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[2008.04.19]Derivatives: Taming the beast
Derivatives 金融衍生品
Taming the beast 降龙术
Apr 17th 2008
From The Economist print edition
It is time to simplify derivatives trading—but not to stunt it
简化衍生品交易正当其时,直接取消则毫无必要

BANKERS, erstwhile masters of the financial universe, are not used to being spoken down to. But just days after the industry resolved, in the words of Deutsche Bank's Josef Ackermann, to “clear our house first and not leave it to the regulators to do it for us”, the Group of Seven finance ministers made it clear that they took such resolutions with a pinch of salt—and vowed to oversee the spring-cleaning themselves.
作为金融业的昔日王者,银行家不习惯被人指手画脚。金融业的危机刚刚过去,德意志银行(Deutsche Bank)的约瑟夫·阿克曼(Josef Ackermann)就说:“自己的房子自己打扫,不用管理层替我们操心。”不过七国集团(Group of Seven,G7)的财政部长们明确表示,他们不完全信任金融业的自治方案,准备亲自出马进行监督。
Reports from the IMF, the Financial Stability Forum, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and other august bodies have drawn attention in the past week to the appalling risk-management by many banks before the credit crisis. That is almost bound to mean tighter capital standards and tougher supervision. Quite right, given that the authorities have gone to extraordinary lengths to bail the banks out. More problematic, though, is the G7's focus on the market for financial derivatives traded off-exchange. These are the volatile instruments that, had Bear Stearns collapsed, could have brought down the financial system with it. Given their fissile nature, it is no wonder regulators are keen to simplify and standardise them. They would be wise, however, to tread carefully.
上周,国际货币基金组织(IMF)、金融稳定性论坛(the Financial Stability Forum,译按,为G7于1999 年 4 月成立的组织,评估影响全球金融稳定的问题,以及研究及监察为解决这些问题而需要采取的行动)、巴塞尔银行监管委员会(the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision)及其他权威机构纷纷发布报告,对许多银行在信贷危机前糟糕的风险管理给予关注,意味着更严格的资本充足标准和更严厉的监管措施基本已是板上钉钉。这很正常,因为管理层为挽救银行可谓呕心沥血。但G7把焦点放在场外交易的金融衍生品市场,这可能有点问题。金融衍生品属于高波动性金融工具,乃是贝斯登(Bear Stearns)倒台的罪魁祸首,还险些累及整个金融系统。从这个角度看,管理层欲将其简化和标准化也不无道理。不过,明智的做法是步步为营。
Swap meet 互换市场
It is not hard to picture derivatives as a central battleground between banks and their regulators. For bankers, the ability to create specialised products for their clients, sold over-the-counter (OTC) like a tailored suit, is not only a fabulous source of fees. It is also a product of what some of them like to call their “intellectual capital”—which is far cheaper than the stuff on their balance sheets, especially now (see article). Clients seem to agree. Despite the crisis, the notional value of credit-default swaps, bedrock of a market for insuring against the risk of default, almost doubled last year, to $62 trillion.
不难想象衍生品会成为银行和管理层之争的中心。对银行家来说,能够为其客户创造专门的产品,像定做服装那样进行柜台交易,获得的好处不仅仅是可观的费用。衍生品是某些银行家所谓的“智力资本”的产物,成本比资产负债表上的那些项目要低得多,在目前的环境下尤其如此。银行客户似乎也赞成这一观点。在信贷危机的冲击之下,信用违约互换(credit-default swaps)作为违约风险保险市场的基石,其名义价值在去年仍几近翻番,达62万亿美元之巨。
After previous derivatives blow-ups in the 1990s, banks fought hard to stop the business being herded onto lower-margin exchanges. This time the authorities may not be so sanguine. The swaps are mostly bespoke, traded between two parties (who often offset the risk by trading with third parties, and so on) and would have been subject to huge counterparty risk if, say, a big dealer like Bear Stearns had collapsed. They may sound sophisticated, but their settlement can be anything but (many contracts are still buzzed by fax from a buyer to a seller for signing). Three years ago, financial supervisors in America and Europe obliged big banks to start clearing a huge backlog in unconfirmed swaps contracts, fearing a legal quagmire if a lot of them needed to be exercised at once.
在1990年代,衍生品数次发生了泛滥然后崩盘的情况,因此现在银行正使尽浑身解数阻止衍生品成为蝇头小利的交易所交易品种,但这回管理层已非易与之辈。绝大多数互换产品是量身定做的,在买卖双方之间交易(交易者通常会通过同时与第三方展开交易来规避风险)。因此,每当某个大型交易商如贝斯登发生倒闭,就会产生巨大的对手方风险。互换产品看似非常成熟,其实成交方式漏洞百出(许多合约仍由买方通过传真传递给卖方签发)。三年前,美国和欧洲的监管者强制大银行清理了大量的未确认互换合约,就是因为担心突然需要大量履约会产生法律困境。
The radical solution is to take the unwanted complexity out of derivatives by forcing them onto exchanges. In an ideal world, that would make for more standardised products that enjoy more liquidity, easier valuations, less risk of legal challenge and more transparency. If you trade swaps like futures, the risk of any trading partner collapsing becomes far less acute; the exchange is the counterparty, and it has the job of monitoring the creditworthiness of the buyers and the sellers.
要彻底解决问题,就必须把不必要的复杂性从衍生品中剔除,方法是强制其进入交易所。在理想的情况下,这可以使产品标准化,从而易于流动和估值、减少法律风险、并增进透明度。如果互换产品可以和期货那样交易,那么因交易伙伴倒闭引致的风险就会降低很多:交易所即为对手方,将担起监控买卖双方信用水平之责。
So far, so simple. But the world of credit is not ideal—especially now. To be useful hedges, swaps need to have a degree of specialisation. Fixed-income contracts can often be more than $1m in size, which means they are not easy to trade widely. There is no guarantee that an exchange-traded contract would be a liquid one. Far better, then, to let the exchanges themselves muscle in on the OTC market when they see an opportunity, grabbing contracts when they can offer greater liquidity, transparency and trust than private parties.
道理就这么简单。但信用市场并非理想状况,尤其是现在。互换产品必须有一定程度的专门化才能成为有用的对冲工具。固定收益合约规模常常超过100万美元,因此难以进行大范围交易。交易所交易合约也未必一定具有很好的流动性。目前的上计是让交易所自主决策,自寻良机,以相对私人交易者的高流动性、高透明度和高信誉与场外交易市场争夺互换市场。
Instead of squashing the market, regulators should continue to encourage efforts to standardise the central clearing of contracts—the messy hinterland where so many of the counterparty problems fester. More automation and standardisation of documents would help minimise potential disputes. It would speed up the process between execution and settlement. And if there is foot-dragging by the banks, the authorities could spur things along by requiring them to post more capital against contracts where there is a risk that a counterparty will go bust. Armed with their brooms and pinnies, the regulators clearly can help to tidy up the OTC market. There is no need to sweep it out of existence.
管理层不应该打压市场,而应该继续支持合约中央结算(central clearing)的标准化——这个一团乱麻的灰色地带正是对手方问题不断恶化的根源。自动化和合约文档标准化有助于减少潜在纠纷,也有利于加快合约执行和结算速度。如果银行在这方面敷衍塞责,管理层可以通过要求其为存在对手方倒台风险的合约提供更高的资本准备来逼其就范。管理层手握拖把和抹布,完全可以将场外交易市场收拾干净,根本没有必要将它扫地出门了事。
《经济学人》(The Economist(http://www.economist.com))
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