10%。此次美国经济衰退可能会比2001年要凶猛，而亚洲也更与国际经济相连。持悲观论调的人认为此次亚洲经济受到的影响也会更严重。

The main reasons to be more optimistic are that domestic demand (consumer spending and investment) is likely to remain stronger and that governments have more flexibility to offset America's malaise. Last year, despite a slowdown in America's imports, most Asian economies grew faster as domestic demand sped up everywhere except Thailand. Robert Prior-Wandesforde, an economist at HSBC, says that those who argue that Asia cannot decouple from America are ignoring the fact that they already have. Take Malaysia: its exports to America plunged, yet its GDP growth quickened from 5.7% at the end of 2006 to 6.7% in the third quarter of last year.
乐观派的观点是这些国家的国内需求（消费者消费及投资）仍然强劲，而且政府更加灵活的对付美国衰退。去年尽管美国进口减缓，随着国内需求增加，除泰国外，多数亚洲经济都在加速。汇丰银行的经济学家Robert Prior-Wandesforde讲，那些认为亚洲不能与美国脱钩的人是无视亚洲经济已经拥有的能力。例如马来西亚： 其对美出口大幅下降，然而其GDP增速，从2006年末的5.7%自己到去年第三季度的6.7%。

Contrary to the popular view that Asia's meltdown during the 2001 recession was entirely due to a slump in exports, Peter Redward, at Barclays Capital, argues that a fall in investment played a bigger role. Too much debt and excess capacity weighed down firms, particularly in the electronics industry, which was at the heart of the American recession. Today firms are in much better shape. Capacity utilisation is high across the region; outside China, investment as a share of GDP is historically low; company balance-sheets are stronger and real interest rates are low. Firms are therefore less likely to slash investment than in 2001.
很多认为2001年亚洲经济衰退是完全由于出口大幅下降造成的。但是与这些观点相反，巴克莱资本的Peter Redward认为投资下降那时起了很大作用。大量负债及剩余生产能力使得公司不堪重负，特别是电子行业，而其是美国经济衰退的核心部分。而目前的公司状况要好得多。这个地区的产能利用率很高；在中国之外，投资占GDP的比例处于历史低点；公司帐目平衡表保持良好，实际利率很低。因此，与2001年不同的是，公司不太会削减投资。

Slowing exports will affect domestic spending. But macroeconomic fundamentals are much healthier in East Asia these days. Large foreign-exchange reserves make countries less vulnerable to shocks. Budgets are in surplus or close to balance, providing more scope for fiscal stimulus to support growth.
出口减少会影响国内消费。但是东亚的宏观经济状况现在要健康得多。大量外汇存底使这些国家受到冲击是不会那么脆弱。收支盈余或接近收支平衡，这为采取财政方式保持增长提供了条件。

For all these reasons, even if Asia's exports clearly have not decoupled from America, its economies will be less hurt by a recession there than in the past. Standard Chartered forecasts that emerging Asia will grow by an average of 6.4% in 2008, down from 7.8% in 2007. In 2001 growth dropped by three percentage points, to 4.2%. Financial markets were slow to realise that growth and hence profits in some countries in emerging Asia will be dented by an American downturn. But now they risk exaggerating the potential damage.
综上所述，即使亚洲出口没有完全与美国脱钩，在衰退时。亚洲经济也不会受到象过去那么大的影响。渣打银行估计新兴亚洲在2008年会平均增长6.4%，低于2007年的7.8%。在2001年，增长下降了3%，得到4.2%。金融市场认识这种增长会慢一拍，而从新兴亚洲一些国家的获利会受到美国经济衰退的影响。但是现在，他们在冒夸大潜在危险的风险。

shiyi18

Asian budget finances
Poles apart两极分化

Feb 14th 2008 | HONG KONG
From The Economist print edition
China has plenty more room than India to stimulate growth在刺激增长方面，中国比印度有更大空间


THE Chinese invented the abacus; India invented the binary and the decimal systems. So both nations are deft at playing with numbers. All the more reason to look carefully at their governments' finances (see chart).
中国人发明了算盘；而印度人发明了二进制及十进制算法。这两个国家对玩弄数字游戏都很有研究。这使得我们在看这两个国家的金融数字时更要小心（见图）。

According to official estimates, China's government ran a budget deficit of around 1% last year. But some economists reckon that the cautious government is understating its true fiscal health: it probably had a small surplus. Indeed, Jiming Ha, chief economist at China International Capital Corporation, an investment bank, reckons that if the profits of state-owned firms were also added in, the government could have a surplus of around 3% of GDP. China's public debt has also fallen to only 17% of GDP, well below the average ratio of 77% in OECD economies. Indeed, China has the best fiscal position of any big country, giving the government plenty of room to cushion the economy if demand suddenly falls.
根据官方估计，中国政府去年的财政赤字为(GDP的）1%。但是一些经济学家估计中国政府过于谨慎，低估了自己的财政状况：中国可能会有少量财政盈余。实际上，一家投资银行，中国国际资本公司的首席经济学家哈继铭认为如果将国有公司利润算入的话，中国的财政盈余会达到GDP的3%。中国的社会债务同时降低到GDP的17%，远远低于经合组织平均77%的债务。实际上，在所有大国中，中国的财政状况是最好的，这使得中国政府在需求突然下降时能有更大迂回空间。

By contrast, India, though improving, has one of the worst fiscal positions in the world. The government tries hard to conceal this fact, boasting that it has reduced its deficit to an estimated 3.3% of GDP in the year ending March, from 6.5% in 2001-02. However, in a recent report the IMF argued that the true total deficit is closer to 7% of GDP once you add in the state governments' deficits and various off-budget items (such as bonds that the government issues to oil companies to compensate them for holding down prices). If the losses of state electricity companies are also added in, the total deficit could top an alarming 8% of GDP. India's public debt is also uncomfortably high at about 75% of GDP.
相对中国来讲，虽然印度的财政状况有所改善，但仍然是世界上财政状况最糟的国家之一。印度政府努力掩盖这一事实，夸口说到三月份为止的预算年，将会使其财政赤字降低到GDP的3.3%，而这个数字在2001-2002年则为6.5%。然而，在最近IMF发布的报告中指出，如果将政府财政赤字及各类财政预算外科目（例如由政府发放给石油公司的债券，以补偿其维持低价油）计算在内， 印度的总财政赤字将接近GDP的7%。如果将国有电力公司的损失加入的话，则印度的财政赤字会达到令人震惊的GDP的8%。印度的社会债务也过高，达到GDP的75%。

The IMF has urged the government to tighten fiscal policy. But since India's budget, due to be presented on February 29th, is the last opportunity to boost spending before a general election next year, the government is likely to turn a deaf ear and instead present its more rosy, more misleading numbers.
IMF呼吁印度政府紧缩其财政政策。但是由于将在2月29日提交的财政预算是明年大选前最后一次增加支出的机会，印度政府多数会自行其是，提交更加华美，更加误导的数字。

shiyi18

Commodities

Pumped up物价飞涨
Feb 21st 2008
From The Economist print edition

Why the price of oil and other raw materials continues to rise despite the economic gloom
为什么当经济前景黯淡时，油价及其他原料价格却持续上涨

                                                                                            AFP


BANKERS and policymakers may be wringing their hands about the prospects for the world economy, but commodities traders, it seems, see no cause for concern. On Wednesday February 20th the oil price hit a new record of $101.32 a barrel. Soyabeans and platinum, among others, have also reached record prices in the past week. Vale, a Brazilian mining firm, has persuaded some steelmakers to pay as much as 71% more this year for its iron ore. Across the world the inflationary impact is tangible. In America consumer prices in January were up 4.3% on a year-over-year basis. Excluding food and energy, they were up 2.5%, well above the Federal Reserve’s comfort level.
银行家及政客们搬弄手指，计算世界经济前景，但是大宗货物交易人员却没有这种顾虑。2月20日是星期三，石油价格在这一天创出101.32美元一桶的新高。大豆，钛以及其他这类货物也在过去一周创下新高纪录。巴西的矿产公司Vale要求钢铁厂今年对其铁矿石多付70%的价格。横跨整个世界，处处可见通胀痕迹。在美国，一月份的消费者指数比上一年上升了4.3%。剔除食品及能源影响，消费者指数仍然上升了2.5%，这远远超出了美国联储会能够安心的水平。

Despite a few years of rising raw-materials prices, many traders remain bullish in part because of further bad news about supply. A shortage of electricity in South Africa, which has forced several big smelters to shut down, has helped cause platinum’s giddy ascent. The political upheaval in Kenya has pushed tea prices higher. A leaking pipeline in Nigeria and a row between Exxon Mobil and Hugo Chávez, the president of Venezuela, have contributed to oil’s recent gains.
虽然初级原料价格已经连续上涨了几年，许多交易员仍然看涨，这部分是由于许多供方来的坏消息。南非电力短缺，这使得几个大冶炼厂停工，这造成了白金价格暴涨。肯尼亚政局动荡，导致茶叶价格上涨。尼日利亚石油管路泄漏，委内瑞拉总统查韦斯与埃克森石油对峙，造成石油价格上升。

Mining and oil firms are struggling to increase output, partly because it takes years to develop new mines or oilfields, partly because shortages of equipment and labour are hampering expansion, and partly because governments in resource-rich countries are becoming ever more prone to jacking up royalties or expropriating resources. Citigroup, for example, expects global copper production to rise by just 2% this year, even though the price is now five times higher than it was five years ago and stocks amount to less than three days’ demand.
矿业及石油公司在增加产量方面也步履艰难，部分是由于开发新矿及新油田要经过数年，一部分是由于设备及人员短缺限制了生产扩张，还因为那些富有资源的国家增收资源费，或收回资源。例如，花旗预计尽管铜价比五年前高出5倍，库存不足3天需求，今年国际铜产量仅会增加2%。

In theory, farmers should be quicker to respond to price signals, since they can easily substitute one crop for another. But the prices of wheat, corn and soyabean are all high, so any big shift towards one crop will come at the expense of the others. There is huge potential to bring more land under cultivation in Ukraine and Kazakhstan—but that would need improvements to infrastructure that could take years.
理论上，由于农民能够很快从种植一种作物转向另一种作物，他们对价格信号的反应会很快。但是小麦，玉米及大豆价格通通都创新高，转向一种作物种植的动作会导致其他作物的价格上涨。虽然在乌克兰及哈萨克斯坦有大量土地可以供种植，但是这些土地需要几年时间进行基本设施改进。

Meanwhile, most analysts expect demand for raw materials to remain firm despite the gloomy economic news. Although Goldman Sachs, for one, expects oil consumption to fall in America, it also predicts that continued growth in booming spots such as China and India will underpin global demand. The International Energy Agency, a watchdog group for consuming countries, still expects the world’s consumption of oil to rise 1.9% this year.
现在，多数分析家预计虽然经济前景黯淡，原材料需求仍然会坚挺。尽管高盛估计美国石油消费会下降，其同时估计如中国及印度这些发展热点会继续增长，维持世界石油需求。由石油消费国家组织的监视机构，国际能源机构仍然预计今年的世界石油消费会增加1.9%。

Worse, rising prices and tightening credit give the firms that process raw materials an incentive to run down their stocks, argues Jeffrey Currie of Goldman Sachs, making prices all the more vulnerable to supply shocks. America’s Department of Agriculture believes global demand for wheat will continue to exceed supply this year. That will push America’s wheat stocks to their lowest level since 1948 (see chart).
更糟的是，价格升高及信贷紧缩刺激生产初级原料的公司减少库存，使得价格对供应短缺更加敏感，高盛公司的Jeffrey Currie如是说。美国农业部认为对小麦的国际需求今年会继续超过供给。这会将美国小麦库存降到1948年来的最低点（见图）。



Nonetheless, the prospects for demand must have diminished at least somewhat as the world economy has slowed, and the outlook for supply has not worsened dramatically in the past few months. Hence some other factor must be at play. Many analysts blame speculation. As falling interest rates, tumbling stockmarkets and contracting house prices drive investors out of bonds, equities and property, the argument runs, there is lots of money looking for a new home. And since commodities have produced such lavish returns in recent years, and have weathered the recent turmoil relatively unscathed, they are an alluring option.
尽管这样，随着世界经济疲软，需求期望已经有所下降，而且过去几个月里供给的展望也没有突然变坏。所以，这里肯定是有其他因素影响。许多分析家抱怨是由投机造成的。当利息，股市及房价下降，投资人出手债券，股票及房产方面的投资。这种理论讲有很多钱在找寻投资机会。由于大宗货物近年来的回报很高，且在近来的动荡中毫发无损，这类投资给出很大吸引力。

Citigroup believes that the recent rise in the oil price “is driven principally by a sharp uptick in fund flows.” Lombard Street Research sees an “iron bubble”. Others worry that America’s fiscal stimulus may cause trouble by inflating demand for commodities. In Citigroup’s cheery phrase, “the collapse of one bubble often sows the seeds of the next.”
花旗银行坚信最近的油价上升“是由大量资金进入造成的”。Lombard Street Research预见“钢铁泡沫”。其他人则担心美国的财政刺激会促进大宗货物需求，造成新问题。按照花旗银行的说法“一个泡沫破灭时，常会播出下一次泡沫的种子”。

shiyi18

Metallurgy
Tougher casting更坚硬的铸造品

Feb 26th 2008
From Economist.com
A new production technique could boost the use of aluminium to make lighter cars新生产工艺将促进使用铝材料制造更轻巧的汽车

A SURE way to reduce the fuel consumption of a car is to make it lighter. Some of the smartest models, like the Audi A8 and the Jaguar XJ, are now built largely from aluminium. Although only a third the weight of steel, aluminium components usually have to be made a bit beefier to replace steel ones, which limits the overall weight savings to about half. And working with aluminium can be more expensive. Nevertheless, the weight-savings are still huge, and these would be even more valuable if mass-production techniques could spread the advantages of aluminium to smaller and cheaper cars. Now an Australian team thinks it has found an efficient way to do just that.
将车做得更轻巧是肯定能降低汽车油耗的一种方法。一些最聪明的汽车，例如奥迪A8及美洲豹XJ已经大幅度使用铝材料了。虽然铝材料的重量是钢铁的三分之一，铝零件通常要比其所代替的钢铁零件更加粗壮些，而这又铝零件的重量优势减少了近一半。并且，铝零件的制造更加昂贵。尽管这样，减轻重量省下的费用仍然巨大，如果大规模生产技术能够将铝零件的优势延伸到更小更廉价的汽车上的话，这就更有价值了。目前，一个澳大利亚团组认为他们找到了做到这些的有效方法。

About half of all aluminium castings are made using high-pressure die-casting (HPDC), in which a molten aluminium alloy is injected under pressure into a steel mould, or die. It can produce extremely accurate, complex parts with smooth surfaces that require little or no machining. Compared with other processes, such as pouring molten metal into an open mould, HPDC is fast and cheap. Automated machines can rattle out small parts every 15-20 seconds. Even making an aluminium engine block can take only a few minutes.
大约有一半的铸铝工艺是高压模铸（HPDC)，在这种工艺中，通过压力将液态铝合金注入钢模，或模具。这种工艺制造的产品相当精确，复杂的零件表面很平滑，几乎不需要机器加工。与将液态金属注入开模的工艺等工艺相比，HPDC工艺很快，并且很便宜。自动机床每15-20秒就可以完成一件小零件。即使是制造铝发动机外壳也仅仅花费几分钟时间。

But there is a penalty: aluminium components made with HPDC cannot usually be heat-treated. This is a process widely used in manufacturing to alter the microstructure of a metal, especially to make it harder. It involves heating, rapid cooling and then “age-hardening”, sometimes for days at precise temperatures. Extremely complex schedules are drawn up by metallurgists to achieve exactly the properties they want; for the blades of fine Japanese swords to chunky wheel hubs or critical aircraft components.
但是也存在缺陷：通过HPDC制造的铝部件通常不能进行热处理。而热处理工艺广泛应用于制造中，以改变金属的内部结构，特别是使其更坚硬。这种热加工包括加热，速冷，然后“时效”（有时要有几天保持在确定温度）。特别复杂的工艺流程是由金相学家设计，以准确达到他们的需要；例如日本武士刀，粗壮的轮毂，或飞机关键部件。

Heat-treating HPDC aluminium parts, however, can wreck them. This is because tiny pockets of gas are trapped in the alloy as the parts are made. Heat treatment causes these pockets to expand rapidly, resulting in blistering and distortion. But Roger Lumley and colleagues at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation in Melbourne have found a way of overcoming that.
然而，对HPDC制造的铝零件进行热处理却会损坏零件。这是由于在制造过程中有些小气泡被封在合金中了。热处理会使得这些气泡急速膨胀，造成气泡或扭曲。但是在墨尔本的英联邦科学及工业研究中心的Roger Lumley及其同事已经找到了解决问题的方法。

Their process also involves a precise heat-treatment schedule, but one that works at much lower temperatures and over a shorter time than usual. For instance, whereas a conventional heat-treatment may involve putting something in a furnace at 500°C for eight hours, Dr Lumley’s method operates at around 420-480°C for only 10-15 minutes. It relies on silicon fragments, which are used in aluminium alloys, changing shape and, in effect, pinning down the gas-containing pores to prevent them from expanding. Timing is everything: if the treatment lasts too long, the silicon changes too much and blistering occurs. Although this is not a complete heat treatment, Dr Lumley says the effects still produce benefits, not least a doubling in strength.
他们的工艺也包括在确定温度下处理的过程，但是其温度比常规的要低很多，同时时间也短。例如，常规热处理会将零件放入加热炉保持摄氏500度，持续8小时，Lumley博士的方法是温度在摄氏420-480度，保持10-15分钟。这个过程还依靠用在铝合金中的硅粒改变形状来完成，即找到气泡并阻止其膨胀。时间是绝对因素：如果时间过长，硅的变化会过大，并产生气泡。虽然这是不完全热处理过程，Lumley博士讲仍然产生效果，起码强度增加一倍。

Because the heating is swift, it can be put into a production line. Because it uses less heat, the running costs would be lower. But it still costs money, so why would manufacturers want to invest in heat-treating HPDC aluminium components unless there are other gains? As luck would have it, there are many.
由于稳定加温，这种工艺可以嵌入生产线。由于这工艺使用较少热，运行费用将减少。但是这仍然要花钱，如果没有其他优点，那么为什么制造商要投资在HPDC铝零件热处理上呢？幸运的是，有许多其他优点。

As a rule of thumb, a 10% increase in yield strength (the point at which something starts to break) lowers the minimum weight of a component by 3%. So a 100% increase means that a component could be redesigned to lose about a third of its weight. Besides helping to make cars even lighter, this also means producers can make more components from the same amount of metal, which lowers the cost of the components. Thermal conductivity is also higher, so parts that get hot, like engine blocks, will be able to transfer heat more efficiently. And fatigue levels are higher, which boosts reliability. All these things mean aluminium could replace more steel parts in cars, especially where strength is important, as in suspension components.
理论上，屈服强度（即开始断裂的强度）每增加10%，可以使得零件重量减少3%。所以100%的屈服强度增加意味着零件重量能够减少三分之一。除了可以使得汽车更加轻巧外，这还意味着制造商能够使用同样多的原料制造更多的部件，而这又使得零件的成本减少。热传导效应也同时增加，所以那些会变热的零件，如发动机外壳之类，能够更有效地传热。疲劳强度得以增加，这又增加了可靠性。所有这些意味着铝零件能够在汽车上代替更多钢铁零件，特别是那些强度十分重要的部件，例如汽车悬挂部件。

Aluminium helps a vehicle’s green credentials, too. Whereas plastic composite materials can also provide great strength and lightness, they can be difficult if not impossible to recycle. Aluminium, by comparison, is relatively easy to use again—and more than 95% of the stuff in HPDC production is already recycled. No surprise then that a number of car-parts makers from around the world are looking at just how hot the Australian system could turn out to be.
铝还能增加车辆的环保。虽然塑料复合材料也能提供高强度，轻巧的部件，但塑料复合材料几乎很难回收利用。与塑料相比，铝材料回收利用相对容易---HPDC生产中95%的原料已经是回收利用的了。数家世界范围的汽车零件制造商正在密切注视澳大利亚系统，看这有多热门也就不足为奇了。

shiyi18

Buttonwood
Beyond reason毫无原因

Feb 21st 2008
From The Economist print edition
The strange existence of market anomalies市场超常运动的存在是很奇怪的

STOCKMARKETS are efficient machines, populated by rational investors seeking to make the best returns that they can. As evidence, look at the difficulty the average fund manager faces in trying to beat the market.
But if that is so, how do you explain the dotcom bubble, when companies with no profits and barely any sales had billion-dollar valuations? And what lies behind the continued existence of market anomalies, such as the tendency for smaller companies to outperform?
股市是个由理性的投资人组成的有效机器，在这里，投资人寻求他们所能得到的最大回报。多数基金管理人艰难的挑战市场回报就是证明。但是即使如此，那么怎么解释那些互联网公司没有利润，仅有很少的销售，但是市场价值几十亿美金时所产生的泡沫呢？在市场不规则后面存在的是什么力量，例如使小公司有超出市场回报的倾向呢？

Academics have been discovering these effects for decades. There are seasonal patterns (stocks tend to do well in January and poorly during the summer). There are also valuation discrepancies (growth stocks tend to underperform). Some of these effects may be random. Analyse enough data and a few oddities will show up; plenty of people think some lottery numbers are “lucky” because they occur more often—though it would be odder still if they all turned up the same number of times. Other effects are real, but may be costly to exploit. For small companies, higher returns may be negated by higher costs, reduced liquidity and higher risk (smaller firms are more likely to go bust).
几十年来，学术界一直在寻求这些效应。有季节性效应（例如股市在一月表现较好，在夏季表现不良）。有评估差异（成长型股票有低于市场回报的倾向）。一些效应可能是随机的。如果分析足够的数据，以及一些超常情况，就会发现了；由于一些乐透奖号码常常出现，很多人认为这些乐透奖号码“幸运”---如果这些号码出现的次数是同样的话，就会很怪了。其他的效应是很实际的，但是要分析则很困难。对于小公司来讲，可能是由于费用高，欠缺流动性及高风险（一些小公司很可能会破产），则那些较高回报可能会被抵消。

The underperformance of growth stocks is linked to an overenthusiasm for extrapolation. A company increases its profits at 20% a year for five years and investors are tempted to believe it can do so for 15; historically, however, such paragons are about as rare as vegetarian cats. In contrast, the prices of “value” stocks (which have a poorer record but lower ratings) perform better than expected.
成长型股票低于市场的回报被认为是与计算过度有关。如果一家公司有5年利润增长20%，投资人会认定这家公司能够在今后15年内持续增长；但是从历史的角度看，这种情况发生的概率就如同出素的猫一样稀少。反之，“价值投资”（通常回报不好，但是评估很低）股票的价格比预计的回报要好。

The latest quirk to be examined is momentum, or the tendency for stocks that did well in the past to do well in the future. Three academics at the London Business School devised portfolios consisting of stocks that had outperformed over a 12-month period. They waited a month to buy them and then rebalanced the portfolio after a further month. In the British market, the “winners” under this methodology outdid the worst performers by more than ten percentage points a year over the past 108 years.
最后要研究的怪现象是惯性，即过去回报很好的股票在将来也会给出很好回报。伦敦商业学院的三个学者实际了一个投资组合，其中包括了那些在12个月里回报超出的股票。他们等了一个月再买入，然后在一个月后重新组合。在过去108年里，在英国股市中，这种方式下的“胜者”比那些最差的股票要给出超过10%的回报。

Some of this excess return will have been eaten up by higher costs; trading costs were substantial until the last 20 years. The momentum effect has also suffered some sharp switchbacks (including an 80% decline in 1975) that may have wiped out those traders who tried to follow it. That could be about to happen now, given that the strategy would leave investors heavily exposed to mining stocks. Momentum wannabes should also be warned that the effect works for individual stocks over months, not years.
这些高出的回报中的某些部分会被过高的费用抵消；在20几年前，交易费用是相当高的。惯性效应在股市快速下跌时（包括1975年80%的跌幅）也受到伤害，那些试图跟随惯性的投资人可能已经出局。现在这种情况也可能很快就发生，这种投资方式可能让投资人过度投资于矿产股。那些跟随惯性投资的人应该注意，这种惯性效应对于个股来讲仅持续几个月，而不是几年。

Nevertheless, it is still a puzzle why such a glaring anomaly has not been arbitraged away. Academics have just about abandoned the idea that all investors are rational; there are too many examples of psychological quirks (such as an aversion to recognising losses) for that to be the case. Nor can a bunch of “super-smart” investors necessarily keep prices in line; they may face constraints on their ability to trade or simply run out of money before the anomalies can be corrected.
不过，人们仍然疑惑为什么人人可辨的市场超常没有被套利呢。学者们都快抛弃投资人是理性的那种观点；有太多心理异常的例子（例如不愿接受损失）可以参照。一群“超级聪敏”的投资人也不一定能够使股价象预期那样；在市场超常出现前，他们可能会受到某些限制，阻止他们交易，或是资金用尽。

Perhaps the most compelling reason why market prices are tough to beat is the “wisdom of crowds” phenomenon. If people are asked to estimate the number of jellybeans in a jar, their average estimate is usually quite close to the truth; indeed the average guess is far better than the vast majority of individual guesses. In other words, as Michael Mauboussin of the fund-management group Legg Mason remarks, the collective is smarter than the average person within the collective.
也许，在为什么很难超出市场价格上，最有影响力的理论是“群体智慧”现象。如果让人们估计一个瓶子里的糖豆，他们所估计的平均数很接近实际数量；实际上，猜测的平均数是比多数的个体猜测要好得多。换句话说，正如基金管理集团Legg Mason的麦克毛博信所说，集体智慧是比整体中平均智力的个人要聪明。

But this wisdom depends on the diversity of the people making the guesses. Mr Mauboussin argues that problems occur when diversity breaks down and “groupthink” starts to take over. Investors no longer guess how many jellybeans are in the jar, but what other people's guesses might turn out to be.
但是，这类智慧是依赖于进行猜测的人的分布。毛博信先生认为当分布受到破坏，而“群体思考”开始进行时，就会发生问题。投资人这时不再考虑在瓶子中有多少糖豆，而是考虑其他人如何猜测。

There's an old test that neatly makes this point. Participants have to choose a number between zero and 100 that will be two-thirds of the average choice of the others taking part. So if you thought the average would be 50, you would go for 33. However, if everyone makes this logical leap, the best guess should be 22 (two-thirds of 33). Extend this process a few times and you can work out that the best choice would be zero. In real life, however, not everyone is so rational and the correct answer is never that low.
有一个老式检验已经给出了这种结论。参与者在0-100的数字中找出一个数，使这个数是三分之二的参与者所选择的平均数。即如果你认为这个平均数为50，你就猜33.然而。当每个人都以这样的逻辑进行猜测时，最好的猜测就会变成22（33的三分之二）。当你多重复几次这种测验，你所得到的最好结果会变成0。然而，在实际生活中，并不是每个人都那么有理性，而所得的的结果也永远不会那么低。

In short, it is very hard to quantify the precise irrationality of investors. That is why investors get lured into buying dotcom stocks in the hope that a “greater fool” will purchase them at a higher price. And that is why there will always be market anomalies for academics to discover.
长话短说，结论是很难用数量来精确计算投资人的非理性。这就是为什么投资人受到诱惑，买入互联网股票，并希望“更傻的人”能够在更高价买入。这就是为什么总是存在市场的不规则，并由学者来发现。

shiyi18

China’s stockmarket
Crash course股市连续下降
Feb 27th 2008 | HONG KONG
From Economist.com
China's stockmarkets have been sliding for months中国股市已经下跌了几个月

AFP
CHINESE investors had a rare opportunity for good cheer on Wednesday February 27th. The country’s two stock exchanges shrugged off Monday’s blues, when both indices dropped by about 4%, and gained a bit instead. Unfortunately Monday is far more typical of trading conditions in recent months in the country’s two markets, in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Despite the power of China’s interventionist government, the importance of maintaining appearances for the Olympics and the country’s relatively strong economic growth, China’s stockmarkets have been suffering from a protracted slide.
2月27日，星期三，中国股民总算看到了股市上涨。中国的两个股市一反周一4%的大幅下跌，转而上升了。不幸的是，周一的下跌已经是见怪不怪了。近几个月来在上海及深圳两个股市中总是在下跌。尽管中国政府为维护奥林匹克的形象，以及中国相对坚挺的经济增长趋势大力进行干预，中国的股市还是在连续下跌中连续受创。

Shanghai is already down by more than a third since October last year. A fall of this severity, had it happened elsewhere, would have already prompted the word “crash” to circulate. But the collapse has sent out few tremors and little nervous talk. There are several reasons why this is so. Foremost, foreign participation in the Chinese market has been strictly curtailed. As a result global losses are limited and so news of the financial destruction that has accompanied the massive share-price losses has failed to stir interest beyond the country’s borders.
从去年10月以来，上海股市的下跌已经超过30%。如果这么严重的下跌发生在其他地方，则会让人们谈论到“崩盘”。但是这种崩盘并没有使人胆战心惊，讲出担心的话来。这种情况是有其原因的。首先，在中国市场中，外国人参与是严重受到限制的。其结果是国际范围的损失是极为有限的，而由这股价大幅下跌而来的金融破坏新闻也没有引发从外国来的注意力。

Exactly a year ago a 9% tumble of Shanghai’s stockmarket sent a shockwave around the world that knocked a couple of percentage points off the Dow Jones Industrial Average in a matter of seconds. Now, perhaps, with damage spreading through the global credit markets, there is a sense that there are bigger things to worry about.
整整一年前，上海股市一天下跌9%引发了世界范围的股市震荡，使得美国道琼斯工业平均指数在几秒钟内下跌了数百点。可是现在，当世界信贷市场已经遭受重创时，人们有更多的担忧。

There are also reasons to believe that the losses—in excess of $1 trillion—are not as devastating as they first appear. Much of the capitalisation of the Chinese markets is tied up in shares held by the government, so whatever the extent of the losses, less than half has been borne by private investors. China has a huge number of brokerage accounts—upwards of 115m and 70,000 new ones are established every day—but many are inactive. And unlike in many Western countries, the stockmarket appears to play a relatively small role in providing capital for companies, with bank loans and retained earnings statistically far more important.
另一个原因是，虽然股市损失超过1万亿美金，但是并不是那么使人心灰意冷。中国股市中的多数资本是由政府所拥有的，尽管下跌幅度很大，仅有不到一半的损失是私人投资者的损失。中国有大量散户投资人，有大约1.15亿个人投资帐户，并且每天增加7万新开户，但是其中很多是不活跃帐户。与多数西方国家不同的是，在为公司提供资金方面，股市扮演了相对小的角色，而银行贷款及收益积累更为重要。

But even with these caveats the losses are still wrenching. Estimates of active brokerage accounts range from 10m-15m and an equal number of people have invested in mutual funds. Bank financing and the reinvestment of profits do play a huge role in Chinese corporate finance, but equity markets became extraordinarily important last year.
Through initial and secondary offerings, Chinese companies raised in excess of $78 billion domestically and more money came in through linked overseas placements. The inflow of new equity allowed companies to increase their capacity to borrow and raised the capability of banks to lend. A receptive public market led to the creation of a vibrant “pre-flotation” private market and improved the ability of private equity to raise funds, each of which supplied billions of dollars of additional capital. All of this is now at risk.
虽然有这类解释，这股市损失仍然使人心痛。据估计，活跃帐户大约有1000万到1500万户，并且有大约等量的人投资于基金。虽然银行贷款及将利润再投资在中国公司的融资中扮演了重要角色，中国公司仍然在中国股市中筹集到780亿美金，并从海外市场筹集了更多的资金。这些流入的资金使得中国股市得以增加自身的贷款能力，并使得银行能够向他们发放贷款。一个能够容纳的公开市场导致了一种有生气的“流通前”私有市场，并且改善了私有资产筹资的能力，而这些都为公司提供了成千上万的资金。所有这些目前都处于危险中。

The change in circumstances has not escaped the notice of China’s interventionist government. Two big companies recently announced large secondary offerings: Ping An Insurance and Pudong Development Bank. The share prices of both have been slammed, possibly because of the expectation of dilution, but possibly because there is no appetite for new shares. In response to the falling market, the China Securities Regulatory Commission warned companies against secondary offerings. Ping An is widely expected to reconsider its huge offering. In a further move to bolster prices, the government is rumoured to be on the verge of reducing a stamp tax on transactions.
在这种情况下，不能不引起中国干预型政府的注意。最近，有两家公司，平安保险及浦东发展银行宣布增发新股。这两家公司的股价受到重创，可能是股东担心发行新股引起股权淡化，但是也可能是由于人们对新股没有兴趣了。面对下跌的股市，中国证监会劝告公司不要增发新股。人们预期平安保险会再度考虑其增发新股的问题。为了进一步稳定股价，有流言说政府会削减交易印花税。

There is, however, only so much that government intervention can achieve. Current valuations, even after the recent sell-off, are still sky high. In the past year, many companies earned substantial profits from gains on stockmarket investments. A repetition is unlikely. More realistically, given the market’s decline, profits will suffer, depressing results and pulling share prices further down in a vicious circle. If that process truly kicks off, no one will argue about whether China’s stockmarkets are crashing or not.
然而，政府的干预并不能达到什么效果。虽然最近股市下跌了，但是目前的价值仍然过高。在过去一年，许多公司都从股市投资中赚了大量利润。但是目前这种情况不能再现。更实际些，随着股市下跌，利润会受到影响，报表不再那么引人注目，并引起股价进一步下跌，进入恶性循环。如果这种情况真发生的话，没有人会讨论（目前）中国的股市是否崩盘与否。